[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-10995 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 6, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
ACTING CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00473-CV-OC-10-GRJ
JOHN W. MANN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WALTER A. MCNEIL, SECRETARY,
Secretary, FL Dept. of Corrections,
JIMMIE O. ATMORE,
GREG WILLIAMS,
FNU MARSH,
Sargeant,
FNU MALLORY,
Sargeant, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 6, 2010)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John W. Mann, a pro se prisoner, appeals the sua sponte dismissal of his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for
cruel and unusual punishment, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). On appeal, Mann contends that: (1) the district court
erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim after it determined that
Mann was not entitled to damages for mental anguish and suffering because he
failed to allege sufficient physical injury; and (2) he is entitled to declaratory relief
in the form of a prison transfer. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review de novo an appeal from a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) sua
sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
taking all factual allegations as true. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1319-20
(11th Cir. 2008). The same standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
also govern § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. Id. at 1320. “Pro se pleadings are held
to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore,
be liberally construed.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).
“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while
in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). “In
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order to avoid dismissal under § 1997e(e), a prisoner’s claims for emotional or
mental injury must be accompanied by allegations of physical injuries that are
greater than de minimis.” Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294
F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2002). We have previously held that a forced “dry
shave” only amounted to a de minimis injury. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279,
1286-87 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated, 197 F.3d 1059, reinstated in relevant part, 216
F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253,
1258 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (bruises received during an arrest were non-actionable de
minimis injury). Even though § 1997e(e) bars damages for mental or emotional
injury, it does not affect the availability of declaratory or injunctive relief. See
Harris, 190 F.3d at 1288.
Here, under our case law, the injuries that Mann complains of -- including
the vague injuries to his back, the scrapes and marks on his knees and legs, the lack
of personal items, the lapse of time in reordering medication, the window-cleaning
assignment, and the discontinuance of his pass for showers twice a day -- amount
to de minimis physical injuries. See Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1258 n.4.1 Section
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Mann’s alleged eye infection and his injuries stemming from his tooth extraction were
not alleged in his complaint and therefore have been abandoned. See Skinner v. City of Miami,
62 F.3d 344, 348 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[A]s a general rule, an appellate court will not consider a
legal issue or theory raised for the first time on appeal.”).
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1997e(e), therefore, bars Mann’s claim for damages as a result of mental anguish
and suffering. See Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1312-13.
Moreover, Mann contends that all of the alleged abuse by prison officials
stemmed from one initial complaint at his former prison, for which he already
received a prison transfer. Thus, Mann’s current request for declaratory relief in
the form of a prison transfer is moot. See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1267
(11th Cir. 2007) (“The general rule in our circuit is that a transfer or a release of a
prisoner from prison will moot that prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mann’s
complaint.2
AFFIRMED.
2
In addition, Mann’s motion to submit supplemental records is DENIED as moot.
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