Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS m UO in T6061 1 Ststuter, bonding require y inOlUth the hauling Of t&6 RQt orohnrdto the peokfnu shed. Th6 rokinglthe fruit, lo.osd6the l6s16 er in6txY6tion6f%Oa the d6616r. The dutlea of the fira then o6eso. It cl068not billm i'mIt lt6 des~tnatton,but thl6 put of the transaotion is perform66 by the d6dLer. Ths fina does not buy or otfu to m, ~611 or offer to ssll, or ship for the purpose of sell- ing either 6s owner, agent or otharwl.68, 6ny oitrua fruit.* Hon. Tom 1. Hartley, page 2 It la 616matary that *the intention oi the. L6glslatur6 in enaotiag a law lr the law itself*, Wo 66S6llO6 of tho law", and 'th6 spirit uhioh gives life" to ths claaotnmat. SO TZI. JUR. 186; POPHAM V. PATTW~SO.X,51 R.W. (Sd) 680; HESS V. SKINNXR R4~INXXRIQCC. t. TIJRNEX,20s 3.18.599, 207 S.W. 171, S16 Y.W. 681; KOY f. SCRNEIDER,SSl S.W. MO. Where the language OS a statute alearly aad dl8- tinetly reveal6 the legIalRtlt6 intent, there Is no rea- son to look elscnrheze. GAWLETT v. COLWI3XWW'Z3* COUJXT(Cir. App.) 250 S.W. 1010, 236 S.W. 970, 222 S.W. 2948 RAILROAD OObXI~jSIGNV. TFXAS & N.O.R2XtaOm CC., (Cit. App.) 42 S.W. (2d) 1091. When the Legislaturedefines a word or group of worU6, whioh It has th6 power to do aad often dO68, the d6fInItion, If olear and uaambIguou8, Is bindlug as aa 6xpresalonof the 16glrlstlreInteat,:-regardlesr of the maaIag of the word In oomn parlanoe 02 in other ooa- aeotlozm. 59 TEL JUR. 200. The guestion besore us Involves the aaal~ais of the d6fiaitiomof the L6gIslature In Seotion 1 of Art. lleb, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, and their ap- plloatIon to the stated set of raots. At tho outset we advance the opinion that thtie deflnltlocsme clew and iaambiguoua. saotlon 1 (1) defines a *p66ker* 6s followsa "Any person ho prepares and/or psoks oitrus f'rultor its products for barter, sale, exchange or shipment.* The fir= whose aatirities are detlned, belag within the purview of the deflaltlon of *psrsons" given in S6otIun 1 (0) Is beyond qusstlon or doubt a lpadkslf. It prepsrea and pxickacitrus fruit Sor aMpeat and gale. Bon. TomL.Hartley, page S The qu6stIon re6olves itself into whether or not a *paoker*,as deilned In Seotlon 1 (I) IS aeom- sarlly a statutory *dealer* wIthin the Aotcs d6flaitlon of *dealer*. A w4ealerW,aoaoralng to seotIon 1 (0). la: *Any person who hand168 fruit, es the word *handle*la 4efln64 ln (4) of thl6 seotioa * + + a We =6 nowthmwa b&ok U~O- the 6tQtUtOm deil- altlon of the word mhan4lea. To be a *dealer*', a 'VmkeP must *han41aa fruit la the uenso that the Leg- islature used the word *handlow,regardles8 of the mean- ing of the word in oolllpon parlanoe Or in other ooaaeo- tions. UPPSTEIN v. STATE, 145 S.W. 144~ BAMCS v. STATE, 28 'Pet.6U. The Citrus Lloea8Ing and B6ndl.q Law IndUputably fixer its oua meaning t0 the WOT&# ~64. Seotlon 1 (a) defines the'word *handlaw, a8 fol- lows: Wean8 bwlng or offering to buy, aelllng or offering to Bell, or shipping for the purpose of #ellIng, whether as owner, agent or othexwla6, any oltrurrfruit within the State OS Texas, an4 ptmnons buying and/or ahlpplng oltrw fruit tar oannlng and/or prooesslng or handler?, as th6 term Is defined." (Uaderreo~lngoura'j w6 think It should be *are"). We now oonsid6r th6 queetion of whether or not the partloular *paoker" under onaslderatlonWhandlom" inuit witf;in,theetatutory meaning of the word wh6zid16W. There Is neoeseltateda strlot applloatlonof the 46fl- nltlon to the faota presenteb and realted at the outset or this opinion. It 16 erpreaaly stated that the paok- er does not buy or offer to buy the fruit from his OUS- tamer; he doea not sell or offer to sell the fruit; h6 does cct ship the fruit himelf for the purpose of selling VLcther ad owner, agent or otherwise",although he "loads the saae into o-p8 under iua~a-cotionsirap 435 Eon. Tom L. E:rtley, page 4 the a0aw. Suoh loading la not tan-u& to ahlp- PW. The pao%ln~ fir& la the present lnstanoe,does not evea bill the frxxltto It8 destination. Finally, the paokar In not within the ocverage of the phrase npersoru'buylngand/or shipping oItru8 fruit for oan- nlog em&/or prooessing*. A oareful examinationof the entire ditru8 Li- oen8lng and Bonding Aot, Artlole 118b, reveal8 the use of the word *packer* in only two other Instanoea,for example In Seotlon 15, a.8r0ii0rr: *It shall be unlanful for any dealer, prooesscr or wW6hOuSWXiI to purohase or reo6 =%= ve or handlo any oltrw fruit wlthout requiring the per8oa rrc~nwhom suoh eltrua fruit Is puroha8e4 or reoelved, to furnish a statement In writing 0s (a) the owner 0s said oltrur fruit, (b) th6 grower 0s 88ia Oltru8 fruit, togetherwlth the approximatelocation of the orohard where uid fruit wattgrowa, (0) the date said fruit wa8 gathered and by whose authority aan wea gather- ed, sad suoh reoords ahallbe kept la a permanent book or folder MU shall be available to inep66- iFajby w Interestedparty.* (Und6reooriB6 . Here the juxtapositionor the word8 ?a6y~t~a *paokeP amounts to a logI8latlve a8bOde *paok&@ need not in every instan bo a *dea 7 Or*. The sac reasoning -ala apply tc Seotion i30, whloh provldes~ *The venue or any Md all orlmlnal aoto and oivii spits instituted uri(Im the prooieiona 0s this act shall be in the aounty where the viola- tion oocurred or where the oltru8 fruits wef6 reoeived by the dealez, paoker or warehcmseman.~ (Underiumringours). under Seotlon I!dealing with *lloense fee aooom- panylag applloatIona,the f6liaring fees are prresorlbadr "(1) For lloenae as a *dealer* 01 *hmbler* 423; Hon. Tom L. Hartley, ~Ri3-e 5 of oltrua fruit. the sum or menty-rive ml- lwa ($25). (8) For license as a *oonunlselon merohant' and/or loontraotdealer*, as the term Is In thir Aot detlned, Twenty-rive Dollarr (*es). (3) For license aa a %lnImum oash dealer' the 8um Of Fire Dollarr ($5). (4) For a license as a *buying agent', the 8um oi One Dollars ($1). (5) For a llcenao as Q *transportlogagent', the ewn or One Dollars ($l)." It Is to be noted thetno fee Ie prerorlbedfor a paoker acting In suoh oapaolty alone. Only where the “psoker”, aa delined In Seotlon 1 (I) IIIa atatut gdealeraor ghandler*,a aoommIsslonmerohant* and "7or eoontraot deUeP, a "lain- sarh dealer*, a %aying agent*, or a *transportingagent*, does he hare to pro- oure a llcerraoand pan a fee therefor under the Texa8 LIoenaIng and Bonding Aot. Analyzing the Aot ae a wholo, it is apparant that the intontlon or the Leglelature In Ita lnaotment was to exsrolse oontrol over upewsonea engaged In the buying, selling, shippin for selling, and wing and/or shipping ror oannlng aa 7or prrooeszdng0r oltru8 rrdt. It le our opinion that a *paoker* ae defined In Section 1 (I) ot Artiole llSb, Vernon's Annotated Cltll 3tatutes, i.e., the Texas CItrue Llceneing and Bonding Act, is not automaticallya ndealer* as delined In 3eo- tion 1 (e) and (b) of the Aot and subject to the require- wnt or a dealer's lioense aa set out in 3eotIomS and 4, or a ~oommIssi.onmerchant* and/or "doalare or a *eon- traot dealer" as defined In Seotion 1 (1) of the Aot and subjeot to the requirements ot lloenae and bond under Sections 8 and 3eotlon 4 (b). It 1s our rurther opinion that a firm engage4 solely &B&b3i&g~~ i&&%@% B~~~t~"l~uuf~rr~~~a~~~r- chard io the packing shed or not, and also loading the Hon. Tom L. Hartley, page (I ma, after pFokiaq It, into railroad box-oemi or truoks under iastruotloaofrom the pereoa or persona for whom the paoklng wes done, Is neither a ude81erR or a 'oom- mirrrlonmerohentn and/or *dealer* or a "ooatract dealer" within the ststutoryaerIaItlone of the term as used la the Texas Citrus Llcenelng and Boadlng Act, I.e., Artiole 11&b, Vernon's Annotated Civil Sttitutes,sad In not subjeot to the recvireaeataof license and surety bond imposed by Section 2 and Scotion 4 (b). It ia our opinion that euch a packer h8 .uehare under oon8ideratloamay lawfully be required to obtain a *traaeportlagagent" llceaee under Geotioa 4 (a) of the Aot where the packer either haul8 the fruit from the orchard to the shed or load8 the ssme into oar8 uader lnstruotlonsrros the person or persons for who,?1the packing Is being done. We have oonsldered the Aot and it8 provfaions and deiialtionsthoroughly because the ooaoluelonrwe have reached are la confliot with portion8 of aa opinion rendered to the Hon. J.E. AlcDonald,CosunissIoaerof Agri- oulture, oa September 10, 1937, by Hon. D& Wllll~Ord, h.xlsteat Attorney General, the pert&mat; provlsloaa which are 8s rollowsr "QuestioaNo. 2 reed8 as hollows: w*Referrlagyou to subseotloa (I) udder Seo- tlon 1 0r ssfd bat and thst portion 0r Section 13 rercrrlag to citrus rruit peoker, 1s the packer, whether a CooperatlreRcrketlag Aseoola- tlon, CorRoratlon,or Oustom paoker, required to ffiekeappLlchtloa,pay license fee, and mke bond, and cone under the general provlaiona Or the law?' "To this question I answer 'yes', f'orthe reason that the term *Paoker*mesas and lnoludee any person who prepare8 and/or paaks citrus!fruit for bnrtcr, sale, exohaage, or shipment. Clearly, the lciwcontemplate8that the packer la a deal- er, within the purview and lntendment Or said Act." Lusofsr ~$8the tlbovereferred to opinion holds 438, HOL. Tom I..fIartley,pge 7 that a *dustonPacker* is automaticallya Wdealerlr*un- der the Act regardlessof the nature of r;iswork an6 Is recclmd to make apylloatloa,pay lioease ree, an4 make bona, under the ~:rovlsloasof the Texas Citrus Licenslcg and Bonding Law, it Is overruledby this opln- lot w?:lohshall oontrol as to the relationshipof *paokeP and wdealer*~.,ynder the Aot. Trusting that the above fully answers your ia- qulw, we are YOWS W=ytNlJ ATITR~EY CLXFXAL OF TZ49 BY iX3:ob A~sistaat VErOCT 25, 1939 ATTORNEY GZiiXRAL Or'TEXAS