MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Feb 22 2017, 6:02 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David L. Joley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Asia Marshall, February 22, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1607-CR-1700
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John Surbeck,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable David Zent,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1501-CM-132
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a jury trial, Asia Marshall was convicted of domestic battery, a Class
A misdemeanor, and disorderly conduct by fighting or tumultuous conduct, a
Class B misdemeanor. Marshall appeals her convictions, raising two issues for
our review: 1) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her
conviction of domestic battery, and 2) whether her two convictions constitute
double jeopardy. Concluding sufficient evidence supports Marshall’s
conviction of domestic battery but the disorderly conduct conviction must be
vacated due to a double jeopardy violation, we affirm in part and reverse and
remand in part.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On December 9, 2014, Marshall and her live-in boyfriend of several years,
Antonio Chacon, had an argument at their home that resulted in Chacon
calling 911. Chacon reported to the 911 operator that Marshall hit him in the
face with a remote control and his face was cut and bleeding. Two Fort Wayne
police officers responded to the home within approximately ten minutes of the
911 call and encountered Chacon, who was bleeding from a cut above his right
eye and announced he wanted Marshall to be arrested. Officer Robert Abels
spoke with Chacon, who related that he and Marshall had been arguing and she
“stabbed him in one of his eyes with the remote control[.]” Transcript, Volume
I at 77. Officer Abels also spoke with Marshall, who admitted she threw a
remote at Chacon, but said Chacon’s eye was injured when he fell down the
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stairs. When the officers placed Marshall under arrest, however, Chacon
objected and indicated he did not want her to be arrested and did not wish to
cooperate further.
[3] The State charged Marshall with domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and
disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor.1 At Marshall’s jury trial, the State
called Chacon as a witness and played the audio of the 911 call for the jury
without objection from Marshall. Chacon acknowledged it was his voice on the
tape, but testified, “I don’t remember a lot that happened” on December 9,
2014. Tr., Vol. I at 62. “It’s vague. Very vague. I remember just trying to just
sleep off my hangover, and you know, [Marshall] was trying to kick me out,
and next thing I know I’m trying to get out [of] the bed. I fall and I wake up
and I’m bleeding everywhere.” Id. at 64. He explained telling 911 that
Marshall hit him with a remote by stating, “when I hit my head, I thought
maybe she had did [sic] it but I hit my head on the ground.” Id. at 68. On
cross-examination by Marshall’s counsel, Chacon categorically stated that
Marshall did not touch him the morning of December 9, 2014. The two officers
testified without objection Chacon told them at the scene Marshall threw a
remote at him causing his injuries.
1
The State originally filed the disorderly conduct charge pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-45-1-3(a)(2) for
making unreasonable noise after being asked to stop. The charge was later amended to disorderly conduct
pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-45-1-3(a)(1) for engaging in fighting or tumultuous conduct.
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[4] The jury found Marshall guilty as charged and the trial court entered judgment
of conviction on both counts and sentenced her to 365 days with 335 days
suspended for the domestic battery conviction to be served concurrently with
180 days with 150 days suspended for the disorderly conduct conviction.
Marshall now appeals her convictions.
Discussion and Decision
I. Domestic Battery
[5] Marshall claims the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for
domestic battery. Our standard of reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim
is well-settled:
First, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of
witnesses. Second, we consider only the evidence supporting the
judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element
of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [W]e
consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the [verdict].
Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citations and quotations
omitted).
[6] Domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor is defined by statute as knowingly
or intentionally touching a person who is or was living as if a spouse in a rude,
insolent, or angry manner that results in bodily injury. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-
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1.3(a) (2014). Marshall’s specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
that the State produced only impeachment and circumstantial evidence of such
a crime and not substantial direct evidence of probative value.
[7] Although Marshall frames her issue in terms of a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, it appears she may actually be challenging the admission of
evidence. We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
King v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1275, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
However, Marshall did not object to the admission of any of the State’s
evidence at trial. A failure to make a contemporaneous objection at trial will
foreclose the raising of such error on appeal unless fundamental error occurred.
Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 118 (Ind. 2015). Marshall makes no claim of
fundamental error. We also note, however, that even if an objection had been
made, there was no error in the admission of the officers’ testimony or of the
911 call.
[8] The officers’ testimony about Chacon’s statements when they arrived at the
residence was admissible as an excited utterance under Indiana Rule of
Evidence 803(2). To qualify as an excited utterance, a statement must have
been made after a startling event has occurred, while under the stress or
excitement caused by the event, and it must relate to the event. Young v. State,
980 N.E.2d 412, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Within ten minutes of making a
phone call to 911, Chacon, bleeding from a cut above his eye, stepped outside
his residence and immediately told the responding officers he wanted Marshall
arrested because she had caused his injury by throwing a remote control at him.
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There was no error in the admission of this evidence. See Fowler v. State, 829
N.E.2d 459, 463-64 (Ind. 2005) (officer’s account of alleged victim’s statements
to him when he responded to a call was properly admitted as an excited
utterance after victim took the stand and refused to answer questions by either
the State or defense), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1193 (2006);2 see also Gordon v. State,
743 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming defendant’s battery
conviction, even though victim did not testify, because responding officer did
testify to his interaction with the victim: “Crimes that may be characterized as
domestic violence offenses sometimes lend themselves to complaining witnesses
recanting [or] failing to appear . . . . Indiana Evidence Rule 803(2) is the
vehicle by which competent, admissible evidence comes to our trial courts in
many of these situations.”).
[9] As for the 911 call, a recording is not admissible unless the voices contained
thereon are identified. Johnson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998). A caller’s identity must be established as a foundation for the admission
of the content of a telephone call. King v. State, 560 N.E.2d 491, 494 (Ind.
1990). The identity of the caller need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt;
identity may be established by circumstantial evidence, and any conflicts in the
2
Further, Chacon testified as a witness and was available for cross-examination, so there is no Confrontation
Clause issue with using the officers’ testimony reporting his statements. See Fowler, 829 N.E.2d at 464
(noting an excited utterance is not necessarily immune from attack under the Confrontation Clause, but also
noting that “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 59 n .9 (2004)).
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proof of identity go to the weight of the evidence and not the admissibility. Id.
at 494-95. Here, the Fort Wayne/Allen County Communication Records
Division certified the recording of the 911 call was a true and complete
reproduction of the original recording. See State’s Exhibit 4. Although Chacon
said he could only “vaguely” remember the phone call with 911, he affirmed it
was his voice on the recording. Tr., Vol. I at 66. The veracity of the recording
and the caller’s identity were therefore confirmed, and there was no error in
playing the audio of the call for the jury.
[10] With regard to the sufficiency of this evidence to prove Marshall committed
domestic battery, Marshall does not challenge the element that she and Chacon
were living as if spouses at the time of the incident. With respect to the
remaining elements, the jury heard Chacon report to a 911 operator that he had
been hit in the face with a remote and was bleeding, and it heard the responding
officers testify they observed a fresh injury to Chacon’s face upon their arrival
and that he told them Marshall had caused the injury. Although Chacon
testified differently at trial, his credibility on the stand was a matter for the jury
to assess, as was determining whether the evidence presented by the State in
this particular case sufficiently proved the elements of the offense. See Willis, 27
N.E.3d at 1066-67. Considering only the evidence most favorable to the
verdict, we conclude there was substantial evidence of probative value
supporting the jury’s determination that Marshall was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of domestic battery. See Gordon, 743 N.E.2d at 379 (arresting
officer’s testimony that victim, who was visibly shaking and had redness around
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her neck, told him defendant had struck her in the face and chest with his fists
and that defendant himself acknowledged that victim bruises easily was “more
than sufficient” evidence to sustain conviction for battery).
II. Double Jeopardy
[11] Marshall also claims her convictions and sentences for both domestic battery
and disorderly conduct by fighting constitute double jeopardy. The State agrees
the two convictions cannot stand. On review, we also agree, as the evidence
supporting both convictions is that Marshall threw a remote at Chacon,3 and
therefore, that fact was necessarily used by the jury as the basis for both
convictions. See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 53 (Ind. 1999) (explaining
that under the actual evidence test of the Indiana double jeopardy analysis, “the
actual evidence presented at trial is examined to determine whether each
challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts”). When we
find two convictions contravene double jeopardy principles, we may remedy
the violation by reducing either conviction to a less serious form of the same
offense if doing so will eliminate the violation. Id. at 54. That is not possible in
this case because neither crime exists in a less serious form. Therefore,
Marshall’s disorderly conduct conviction must be vacated.
3
As noted above, Marshall’s Class A misdemeanor domestic battery conviction required proof that she
touched Chacon in a rude, insolent or angry manner. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(2). The Class B disorderly
conduct conviction required proof she engaged in fighting. Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(1).
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Conclusion
[12] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Marshall’s conviction of
domestic battery. However, her convictions of both domestic battery and
disorderly conduct violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Indiana
Constitution. We therefore affirm Marshall’s conviction of domestic battery
and remand to the trial court to vacate the conviction and sentence for
disorderly conduct.
[13] Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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