IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1151
Filed February 22, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARK EUGENE ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert,
Judge.
Defendant appeals from order denying his motion for new trial.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kristin Guddall, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
This matter comes before the court a second time. In the prior appeal, we
determined sufficient evidence existed to support Mark Robinson’s conviction for
second-degree robbery. See State v. Robinson, No. 14-1845, 2016 WL 894110,
at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2016). However, because the district court applied
the incorrect legal standard in ruling on Robinson’s motion for new trial, we
conditionally affirmed the conviction and remanded the case with directions to
apply the correct legal standard. See id. at *4–5. On remand, the district court
denied the motion for new trial. On appeal, Robinson contends the district court
again applied the incorrect standard.
The facts and circumstances of the offense are set forth in our prior
opinion:
The jury could have found the following facts from the
State’s evidence presented at trial. On the evening of January 1,
2014, Mark Robinson drove away in a Ford Taurus that the owner
had left idling in the Forest Mart parking lot on University Avenue in
Des Moines. About half an hour later, Robinson entered the Kum &
Go on Hickman Road and asked the clerk working behind the
counter for two cartons of cigarettes.
The clerk—who was working alone—retrieved the cartons,
scanned in the prices, and rang up the sale. She kept her hand on
the cartons while Robinson tried to swipe his credit card. Robinson
could not complete the transaction because he held the card upside
down. The clerk suggested he turn it around, but instead of
reswiping the card, Robinson lunged toward her. The clerk testified
Robinson “almost jumped over the counter”—grabbing the cigarette
cartons out of her hand. The clerk recalled being scared and, in
response to Robinson’s sudden movement, she “jumped back, not
knowing what he [was] going to do.”
After taking the cartons from the clerk, Robinson placed one
hand in his pocket—acting “like he had a weapon” to harm her—
and demanded more cigarette cartons. He ordered her to “give me
two more right fucking now.” The clerk complied with his demand,
and he ran out of the store. Investigators retrieved the surveillance
video from several cameras positioned around the convenience
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store. The prosecution presented the video to the jury during
Robinson’s trial. The jury convicted Robinson of robbery in the
second degree.
Id. at *1.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(6) allows a defendant to
request a new trial when the verdict is “contrary to law or evidence.” That means
“contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659
(Iowa 1998). The purpose of granting a new trial based on the weight of the
evidence is to avoid a miscarriage of justice in which the evidence preponderates
heavily against the verdict. Id. at 658–59. A weight-of-the-evidence standard
requires the court to independently “weigh the evidence and consider the
credibility of the witnesses.” Id. at 658.
“A district court should grant a motion for a new trial only in exceptional
circumstances.” State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 705 (Iowa 2016). “We generally
review rulings on motions for new trial asserting a verdict is contrary to the weight
of the evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 706. “However, we review a
claim that the district court failed to apply the proper standard in ruling on a
motion for new trial for errors at law.” Id. “On a weight-of-the-evidence claim,
appellate review is limited to a review of the exercise of discretion by the trial
court, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence.” State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Iowa 2003).
Robinson contends the district court did not engage in an independent
evaluation of the evidence or make any credibility determinations. See State v.
Scalise, 660 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2003). We disagree. The record reflects the
district court was aware of our prior ruling. In denying Robinson’s motion, the
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district court noted its recollection of the evidence presented at trial. The district
court noted the video and the testimony “don’t mesh completely” but stated its
belief “there is also more than sufficient correlation between the two” to reach the
conclusion it did. The court twice stated it was examining whether “the greater
weight of the evidence” supported the jury’s finding. Robinson directs our
attention to the court’s statement it did not find “sufficient grounds . . . to invade
the province of the jury and to upset their deliberations and ultimate conclusions.”
Robinson reads too much into the court’s use of the word “sufficient.” Granting a
motion for new trial necessarily invades the province of the jury. See State v.
Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006). We view the court’s statement as
merely restating its conclusion “that the verdict is not so inconsistent with the
greater weight of the evidence, taking the testimony of the clerk along with the
video, to have created that miscarriage of justice.” Finding no error of law, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.