IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-2124
Filed February 22, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF R.R.,
Minor child,
M.E., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Nancy A. Trotter, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Gretchen Witte Kraemer,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Jessica A. Millage of Millage Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, guardian ad
litem for minor child.
Erin M. Hardisty of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney for child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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VOGEL, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.1
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
R.R., born 2007, came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS) in April 2015, upon allegations the mother, who was R.R.’s sole
caretaker, was using methamphetamine. In March, as part of another case, the
mother provided a hair sample for drug testing, which tested positive for
methamphetamine. The mother claimed the positive result was due to a relapse
in December 2014. The mother agreed to a substance-abuse evaluation and a
mental-health evaluation. She also provided another drug screen, which was
again positive for methamphetamine.
On April 30, due to ongoing concerns about the mother’s continued drug
use and allegations that the mother was selling drugs out of the home, R.R. was
removed from the home and placed in foster care. A hair stat drug screen
revealed he had been exposed to methamphetamine in the mother’s home. The
mother agreed to participate in protective and reunification services, including
substance-abuse evaluations and treatment programs, and mental-health
evaluations and treatment programs. On July 21, the district court adjudicated
R.R. a child in need of assistance and continued his placement in foster care.
Despite services offered through the DHS, the mother made little progress
in her substance-abuse treatment. The mother was sporadic in attending
treatment sessions and missed several random drug-testing screens from August
2015 through March 2016. At the mother’s request, the DHS agreed to switch to
1
The putative father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he does not appeal.
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sweat patch drug testing, but the mother initially refused to have one applied. In
March 2016, the mother was recommended for a group-treatment program. She
attended five sessions but was unsuccessfully discharged in late June. In May
2016, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine on a sweat patch screen.
From that date forward, she refused to have another sweat patch applied.
Throughout the case, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine several
times and never provided a negative drug screen.
The mother also struggled to make progress in her mental-health
treatment. She met with a therapist sporadically throughout the case but resisted
completing the suggested psychological assessment. Her relationship with her
therapist was volatile, including one incident where the mother was yelling so
loudly it prompted the therapist’s coworkers to verify the situation was under
control. She met with a psychologist once and was prescribed medications;
however, she missed her follow-up appointment and was unable to refill her
medications.
Following permanency review hearings on February 18, 2016, and April
19, 2016, R.R. continued in foster care. On June 13, after more than one year of
offered services, the State filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental
rights. The matter came on for hearing on August 17 and September 15. The
mother contested the termination but admitted to using methamphetamine and
marijuana between the two hearing dates. On November 30, the district court
terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f)
(2016). The mother appeals.
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II. Standard of Review
We review proceedings regarding termination of parental rights de novo,
giving weight to the factual findings of the lower court, while not being bound by
them. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014).
III. Statutory Grounds for Termination
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) permits termination if:
The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the
present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the
child’s parents as provided in section 232.102.
The mother argues the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
child could not be returned to her custody and that termination was not in the
best interests of the child.
Based on the record, we agree with the district court that significant
barriers exist that prevent the child from being returned to the mother. The
mother failed to complete the suggested treatment programs, missed drug
screens on several occasions, and tested positive for methamphetamine on
multiple occasions throughout the pendency of the case. As the case
progressed, the mother became more and more resistant to services offered
through the DHS and eventually stopped submitting to drug screens altogether.
She also struggled with mental-health issues. She attended treatment
sporadically, missed follow-up appointments, and failed to secure refills of
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medication she was prescribed. In addition, she admitted during the termination
hearing that the child could not be returned to her care at the present time and
provided no timeline as to when the child could be returned to her.
The district court determined the mother had not addressed the issues
that led to removal and returning R.R. to her custody would subject the child to
further adjudicatory harm:
The Court finds that in general, Mother’s testimony shows she
continues to lack insight into her own substance abuse and mental
health issues and choses to focus on her perceived shortcomings
by the providers. . . . [I]t is equally clear Mother has [not] remedied
the issues which led to removal. She has not participated in Child’s
mental health services or taken accountability for her decisions
which have negatively impacted this child. The FSRP provide[r]
testified Mother has only attended half of her offered visits. The
provider also testified that when Mother fails to appear for visits the
child appears sad. She has not consistently participated in
individual therapy. She failed to meaningfully complete her
psychological evaluation. She continues to have unresolved
depression, anxiety and anger issues which impact her daily
functioning. These concerns have been noticed by multiple
providers. Mother continued to provide a variety of reasons she
had not consistently participated in visitation, substance abuse
treatment, and mental health services. Those explanations ranged
from her pet turtle being run over to DHS not provid[ing]
transportation assistance. Mother has had the opportunity to
engage in services, unfortunately, she failed to take advantage of
those ordered services. Mother admitted during her testimony that
she could not resume care today and could not provide a time
frame as to when she would be in a position to do so. Although
Mother loves this child, she cannot safely resume care for him, and
he has already been removed from her custody for 17 months. At
some point Mother’s desires must give way to this child’s need to
grow up in a stable home where his basic needs, as well as his
emotional needs, will be met on a consistent basis.
The mother’s appeal suggests we look past the evidence in the record and the
observations of the district court because “[t]his mother had raised two children,
while using substances, with no discernible problems.” We reject this argument
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and agree with the district court there was clear and convincing evidence the
child could not be returned to the mother.
IV. Best Interests
In accordance with Iowa Code section 232.116(2), the district court
considered “whether termination is in the best interest of the child.” The court
stated:
Unfortunately, the safety concerns that led to removal continue to
exist today. The [mother’s] lack of participation in services shows
an inability or unwillingness to make necessary changes to have
the child placed in [her] care. It is not in this child’s best interest to
continue to suspend the crucial days of childhood while the
[mother] experiments with ways to face up to [her] own problems.
“[W]e cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground
for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to
be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010). We agree it was in the child’s best interest to
terminate the mother’s parental rights and nothing militated against termination.
See Iowa Code § 232.116(3).
V. Conclusion
We agree the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the mother’s
parental rights should be terminated under section 232.116(1)(f). We also agree
with the district court that termination is in the child’s best interests. We therefore
affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.