This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1156
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Jesse Tyler Schafer,
Appellant.
Filed February 21, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-14-823
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brandi L. Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Thomas Boenigk, Assistant County
Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his probation revocation, arguing that (1) the district court
lacked jurisdiction over his case based on the juvenile court’s certification of the case to
adult court; (2) the district court committed reversible error by finding appellant in
violation of a condition regarding unsupervised contact with minors; and (3) the evidence
was insufficient to show that the need for appellant’s confinement outweighs the policies
favoring probation. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 1, 2013, when appellant Jesse Schafer was 17 years old, he had sexual
intercourse with a 14-year-old girl. Respondent State of Minnesota initially filed a
delinquency petition against Schafer in juvenile court, charging him with third-degree
criminal sexual conduct. The juvenile court certified Schafer to stand trial as an adult,1 and
the state then filed a complaint in adult court, charging Schafer with one count of third-
degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2012)
(complainant at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and actor more than 24 months older
than complainant).
At a plea hearing on October 6, 2014, Schafer pleaded guilty to one count of third-
degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court stayed adjudication for four years,
conditioned on Schafer’s full compliance with terms of probation, which included, among
other things, that any contact by Schafer with females under age 16 be supervised and
approved in advance by Schafer’s corrections agent. In less than a year, Schafer signed
four probation agreements that, in pertinent part, prohibited him from (1) using or
1
Although the addendum to Schafer’s appellate brief includes a copy of the certification
order, the record before us does not include the delinquency petition filed in juvenile court,
Schafer’s waiver of a certification hearing in juvenile court, or the juvenile court’s
certification order. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (“The documents filed in the trial
court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record
on appeal in all cases.”).
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possessing alcohol or mood-altering chemicals, except as prescribed; (2) owning or
possessing “any computer (or anything with computer capabilities such as iphones, smart
phones, ipads, tablets, watches, etc) that does not have installed pornographic filters and
social media filters”; (3) having “unsupervised contact with females under the age of 16.
Supervised contact is approved through sex offender treatment therapist and supervising
Corrections Agent”; and (4) possessing or using “any pornographic/sexually explicit
material.”
On April 13, 2015, Schafer admitted to violating his probation by using
methamphetamine and marijuana, by not putting a pornography filter on his phone, and by
viewing pornography. The district court revoked the stay of adjudication, stayed imposition
of the sentence, and continued Schafer on probation for four years from the date of the
hearing with terms of probation as previously imposed. The court also ordered Schafer to
register as a sex offender.
On June 16, 2015, Schafer again admitted that he violated his probation by using
marijuana and by using the Internet to access Facebook. Among other things, the district
court vacated the stay of imposition, imposed a prison sentence of 36 months, and stayed
execution of the sentence. On September 4, 2015, after Schafer committed another
probation violation, the court imposed sanctions on him.
On April 14, 2016, Schafer appeared at another admit-deny probation-violation
hearing. The district court explained the alleged probation violations on the record as
follows:
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THE COURT: The violation report — I’m just going to go over
the violations with you to make sure you understand ‘em. [I]t’s
alleged that you violated the following. Condition—special
condition number fourteen, not to use or possess alcohol or
mood-altering chemicals except as prescribed. The specifics of
that are that you did admit to having a few beers and some pills,
and admitted to that around April 13.
[A]lso it’s alleged that you violated special condition
number nineteen, not to access or use of internet without
approval. That on April 6 you admitted you had possession of
a cell phone that you did turn over to your agent at that time,
and there was a confirmation the proper filters weren’t in place.
[A]nd that you also admitted there was a second cell phone
which was returned to your mother.
There’s another allegation that you violated special
condition number twenty. That you were not to have
unsupervised contact with females under the age of sixteen and
that there were numerous pictures of you having contact with
females that appeared to be under sixteen in that phone.
Special condition number twenty-two is alleged to be in
violation, not to use or possess any pornographic or sexual
explicit material, and after review of the phone it showed that
there were two sexually explicit pictures and one video. Do you
understand the allegations?
THE DEFENDANT: Ah, yes, Your Honor.
Schafer denied the allegations, and the court conducted a contested probation-violation
hearing. On April 18, 2016, after the contested probation-violation hearing, the court found
that Schafer violated probation, that his probation violations were serious, not technical,
and went directly to the underlying offense, and that Schafer’s confinement was
appropriate because probation was no longer sufficient to protect public safety. The court
revoked the stay of execution and committed Schafer to the Minnesota Department of
Corrections for 36 months.
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
I
Schafer argues that his conviction and sentence are void because the adult court that
convicted and sentenced him never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over his case.
Schafer argues that the juvenile court’s certification order was insufficient to confer
subject-matter jurisdiction on the adult court because the juvenile court transferred the case
to adult court based on his waiver and the parties’ plea agreement, not on public safety.
This court “review[s] the juvenile court’s decision to certify a child to adult court for an
abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 34 (Minn. 2014). We “review
questions of law de novo, and . . . findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.”
(citation omitted). Id. at 34–35. “A finding is clearly erroneous only if there is no
reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an appellate court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Id. at 35 (quotation omitted).
We construe Schafer’s subject-matter jurisdiction argument to be a challenge to the
validity of the juvenile court’s certification order. Because the record before us does not
include Schafer’s waiver of a certification hearing in juvenile court or the juvenile court’s
certification order, the record is insufficient to conduct a review of the validity of the
certification order. Based on our reading of the certification order included in the
addendum to Schafer’s appellate brief, even if we were to consider Schafer’s challenge to
the validity of the certification order, Schafer would not prevail. Schafer attacks the
certification order on the basis that it does not contain a required finding that certification
would serve public safety. But the certification order in Schafer’s addendum complies with
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the requirements applicable to an order issued following a waiver of the right to a
certification hearing and stipulation to the certification order. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P.
18.07, subds. 1 (outlining the requirements for a certification order following a waiver and
stipulation, which do not include a requirement that such an order contain public-safety
findings), 2 (requiring a certification order issued after a contested certification hearing to
contain public-safety findings); see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.01, subd. 1 (stating
that Rule 18 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure applies when, as
here, “the prosecutor moves for certification and a child is alleged to have committed, after
becoming fourteen (14) years of age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an
adult”).
II
Schafer argues that the district court committed reversible error by finding that he
violated a condition regarding unsupervised contact with minors, contending that his
probation conditions did not require him to obtain his corrections agent’s advance approval
of his contact with females under age 16, as long as an adult supervised the contact. He
claims that he fully complied with his probation conditions because his adult girlfriend
supervised his contact with her female children under age 16.
Before revoking probation, a district court must determine on the record (1) if a
specific condition of probation was violated and (2) whether that violation was intentional
or inexcusable. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Minn. 2005) (citing State v.
Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980)). If the court finds clear and convincing
evidence of an intentional or inexcusable violation, the district court also must evaluate
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whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id.; see also
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 2(1)(c)b (requiring proof of a probation violation by clear
and convincing evidence before probation can be revoked). “A district court has broad
discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be
reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Ornelas, 675 N.W.2d 74,
79 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249−50) (quotation marks omitted).
Schafer’s argument that he complied with the terms of his probation fails because
the terms of his probation required him to get advance approval from his corrections agent
before having supervised contact with females under age 16.
Schafer also argues that his probation revocation violates due process because
the written terms of his probation did not afford him fair notice that he must obtain
agent approval before having supervised contact with females under age 16. “When
sentencing a defendant, a court shall state the precise terms of the sentence.” Id. at 80
(quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(A)) (quotation marks omitted). “In imposing a
probationary sentence, if noncriminal conduct could result in revocation, the trial court
should advise the defendant so that the defendant can be reasonably able to tell what lawful
acts are prohibited.” Id. (quotation omitted). “It is an essential component of due process
that individuals be given fair warning of those acts which may lead to a loss of liberty.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “This is no less true whether the loss of liberty arises from a criminal
conviction or the revocation of probation.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When the acts
prohibited by the probation conditions are not criminal, due process mandates that the
petitioner cannot be subjected to a forfeiture of his liberty for those acts unless he is given
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prior fair warning.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Whether a defendant has been denied due
process of law is a question of law that [this court] review[s] de novo.” State v. Beaulieu,
859 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 2015).
At his sentencing hearing, the district court specifically clarified the meaning of the
advance-approval probation condition and Schafer acknowledges that, “[b]ack in 2014, the
court did state that he needed such approval.” Moreover, the probation condition was
included in each of the four probation agreements that Schafer signed, and we reject
Schafer’s suggestion that the wording in the probation agreements is ambiguous. His past
conduct was consistent with an understanding that he was required to receive agent
approval before having adult-supervised contact with females under age 16. On at least one
occasion, he asked his corrections agent to approve his mother to supervise him when he
had contact with females under age 16.
Schafer also argues that he did not have fair notice that he needed agent approval
before having adult-supervised contact with females under age 16 because he received
mixed messages from the district court. After a careful review of the record, we are not
persuaded. The record contains sufficient evidence that Schafer had fair notice that he
needed approval from his corrections agent before having supervised contact with females
under the age of 16. We conclude that his probation revocation therefore did not violate his
due-process rights.
III
Schafer argues that clear and convincing evidence does not show that the need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Even if the facts allow probation
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revocation, “policy considerations may require that probation not be revoked.” Modtland,
695 N.W.2d at 606 (quotation omitted). “[T]he purpose of probation is rehabilitation and
revocation should be used only as a last resort when treatment has failed.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “When determining if revocation is appropriate, courts must balance the
probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and
the public safety, and base their decisions on sound judgment and not just their will.” Id.
at 606–07 (quotations omitted); see also State v. Rottelo, 798 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. App.
2011) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked probation
because Rottelo did not remain in contact with probation officers, had multiple offenses in
his history, and showed a pattern of noncompliance with probation), review denied (Minn.
July 19, 2011). A court should only revoke probation if the court finds
on the basis of the original offense and the intervening conduct
of the offender that:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted).
We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the
district court’s finding that “the need for confinement [was] outweighed by the public
policy that favors it.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Schafer’s
probation.
Affirmed.
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