Com. v. Vestal, N.

J-S80021-16 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. NATHANIEL VESTAL Appellant No. 1786 MDA 2015 Appeal from the PCRA Order entered September 11, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at Nos: CP-40-CR-0001279-2011, CP-40-CR-0002528- 2012, CP-40-CR-0003806-2012, CP-40-CR-0002333-2013 BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and RANSOM, JJ. JUDGMENT ORDER BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2017 Appellant, Nathaniel Vestal, appeals from the September 11, 2015 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, denying his petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Appellant, who entered into a negotiated plea on January 21, 2014 and whose March 21, 2014 sentence included a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(a)(2), contends the PCRA court erred in determining that plea counsel was not ineffective in light of counsel’s failure to challenge an illegal mandatory minimum sentence in the wake of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). We agree. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court explained that appellate decisions subsequent to the denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition have guided J-S80021-16 the court’s judgment to conclude plea counsel was in fact ineffective for failing to object to imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. PCRA Court Opinion, 5/11/16, at 2. The Commonwealth agrees, acknowledging that Appellant’s case is governed by Commonwealth v. Melendez- Negron, 123 A.3d 1087 (Pa. Super. 2015), and that PCRA counsel’s failure to challenge Appellant’s mandatory minimum sentence post-Alleyne constitutes ineffectiveness. Commonwealth Brief at 7. Although Appellant seeks a remand for resentencing, or alternatively reinstatement of his appeal rights, we agree with the PCRA court and with the Commonwealth that this case is governed by Melendez-Negron where we recognized “that the shared misapprehension that the mandatory minimum sentence . . . applied to Melendez-Negron tainted the parties’ negotiations at the outset. . . . [T]he parties’ negotiations began from an erroneous premise and therefore were fundamentally skewed from the beginning.” Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d at 1094. Therefore, we not only reverse the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition, but we also vacate his judgment of sentence and his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings. See also Commonwealth v. Lenhoff, 796 A.2d 338, 343 (Pa. Super. 2002). Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Guilty plea vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. -2- J-S80021-16 Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 2/27/2017 -3-