NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 27 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LISA ANN ATKINS, No. 15-16242
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00815-DLR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GOVERNING BOARD OF CREIGHTON
SCHOOL DISTRICT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Lisa Ann Atkins appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her employment action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e));
O’Donnell v. Vencor, Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (statute of
limitations and application of equitable tolling where facts are undisputed). We
may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d
1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Atkins’s equal protection claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as barred by Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations because
Atkins filed this action eight years after the injury accrued. See Douglas v. Noelle,
567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 claims are governed by forum state’s
statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and accrue when the plaintiff
knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action); see
also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two year statute of limitations for personal injury
action).
The district court properly dismissed Atkins’s gender discrimination claim
under Title VII because Atkins failed to file this action within ninety days of
receiving a right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (action must be filed
within ninety days of issuance of the right to sue letter); Payan v. Aramark Mgmt.
Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2007) (Title VII action must
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be commenced within ninety days after receipt of a right to sue letter). The district
court properly found that equitable tolling did not apply to Atkins’s Title VII claim
because Atkins failed to show extraordinary circumstances beyond her control that
justified equitable tolling. See Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir.
1999) (explaining that equitable tolling is warranted “when extraordinary
circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control made it impossible to file a claim on
time”); O’Donnell, 466 F.3d at 1111 (“[w]here a complaint is timely filed and later
dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not toll or suspend the ninety day
limitations period” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Dismissal of Atkins’s negligence claim was proper because it was barred by
the statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two year statute of
limitations for negligence claim).
AFFIRMED.
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