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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Co)
C.4
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 73563-2-1
)
Respondent, )
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
)
TIFFANY L. MARTIN, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. ) FILED: February 27, 2017
)
MANN, J. --- Tiffany Martin appeals her conviction for identity theft assigning error
to the trial court's use of an alternative means jury instruction without providing a
corresponding unanimity instruction. Martin also appeals the trial court's order denying
her motion to suppress the evidence obtained after the police seized the vehicle she
was using at the time of her arrest. Because identity theft is not an alternative means
crime and the police had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence
of a crime, we affirm.
FACTS
On April 4, 2014, shortly before 1:00 a.m., Bellevue police officers were
dispatched to a suspicious circumstances call from a Shell gas station. A witness
reported that a dark colored sedan backed up to a garbage can on the side of the gas
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station. The witness reported that a male and female were going through purses and
putting some of the contents into a clear plastic bin and other items into the garbage
can. The witness later told the police that when the man saw the officers arriving he
placed the plastic bin in the trunk and tried unsuccessfully to close the trunk.
Bellevue Police Officer Jacob Childers responded first. When he initially drove
by the gas station he saw two people digging around in the back seat of a dark sedan.
When Childers approached the car, he saw a man standing at the back of the car with
the trunk open and a woman sitting in the back seat. Childers noticed several purses
and wallets inside the trunk, stacked on top of a plastic bin. Childers saw three or four
cell phones, flashlights, screwdrivers, wallets, an empty purse, and a laptop bag inside
the cab of the car. He also saw several knives inside the car, including one within the
woman's reach, which he seized for safety purposes. Childers reported that
screwdrivers, flashlights, and knives are commonly found in cars of people engaged in
vehicle prowling or burglary.
Bellevue Police Officer Brian Schaffer arrived shortly after Childers. As he
approached the car, he could see two or three purses and a backpack in the trunk. He
saw screwdrivers, flashlights, an empty laptop case, four cell phones, two wallets, and
an empty black purse in the cab of the car. Schaffer believed the cell phones, wallets,
bags, and purses might have been stolen in vehicle prowls. He also reported that
screwdrivers were often used to pry open windows and car doors. Schaffer believed
the car likely contained stolen property and the items in the car were consistent with
vehicle prowl or identity theft.
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When approached by officers, the male identified himself as Jontel Jackson. The
woman in the back seat claimed her name was Alicia Staton but was later identified as
Tiffany Martin. Childers recognized Jackson from a previous contact about two years
prior. Childers served a search warrant on the car Jackson and Martin were using and
found a large plastic tub of stolen mail in the trunk, along with stolen credit cards and
financial information. Jackson was later convicted of identity theft. Childers believed
that the woman in the car was actually Tiffany Martin, but he was not sure.
Jackson declined to allow a search of the car. The officers released Martin and
Jackson; but had the car impounded so they could obtain a search warrant. Schaffer
obtained the warrant later that day and searched the car. The search revealed a
screwdriver, flashlight, pry bar, cell phones, wallets containing Jackson's and Martin's
information, credit cards in other people's names, receipts for gift cards and other
purchases using various credit cards, purses and bags, and a binder and ledger
containing other people's names, addresses, social security numbers, account
numbers, birth dates, checks, and credit cards.
Martin was charged with eight counts of second degree identity theft under RCW
9.35.020. Before trial, Martin moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, arguing
that the search and seizure of the car was unconstitutional because the police did not
have probable cause. The court denied the motion. At the conclusion of trial, the trial
court provided the following instruction to the jury:
A person commits the crime of identity theft in the second degree
when, with intent to commit or aid or abet any crime, he or she knowingly
obtains, possesses, uses or transfers a means of identification or financial
information of another person, living or dead, knowing that the means of
identification or financial information belongs to another person.
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The to-convict instructions for each of the eight counts stated in relevant part: "(1) What
on or about April 4, 2014, the defendant knowingly obtained, possessed, or transferred
a means of identification or financial information" of each named victim. The
instructions defined "possession," but did not provide definitions for "obtain" or
"transfer."
The jury found Martin guilty of all eight counts as charged.
ANALYSIS
I
Martin argues first that her state constitutional right to jury unanimity was violated
because the jury was instructed on alternative means of committing identity theft without
including a unanimity instruction requiring the jury to find which of the alternative means
it relied upon in reaching the conviction. We disagree.
The alternative means determination relates to the constitutionally protected right
of jury unanimity required under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution.
State v. Owens, 180 Wn.2d 90, 95, 323 P.2d 1030 (2014). An alternative means crime
is one where there are multiple means of proving the charge. Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 96.
When there are multiple means of proving the crime, a defendant is entitled to an
express unanimous jury determination as to which particular means he or she is guilty
of committing, unless there is sufficient evidence to support each of the alternative
means. Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 95 (citing State v. Ortega-Martinez, 124 Wn.2d 702, 707-
08, 881 P.2d 231 (1994)).
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The legislature has not defined what constitutes an alternative means crime or
designated which crimes are alternative means crimes. Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 96.
Therefore, it is up to the courts to determine whether the crime is an alternative means
crime by reviewing each case on its own merits. Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 96. We review
questions of statutory interpretation de novo and interpret statutes to give effect to the
legislature's intentions. State v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571, 577-78, 238 P.3d 487(2010).
Use of a disjunctive "or" in a list of methods for committing the crime does not
necessarily create alternative means of committing the crime. State v. Peterson, 168
Wn.2d 763, 770, 230 P.3d 588(2010). The analysis places less weight on the use of
the disjunctive "or" and more weight on the distinctiveness of the criminal conduct.
State v. Sandholm, 184 Wn.2d 726, 735, 364 P.3d 87(2015). "The more varied the
criminal conduct, the more likely the statute describes alternative means. But when the
statute describes minor nuances inhering in the same act, the more likely the various
'alternatives' are merely facets of the same criminal conduct." Sandholm, 184 Wn.2d at
734.
We begin our review by analyzing the language of the criminal statute at issue.
Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 96. RCW 9.35.020(1) provides:
No person may knowingly obtain, possess, use, or transfer a
means of identification or financial information of another person, living or
dead, with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime.
(Emphasis added.) Martin contends that the use of four different verbs in the statute—
obtain, possess, use, or transfer—establishes that there are four alternative means of
committing the crime. And because the State was unable to prove that she
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"transferred" any of the identification or financial information, the conviction must be
overturned.
Our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Owens. In Owens, the court
considered RCW 9A.82.050, which provides that laj person who knowingly initiates,
organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property for sale
to others, or who knowingly traffics in stolen property, is guilty of trafficking in stolen
property in the first degree." (Emphasis added.) The court held that the first seven
alleged alternatives, "initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or
supervises," represented multiple facets of a single means, while the eighth alternative,
"traffics" was a true alternative because it described a separate category of conduct,
namely the act of moving and selling the product as opposed to the act of stealing the
product. Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 97-98.
The court further reasoned that the first seven verbs were so closely related that
they could not be viewed as distinct acts:
[lit would be hard to imagine a single act of stealing whereby a person
'organizes' the theft but does not 'plan' it. Likewise, it would be difficult to
imagine a situation whereby a person 'directs' the theft but does not
'manage' it. Any one act of stealing often involves more than one of these
terms. Thus, these terms are merely different ways of committing one act,
specifically stealing.
Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 99.
Relying on Owens, this court recently analyzed the identity theft statute at issue
in this case and concluded that RCW 9.35.020 is not an alternative means statute.
State v. Butler, 194 Wn. App. 525, 529, 374 P.3d 1232(2016). Butler compared the
four verbs used to describe identity theft to the seven verbs in Owens, holding:
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[t]he verbs here are not distinct means by which to commit identity theft,
but rather are multiple facets of a single means. For instance, following
the analysis in Owens, it would be hard to imagine the crime of identity
theft being committed by a single act of "using" a check that did not also
involve "obtaining" and "possessing" the check. Likewise, one could not
"transfer" financial information without also "obtaining" and "possessing"
that information.
Butler, 194 Wn. App. at 530. In contrast, a defendant can be guilty of "trafficking" stolen
goods without having participated in stealing those goods.
The Butler court went on to reject the argument that these terms were different
because not all of the terms interconnected, for instance, "one could 'obtain' financial
information without 'using' or 'transferring' it." Butler, 194 Wn. App. at 530. The court
pointed out that the same argument existed regarding the terms in Owens. Butler, 194
Wn. App. at 530. A person might "finance" or "initiate" a theft without then "managing"
or "supervising" it. Butler, 194 Wn. App. at 530. The court reasoned that every verb
need not correspond with every other verb in order to be considered a single means,
holding that lbjecause no single action in the statute could be completed without
simultaneously completing at least one other action, the various acts are too similar to
constitute distinct alternative means." Butler, 194 Wn. App. at 530.
The distinction between the act of trafficking and committing the theft as found in
Owens, is that the eventual trafficker could be uninvolved in the theft itself. Here, a
defendant cannot "transfer" or "use" information that was never "obtained" or
"possessed." Moreover, a person who "obtains" and "possesses" the legal or financial
information of another generally does so with the objective of "using" or "transferring"
that information. The fundamental nature does not vary significantly between these
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terms, as they are merely different stages of committing the same act—
misappropriating the identity of another person. See Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 99.
Martin argues next that the legislature's intent that identify theft be an alternative
means crime is apparent from the legislature's statement of intent which provides, in
part:
The legislature intends to penalize for each unlawful act of improperly
obtaining, possessing, using, or transferring means of identification or
financial information of an individual person. The unit of prosecution for
identity theft by use of a means of identification or financial information is
each individual unlawful use of any one person's means of identification or
financial information. Unlawfully obtaining, possessing, or transferring
each means of identification or financial information of any individual
person, with the requisite intent, is a separate unit of prosecution for each
victim and for each act of obtaining, possessing, or transferring of the
individual person's means of identification or financial information.
RCW 9.35.001.
Martin maintains that by creating separate "units of prosecution" for each
unlawful act involving a person's identification of financial information, the legislature
intended that identify theft be an alternative means crime. While the legislature
amended the identity theft statute in 2008 to clarify that the statute created separate
"units of prosecution," Martin provides no authority for the proposition that having
separate units of prosecution equates to alternate means of committing that crime.'
We agree with Butler, and find that the statutory language in RCW 9.35.020 does
not dictate alternative means, but simply describes facets of the same type of conduct.
1 The legislature amended the intent statement in RCW 9.35.001 in response to our Supreme
Court's determination that double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Washington State
Constitutions precluded "convicting a defendant more than once under the same criminal statute if only
one 'unit' of the crime has been committed." State v. Levda, 157 Wn.2d 335, 138 P.3d 610(2006).
Based on the amended language, a defendant can be charged for "each individual unlawful use" and for
"each act of obtaining, possessing, or transferring" an individual person's means of identification or
financial information. See RCW 9.35.001.
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11
Martin argues alternatively that the State assumed the burden of proving that
Martin knowingly obtained, possessed, and transferred a means of identification or
financial information because all three terms were included in the "to-convict"
instruction. Martin bases this assertion on the "law of the case doctrine." We disagree
for two reasons.
First, even if the law of the case doctrine was consistent with current law, the
doctrine would not be applicable in this case. The law of the case doctrine concerned
the State's burden of proof when the to-convict instruction includes additional
nonessential elements of the charged crime. State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97, 102, 954
P.2d 900(1998); State v. Tyler, 195 Wn. App. 385, 388-89, 382 P.3d 699(2016).
Under the law of the case doctrine, "[i]n criminal cases, the State assumes the burden
of proving otherwise unnecessary elements of the offense when such added elements
are included without objection in the "to convict" instruction." Hickman, 135 Wn.2d at
102. Here, consistent with RCW 9.35.020(1), the to-convict instruction provided that the
State must prove Martin "knowingly obtained, possessed, or transferred" a means of
identification or financial information for each named victim. The to-convict instruction
did not contain added or unnecessary elements.
Second, in Tyler, this court reviewed the law of the case doctrine in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. , 136
S. Ct. 709, 193 L. Ed. 2d 639(2016), and concluded that Hickman and State v. Hayes,
135 Wn. App. 459, 262 P.3d 538 (2011), no longer correctly stated the law. Tyler, 195
Wn. App. at 396-400. As we explained,"Musacchio makes it clear that a reviewing
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court is to disregard 'additional elements' and 'false alternative means' set out in a to-
convict instruction and, instead, must evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence based on
the essential elements of the charged crime as enacted by the legislature." Tyler, 195
Wn. App. at 400.
While Musacchio does not change Washington's evidentiary sufficiency analysis
when the charged crime actually sets forth alternative means, it does mean that the law
of the case doctrine does not require the State to prove additional or alternate elements
for a crime based on the language of the to-convict instructions. Tyler, 195 Wn. App. at
400, n.9. When a jury reaches a verdict for a single means crime, even if the to-convict
instruction includes definitional alternatives, the verdict is "necessarily unanimous as to
the means by which it was committed." Tyler, 195 Wn. App. at 403.
Ill
Martin asserts finally that the seizure of the car was unlawful because it was not
supported by probable cause. We disagree.
Martin does not challenge the search warrant obtained by police after seizing the
vehicle, but instead challenges whether the police had probable cause to impound, or
seize, the car prior to obtaining the search warrant.2 We review the denial of a motion
to suppress to determine whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings
of fact. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 628, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009).
Police may lawfully impound a vehicle as evidence of a crime when the police
have probable cause to believe the vehicle was stolen or was used in the commission of
2 To the extent Martin challenges the validity of the search warrant that argument is waived as it
was not raised at trial. Martin's CrR 3.6 motion to suppress challenged the "warrantless search and
seizure of the occupants of the black 2000 Audi, and subsequent impoundment of the car."
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a felony offense. State v. Tyler, 177 Wn.2d 690, 698, 302 P.3d 165 (2013). "[W]hen an
officer has probable cause to believe that a car contains contraband or evidence of
crime, he or she may seize and hold the car for the time reasonably needed to obtain a
search warrant and conduct the subsequent search." State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641,
653, 826 P.2d 698 (1992). A car may be seized by either placing a guard on the car at
the scene or by towing it elsewhere. Huff 64 Wn. App. at 653. Seizing the vehicle in
order to obtain a warrant, rather than searching immediately, is "a course of action that
the law prefers." Huff, 64 Wn. App. at 649.
Probable cause exists if facts and circumstances support a reasonable inference
that the defendant is probably involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the crime
can be found at the place to be searched. State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182, 196 P.3d
658 (2008). Probable cause determinations come from looking at the totality of the
facts and circumstances known to the officer, including the defendant's prior convictions
that are of the same general nature as the crime under investigation. See State v.
Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 749, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001); Bokor v. Dep't of Licensing, 74 Wn.
App. 523, 526, 874 P.2d 168(1994). Probable cause requires "more than mere
suspicion or personal belief that evidence of a crime will be found on the premises
searched." Neth, 165 Wn.2d at 182. However, "probable cause is not negated merely
because it is possible to imagine an innocent explanation for observed activities." State
v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339, 344, 783 P.2d 626 (1989).
The evidence here supports that there was probable cause to seize the car
Martin and Jackson were using. The witnesses specifically called the police to report
seeing Martin and Jackson going through purses and wallets outside of the car the
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police impounded. The officers saw several purses, wallets, and bags inside the car
and trunk, as well as screwdrivers, knives, and flashlights. Based on the officers'
experience and expertise, they recognized these items as being commonly used in car
prowls and identity theft. Further, one of the officers recognized Jackson from a prior
contact where Jackson had worked with Martin to commit identity theft. The evidence
presented was substantial enough to support a reasonable inference that, upon
searching the vehicle, the police would find evidence of vehicle prowling or identity theft.
We affirm.
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State Of Washington v. Tiffany L. Martin
Combined Opinion