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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-16-168
VIRGINIA MEDEIROS Opinion Delivered March 1, 2017
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE MARION
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 45DR-14-125-4]
HONORABLE GORDON WEBB,
JULIO C. MEDEIROS JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
Appellant Virginia Medeiros appeals a Marion County Circuit Court order barring
enforcement of her claim of spousal support from her ex-husband, appellee Julio Medeiros.1
On appeal, Virginia contends that the trial court erred in (1) allowing Julio to assert certain
equitable defenses, including the equitable defense of laches; (2) applying Arkansas law instead
of California law; and (3) determining that her claim was barred by laches. We affirm.
A brief recitation of the facts is necessary. Virginia and Julio were divorced in the State
of California in 1991. Under the terms of the California divorce decree, Julio had an
obligation to pay Virginia spousal support. On July 15, 2014, Virginia filed a petition to
register her California divorce decree in Arkansas pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act2 (UIFSA). She also filed a motion for contempt, alleging Julio’s failure to make
1
This is the second time this case is before us. Medeiros v. Medeiros, 2016 Ark. App.
522. (Medeiros I).
2
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-17-101 et seq (Repl. 2015).
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his spousal-support payments under the decree and seeking enforcement of the California
judgment in the Arkansas courts. She attached the 1991 divorce decree and an affidavit of
arrearage to the petition. At her request, the court scheduled a hearing on her motion for
contempt for November 19, 2014.
Julio was served on August 1, 2014, and on August 26, 2014, he filed an answer to the
petition. Julio asserted a general denial to the allegations but specifically raised the affirmative
defense of laches, the statute of limitations, and other defenses “found in the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure” and the constitutions of the United States and Arkansas. Virginia
responded that Julio had failed to follow the statutory procedure to properly object to the
registration of the California decree, that his defenses should not be permitted, and that the
registration should be confirmed. The trial court allowed Julio to challenge the registration
and then applied the defense of laches to bar Virginia’s enforcement of the decree. Virginia
appeals.
Virginia first argues that the trial court erred in allowing Julio to assert a challenge to
the registration of their California divorce decree. She argues that Julio’s response was
untimely and that he failed to request a hearing as required under UIFSA.
In order to address Virginia’s first argument, a review of the statutory requirements of
UIFSA is in order. UIFSA is a mechanism by which support orders issued in one state may
be registered in another for purposes of enforcement. Here, California issued a support order,
and it can be registered in Arkansas for enforcement purposes. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-17-601.
UIFSA sets out the procedure for proper registration. On receipt of a proper request for
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registration, the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as “an order of a tribunal
of another state or a foreign support order.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-17-602(b). The support
order issued in another state is considered “registered” when the order is filed. Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-17-603(a). Here, Virginia properly filed the California decree with the State of
Arkansas, and it was registered at the time of filing.
UIFSA also sets forth the proper procedures for enforcement of a registered support
order from another state. Once a support order has been registered pursuant to UIFSA, the
nonregistering party shall contest the validity or enforcement by requesting a hearing within
twenty days after notice of registration. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-17-605 and -606. The only
method for contesting the validity of a foreign support order is to request a hearing within
twenty days after notice of registration. State of Washington v. Thompson, 339 Ark. 417, 6
S.W.3d 82 (1999). If the nonregistering party fails to timely contest the validity or
enforcement of the support order, the order is confirmed by operation of law. Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-17-605(b).
Virginia argues that it is undisputed that Julio did not request a hearing within twenty
days of service. Based on his failure to timely contest, she argues that the order was confirmed
by operation of law. Once confirmed, Virginia argues, he is precluded from any further
contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of
the registration. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-17-608. Virginia’s argument and statement of the law
is incomplete because it ignores the UIFSA notice requirement.
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When a support order issued in another state is registered, the registering tribunal of
this state shall notify the nonregistering party of the registration. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-17-
605(a). The notice requirement under UIFSA is very specific. The notice must be
accompanied by a copy of the registered order and the documents and relevant information
accompanying the order. Id. The notice must inform the nonregistering party (1) that a
registered support order is enforceable as of the date of registration in the same manner as an
order issued by a tribunal of this state; (2) that a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement
of the registered order must be requested within twenty days after notice; (3) that failure to
contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner will result in
confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages; and (4) of
the amount of any alleged arrearages. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-17-605(b).
Here, there is no record that Julio was ever served with notice setting forth the specific
UIFSA requirements pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-17-605(b). The return of
service indicates that Julio was served with the following documents: (1) a summons reciting
the standard thirty-day time limit for answering imposed by the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure; (2) a notice; (3) a notice of hearing; (4) the petition to register a foreign divorce
decree; (5) the motion for contempt; (6) an exhibit; and (7) plaintiff’s first set of
interrogatories and request for production of documents propounded to defendant. In
Mederios I, supra, we noted that, while the return of service represented that Julio was served
with a “Notice,” no copy of this document was contained within our record. We stressed
that this missing “Notice” was “essential to our determination of the issues.” We ordered the
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parties to settle and supplement the record with the documents served on Julio when the case
was first initiated. Despite our remand for supplementation, the record is still void of this
missing “Notice.”
We hold that Julio was never served with the necessary notice required by Arkansas
Code Annotated § 9-17-605(b). There is no evidence in the record that Julio received any
notice specifying the correct time limitation or procedure by which to contest the registration
under UIFSA, and Julio specifically denied receiving any such notice. Arkansas Code
Annotated § 9-17-605 mandates that the nonregistering party shall be notified. Under our
principles of statutory construction, “shall” is mandatory. Thompson, supra. Because Julio was
not properly notified, the California support order was not confirmed by operation of law.
However, our analysis does not end there. The trial court found that the information
given to Julio provided conflicting information about the appropriate course of action to take
in responding to the proceedings against him. Here, Julio received a summons reciting a
thirty-day time limit upon which to respond, as well as a notice of hearing referencing both
the registration of the contempt decree and the contempt motion. Julio was also served with
the petition to register. However, the petition to register did not reference UIFSA nor did
it provide the required notice detailing his obligations under UIFSA. Relying on this court’s
decision in Thompson, supra, the trial court found that, because the information provided to
Julio stated that he had thirty days in which to respond and that a hearing had been set at
Virginia’s request, Julio’s response would be treated as timely and he would be allowed to
present his defenses. The trial court was correct in its assertion.
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This case is factually similar to Thompson. In Thompson, this court held that Thompson
should not be barred from asserting his defenses under Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-17-607,
because the information he received when he was served with the petition to register was
conflicting and confusing as to the appropriate course of action to take in responding to the
proceedings against him. Here, in addition to not being properly served with the necessary
UIFSA notice, Julio was served with information that he had thirty days to respond and that
a hearing had already been requested. Just as this court found in Thompson, it was not
unreasonable for Julio to believe that all of the actions required by the summons and the
notice of registration had been taken; that is, a hearing had been requested, albeit by Virginia,
and that a responsive pleading had been timely filed. Just as in Thompson, based on these
particular circumstances, the trial court was correct in finding that Julio should not be barred
from presenting any defense allowed under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-17-607.
Next, Virginia argues that California law governs the enforcement of the divorce
decree, not Arkansas law; thus, the trial court erred in applying Arkansas law on laches to
defeat her claim. However, Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-17-607 provides that a party
contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered support order has the burden of proving
certain defenses. One of the statutory defenses that is available to the contesting party is that
there is a “defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-17-
607(5) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute clearly provides that Julio can assert the Arkansas
law of laches as a defense to the enforcement of the support order. The trial court did not err
in doing so.
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Finally, Virginia argues that there was insufficient evidence to support Julio’s claim of
laches because there was no testimony that Julio had changed his position to his
detriment—an element of the defense. Here, Virginia waited nearly twenty-five years to
initiate a proceeding to collect spousal support. There was evidence that Julio never requested
child support from Virginia even though such a remedy was available to him during this
twenty-five-year period, but that his claim for such support is now barred. If he had known
that Virginia intended to assert her alimony claim, he could have brought his claim for child
support to offset the amounts owed. Additionally, Julio is now closer to retirement and might
have handled his financial accounts differently if he had known that she intended to assert her
claims. Twenty-five years is a long time, and until the claim was filed, there was no evidence
that Virginia ever intended to assert her alimony claim, despite interaction between the
parties. Based on these facts, it was not error for the trial court to find that Julio successfully
established his defense of laches.
Affirmed.
VAUGHT and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Carla Miller and Kimberly Eden, for appellant.
Samuel J. Pasthing, P.A., by: Samuel J. Pasthing, for appellee.
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