[Cite as State v Walters, 2017-Ohio-793.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
DEFIANCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 4-16-17
v.
DUSTIN MARK WALTERS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Defiance Municipal Court
Trial Court No. TR-16-3688
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 6, 2017
APPEARANCES:
Ian A. Weber for Appellant
Carson L. Slade for Appellee
Case No. 4-16-17
PRESTON, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Dustin Mark Walters (“Walters”), appeals the
August 17, 2016 judgment entry of the Defiance Municipal Court. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On July 28, 2016, Walters was charged with willful or wanton disregard
of safety on highways, a violation of R.C. 4511.20, commonly referred to as
“reckless operation” of a vehicle, a minor misdemeanor. (Doc. No. 1). On August
17, 2016, Walters appeared, pro se, and pled no contest to the charge. (Doc. No. 2);
(Aug. 17, 2016 Tr. at 2). The trial court accepted Walters’s plea and found him
guilty of the charge. (Id.); (Id. at 4). The trial court sentenced Walters to a six-
month license suspension and ordered him to pay a fine and costs. (Doc. No. 2).
{¶3} Walters, with the assistance of counsel, filed his notice of appeal on
September 16, 2016. (Doc. No. 3). Walters raises one assignment of error for our
review.
Assignment of Error
The Finding Of The Court That The Defendant/Appellant Was
Guilty Of Reckless Operation Pursuant To ORC 4511.20 Was Not
Supported And Was Against the Manifest Weight Of The
Evidence.
{¶4} In his assignment of error, Walters asserts that his conviction is against
the manifest weight of the evidence and based on insufficient evidence.
Specifically, Walters argues there is insufficient evidence that he acted willfully or
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wantonly. (Appellant’s Brief at 6). He also argues that the trial court’s conclusion
that he acted willfully or wantonly is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
(Appellant’s Brief at 5).
{¶5} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). We address each concept individually.
{¶6} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly,
“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the
evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the
credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v.
Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33,
citing State v. Williams, 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.).
See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19
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(“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight
of the evidence.”), citing Thompkins at 386.
{¶7} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and
determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v.
Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court must,
however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the
weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10
Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly
in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’
should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d
Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio
St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
{¶8} R.C. 4511.20 provides, in relevant part, “No person shall operate a
vehicle * * * on any street or highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety
of persons or property.” R.C. 4511.20(A). One acts willfully when one’s conduct
is done “intentionally, designedly, knowingly, or purposely, without justifiable
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excuse.” State v. Adams, 9th Dist. Medina No. 03CA0098-M, 2004-Ohio-3253, ¶
9, citing State v. Earlenbaugh, 18 Ohio St.3d 19, 21-22 (1985). A wanton act is one
done in reckless disregard of the rights of others and which indicates a reckless
indifference to the consequences to the life, limb, health, reputation, or property of
others. Id., citing Earlenbaugh at 21-22. By the same token, a motorist acts
wantonly when, with full knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, he or she
recklessly and inexcusably disregards the rights of other motorists. Id., citing
Earlenbaugh at 22.
{¶9} At the hearing, the State recounted the statement of Trooper Matthew
Gardner (“Trooper Gardner”) of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, who issued the
citation at issue in the case. (Aug. 17, 2016 Tr. at 3). The State’s recounting of
Trooper Gardner’s statement can be summarized as follows: On July 28, 2016, at
approximately 6:51 p.m., Trooper Gardner received a traffic complaint indicating
that, on U.S. 24 at approximately mile marker 53, a motorcycle was traveling at an
excessive speed. (Id.). Trooper Gardner spoke with a law enforcement officer from
the Henry County Sheriff’s Office, who indicated that the motorcycle was black in
color. (Id.). That officer also described the individual that the Henry County
Sheriff’s Office had seen. (Id.). Soon after, the Henry County Sheriff’s Office
indicated to Trooper Gardner that it observed a motorcycle near Napoleon, but the
motorcycle was traveling so fast that officers were unable to catch it. (Id.). At
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approximately 7:03 p.m., Trooper Gardner observed a motorcycle on U.S. 24 near
Flory Road, at which time the motorcycle appeared to be traveling approximately
eighty miles per hour, though Trooper Gardner was unable to check the vehicle’s
speed with his radar gun. (Id.). Trooper Gardner watched as the motorcycle slowed
down briefly and, on State Route 281, passed between a semi truck and a passenger
vehicle, basically creating a third lane of travel. (Id.). Trooper Gardner initiated a
traffic stop of the motorcycle on U.S. 24 near mile marker 27. (Id.).
{¶10} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that Walters’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. A rational
trier of fact could have found that Walters acted willfully or wantonly.
{¶11} As an initial matter, we note that Walters did not dispute the
underlying facts alleged in the complaint because he pled no contest to the charge.
(Aug. 17, 2016 Tr. at 2). As such, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably
have believed the evidence the State offered and, if it did, he could have believed
that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Erskine, 4th Dist. Highland No. 14CA17, 2015-Ohio-710, ¶ 11, citing City
of Cuyahoga Falls v. Bowers, 9 Ohio St.3d 148, 150 (1984).
{¶12} We now review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Walters’s
conviction. State v. Velez, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-10, 2014-Ohio-1788, ¶ 68,
citing State v. Wimmer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-98-46, 1999 WL 355190, *1 (Mar.
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26, 1999). Because it is the only element Walters challenges on appeal, we review
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting only whether he acted willfully or
wantonly.
{¶13} First, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, that Walters’s passing improperly between the semi and the passenger
car constituted the operation of a vehicle on the highway in willful disregard for the
safety of persons or property without a justifiable excuse. See State of Ohio v.
Williams, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 2011CA18, 2012-Ohio-725 ¶ 29. Trooper Gardner
observed Walters pass between a semi truck and a passenger car in such a way as to
essentially create a third lane on a two-lane road. (Aug 17, 2016 Tr. at 3). This is
to say that, for a time, two vehicles parallel to one another occupied the same lane
of travel, with each going at least as fast as one would expect on a highway, possibly
faster. (See id.). One vehicle need not be close to another at such high rates of
speed for this situation to be quite dangerous; even if both vehicles in the same lane
were traveling at the posted speed limit, distances between the vehicles could be
closed quickly, and a crash might well ensue. Even greater peril is involved here,
as there were three vehicles—Walters’s motorcycle, the passenger car, and the semi
truck. (Id.). This passing between the car and the semi truck could be found to be
willful—Walters was in control of his motorcycle when it occurred, suggesting that
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his act was one done with intent, design, knowledge, or purpose. Williams at ¶ 29.
Traversing a highway improperly at a high rate of speed and with two other
motorists close at hand is inherently perilous to the persons and property of all
involved. (See id.).
{¶14} Second, we conclude that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could have concluded that Walters
operated a vehicle on the highway in wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property because the facts suggest that Walters substantially exceeded the speed
limit on a highway occupied by other motorists and that he passed improperly
between two fellow motorists while traveling at a high rate of speed. See State v.
Hitchcock, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 16-COA-021, 2017-Ohio-126, ¶¶ 16-17. Such
dangerous conduct could be found to indicate a reckless disregard for the rights of
those other motorists, as well as a reckless indifference to the life, limb, health, and
property thereof. (Id.).
{¶15} Walters further argues that his conviction is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. When considering the sufficiency of evidence, “[t]he
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259
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(1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997).
{¶16} However, when determining whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,
“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of
witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing
court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.
Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v.
Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
{¶17} We conclude that the trial court’s ruling was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Briefly summarized, the evidence was as follows: Trooper
Gardner observed Walters traveling at, by his estimation, eighty miles per hour on
a highway occupied by other motorists while Walters himself, because he was on a
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motorcycle, was essentially exposed to the open air. (Aug. 17, 2016 Tr. at 3). He
then observed Walters pass improperly between a semi truck and a passenger
vehicle, still at a high rate of speed, traveling parallel to both other vehicles while
in the same lane of travel as one of them. (Id.). Walters’s own account of the events
in question differs from Trooper Gardner’s only in that Walters asserts he was not
speeding. (Id. at 3-4). The trial court clearly believed that Trooper Gardner was
credible. (See id. at 4). Because the trial court was in the best position to assess the
credibility of evidence, we cannot disturb the trial court’s findings as to credibility
absent clear error. See Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). We conclude that, in weighing the statements of Trooper
Gardner, who was directly behind the defendant and in a positon to clearly observe
what happened, against the possible self-serving statements Walters made, the trial
court did not clearly lose its way and thereby create a manifest miscarriage of justice
such that a new trial must be ordered.
{¶18} We are cognizant of the fact that, despite our conclusion, the trial court
heard evidence weighing against Walters’s conviction. Walters asserted that he did
not exceed the speed limit, and he claimed that the semi truck and passenger car
were separated by approximately fifteen or twenty feet. (Aug. 17, 2016 Tr. at 3-4).
Walters further claimed that he did not create a third lane of travel but that, because
he was on a motorcycle, he did not need a great deal of space to pass other vehicles.
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(Aug. 17, 2016 Tr. at 4). He described himself as having passed between the
vehicles slowly. (Id.). For the reasons above, however, we conclude that the
evidence weighing against Walters’s conviction does not entitle him to the relief he
requests.
{¶19} Walters’s assignment of error is overruled. Having found no error in
the trial court’s proceedings in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur.
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