MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 07 2017, 9:30 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Charles W. Lahey Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nyesha Crockett, March 7, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A03-1605-CR-1177
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jane Woodward
Appellee-Plaintiff. Miller, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D01-1409-MR-10
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a jury trial, Nyesha Crockett was convicted of murder and battery
resulting in serious bodily injury and the trial court sentenced her to an
aggregate sentence of eighty years executed in the Indiana Department of
Correction. Crockett appeals, raising three issues for our review: 1) whether the
State failed to turn over exculpatory evidence in contravention of Brady v.
Maryland, 2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence,
and 3) whether Crockett’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offenses and her character. Concluding there is no Brady violation, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence, and Crockett’s sentence
is not inappropriate, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Crockett and her boyfriend, Micahyah Grier, had two children together: A.C.,
nicknamed LayLay, who was born on October 13, 2012, and M.C., who was
born on September 30, 2013. On February 1, 2014, Crockett and the children
were at a friend’s house where they were temporarily staying when Crockett left
the home to visit with Grier. During this time, Crockett and Grier argued.
When Crockett returned home, she entered her bedroom with the children.
Shortly thereafter, Crockett exited the bedroom and explained to other
individuals in the residence that A.C. was not breathing. Crockett called 911
and explained to the operator A.C. was lying down with a scarf around her
neck. A.C. was then taken to a local hospital where she was treated by Dr.
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Darley Emenim. When A.C. arrived at the hospital, Dr. Emenim observed she
had no heartbeat. Doctors were able to restart A.C.’s heart, but she remains in
a vegetative state to this day.
[3] Nearly six months later, on August 30, 2014, Crockett, Grier, and eleven-
month-old M.C. were staying at Grier’s mother’s house. At some point, Grier
and his friend, Tyeshun Johnson, left the home and Crockett followed the pair.
Nearly three hours later, Crockett returned to the home and asked to borrow
Grier’s mother’s cell phone. Because Grier did not have a phone, Crockett
contacted Grier by calling Johnson’s phone. Crockett then sent several text
messages to Johnson’s phone:
9:30 p.m.: Is [Grier] with you have him call me asap
9:23 p.m.: Imma leave him outside then
9:25 p.m.: Come get him before i hurt him
9:27 p.m.: Okay think i wont
9:51 p.m.: Good luck with everything and i hope you find your
son
State’s Ex. 17. Around the same time, Crockett sent Grier a message on
Facebook: “Im Gonna Make Sure You Remember This Nite Just Like The Day
With Laylay You Gone Go Party And Your Son Gone Be In Somebody
Dumpster.” State’s Ex. 59. Crockett thereafter returned the phone to Grier’s
mother and entered a bedroom alone with M.C. At approximately 11:00 p.m.,
Crockett exited the room and stated to Grier’s mother, “I can’t do this
anymore. . . . The same thing has happened to [M.C.] that’s happened to
[A.C.]” Transcript at 341-42. Grier’s mother immediately went to M.C. and
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discovered him lying on the floor, his lips blue. Law enforcement arrived on
the scene shortly thereafter and performed CPR until paramedics arrived. At
this point, several people were at the house and due to the commotion, Crockett
was placed in the back of a law enforcement vehicle. Law enforcement then
took Crockett to the hospital where M.C. was receiving care. When M.C.
arrived at the emergency room, he was treated by Dr. Emenim, who later stated
M.C. arrived at the hospital with no heart beat and no brain function. In caring
for M.C., Dr. Emenim observed hemorrhaging in M.C.’s eyes consistent with
strangulation. M.C. was later pronounced dead and the autopsy report
indicates the cause of death was homicidal asphyxia.
[4] Crockett remained at the hospital until approximately 3:00 a.m. when law
enforcement transported her to the St. Joseph County Sheriff’s Office Metro
Homicide Unit Headquarters. At the time, Crockett was not handcuffed and
she did not object to being transported. Law enforcement allowed Crockett to
bring with her a hospital blanket and further provided Crockett with an
opportunity to sleep when she arrived at the station. At approximately 5:30
a.m., Detective Cook interviewed Crockett.1 Detective Cook initiated the
discussion by informing Crockett of her Miranda rights, asked if she understood,
and provided her with a waiver form. Crockett acknowledged she understood
her rights and signed the waiver.
1
Throughout the interview, it does not appear law enforcement or Crockett knew M.C. had died in the
hospital.
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[5] During the interview, Crockett initially explained hospital staff told her A.C.’s
injuries occurred due to a stroke. When Detective Cook asked what happened
to M.C., Crockett explained she and M.C. were sleeping in the bedroom and
when she woke up she observed M.C. was not breathing. About twenty-five
minutes into the interview, Detective Cook confronted Crockett with the
messages she sent to Johnson’s phone. Crockett became tearful and admitted
to shaking M.C. once but explained M.C. fell asleep thereafter. A few minutes
later, Crockett admitted to shaking M.C. a couple of times. The discussion
continued and Crockett later admitted to shaking M.C. until he stopped crying.
Crockett claimed M.C. was still breathing at the time but he was making
gurgling noises. Detective Cook thereafter provided Crockett with a doll and
encouraged her to show how she shook M.C., which she did. About one hour
and twenty minutes into the interview, Detective Cook left the room for a
break, the first of six total breaks Crockett received.
[6] When Detective Cook returned from the break nearly five minutes later, he
questioned Crockett about the circumstances surrounding A.C.’s injuries.
Crockett denied injuring A.C. and explained A.C. enjoyed playing with scarves,
implying A.C. must have been playing with the scarf and accidentally wrapped
it around her neck. This portion of the interview lasted approximately twenty-
five minutes. Detective Cook then exited the room for another five-minute
break.
[7] Following another twenty-five-minute session, Crockett received another break.
Twelve minutes into this break, Crockett requested Detective Cook return to
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the room and admitted to choking A.C. with a scarf because she was angry with
Grier. Detective Cook then focused the interview on M.C. Crockett admitted
she shook M.C. multiple times and threw him on the floor. Later, Crockett
admitted to choking M.C. with one of his shirts. When asked to clarify the
sequence of events, Crockett admitted to choking M.C. with a t-shirt, then
kicking him, and shaking him until he stopped crying. Including the six breaks,
the interview lasted just under four and one-half hours. Crockett was arrested
at the conclusion of the interview.
[8] The following day, Crockett requested another interview and spoke to Detective
Cook. Detective Cook again read Crockett her Miranda rights. During this
interview, Crockett denied being responsible for A.C.’s injuries. Confusingly,
Crockett explained she previously admitted to harming A.C. because she feared
Grier would accuse her of harming A.C. As to M.C., she acknowledged she
put a shirt over his neck and kicked him, but denied she caused him to stop
breathing.
[9] On September 2, 2014, the State charged Crockett with murder, battery
resulting in serious bodily injury as a Class B felony, aggravated battery as a
Level 1 felony, and neglect of a dependent causing death as a Level 1 felony.
On August 18, 2015, Crockett moved to suppress evidence of her confession,
arguing her statements made during the interview were not voluntary. At a
hearing on the matter, the State presented a video recording of Crockett’s
interview and the testimony of Detective Cook. Detective Cook testified he has
conducted hundreds of interviews over the course of his seventeen-year career
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and does not employ any particular interrogation technique. On cross-
examination, Crockett questioned Detective Cook as to specific interrogation
training he received. Detective Cook explained he received training from
numerous interrogation schools, including a Wicklander-Zulawski class in
2011. Detective Cook could not recall whether the Reid Technique was taught
in the class.2 When pressed whether he used “psychological techniques” to get
Crockett to confess, Detective Cook stated, “It’s a possibility I may have. I
used techniques from a bunch of different things that I’ve learned, including
what I’ve taught myself. I do not follow a set guideline for a certain
interrogation, or interview technique.” Tr. at 38.
[10] Crockett also testified and presented the testimony of her expert witness, Dr.
Lawrence White. In sum, Dr. White, who has published a number of articles
pertaining to false confessions, opined Crockett was coerced into talking with
law enforcement. In addition, he noted his belief Detective Cook’s
interrogation style significantly matched the type of interviewing called for
under the Reid Technique.
[11] In denying Crockett’s motion to suppress, the trial court reviewed the
discussions between Crockett and Detective Cook and concluded the State
2
Crockett makes many assertions regarding the Reid Technique throughout her brief. However, she fails to
explain what the Reid Technique is or what effect, if any, it has on this case. We have previously discussed
the Reid Technique and described it as a technique used by police officers when interviewing or interrogating
suspects. See Malloch v. State, 980 N.E.2d 887, 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt Crockett’s statements were made
voluntarily, noting in relevant part,
Although she did not complain about the behavior of the police
when she met with them on September 1st, Crockett now
contends her August 31 statements were involuntary and should
be suppressed. She maintains she did not understand her rights.
She says she agreed to an interview only because she thought she
had to agree in order to reunite with her son. She alleges the
police yelled at her and intimidated her during the interview.
The recording of the August 31 interview belies Crockett’s
claims. Crockett was clearly advised of her Miranda rights. She
was told she did not have to talk to the police. She was told that,
if she choose [sic] to talk, she could end the interrogation at any
time. She was not told she had to speak with police if she wished
to see her son. She was not oppressed or deceived. Det. Cook
was often skeptical of Crockett’s story and occasionally raised his
voice, but the detective did not yell at Crockett or threaten her in
any way. Rather, whether by instinct or design, the detective was
generally soft-spoken and solicitious [sic] of the young mother.
Based on its review of the recorded interview, the Court does not
find Crockett credible when she asserts she was intimidated by
Det. Cook, was coerced by Det. Cook or that [she] made her
statement against her will.
Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 3 at 62-63 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted). As to Dr. White’s testimony, the trial court noted,
Dr. Lawrence White also offered his opinion of the interview. . . .
At defendant’s request, Dr. White reviewed Crockett’s August 31
statement. He did not meet with Crockett, he did not subject her
to testing, nor, apparently did he request any records that would
have supported her claims of post-partum depression and
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anxiety. He also did not attempt to determine the investigating
officers’ training and experience in interrogation.
As he evaluated the August 31 interview, Dr. White noted
several personal characteristics that might have made Crockett
more vulnerable to confessing. However, Dr. White focused
much of his criticism on Det. Cook’s behavior during the
interrogation. According to [Dr. White], Det. Cook isolated
Crockett and used the disparity of power between Crockett and
Cook to place himself in a position of dominance. He then
reinforced this dominance by his behavior toward her. Dr.
White contends that Crockett was helpless and felt she could
extricate herself from this position only by confessing. [Dr.
White] opined that Crockett was, therefore, bullied and coerced
into talking to police.
The Court has considered Dr. White’s testimony in arriving at a
decision here. The value of his opinion has been diminished,
however, by his apparent failure to consider Crocket’s September
1 explanation for her confession. According to Crockett, factors
external to the interrogation, specifically Crockett’s concerns
about [Grier] and his family, motivated her decision to confess.
While perhaps there is a way to reconcile Crocket’s explanation
for her confession and [Dr. White’s] opinion that the confession
was coerced, Dr. White did not adequately harmonize the
conflict.
Id. at 63-64 (footnotes omitted).
[12] At trial, the State admitted evidence of Crockett’s statements to Detective
Cook. In addition, both Detective Cook and Dr. White provided essentially the
same testimony they each provided at the hearing on Crockett’s motion to
suppress. On rebuttal, the State called Joseph Buckley, the president of Reid
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and Associates where the Reid Technique first originated. Buckley testified
Wicklander-Zulawski was founded by two former employees of Reid and
Associates. However, Buckley opined that Detective Cook did not utilize the
Reid Technique during his interview with Crockett.
[13] The jury found Crockett guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment of
conviction for murder and battery resulting in serious bodily injury and
sentenced Crockett to eighty years executed in the Department of Correction.
This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be added as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Brady Violation
[14] In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court of the United States held “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In order to prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must
establish the prosecution suppressed evidence, the evidence was favorable to the
defense, and the evidence was material to an issue at trial. Bunch v. State, 964
N.E.2d 274, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Evidence is deemed
material if there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would
have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. Id. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. Id. The State will not, however, be found to have suppressed
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material evidence if the evidence was available to the defendant through the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Id. Evidence favorable to the defense includes
both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Id. at 297-98.
[15] Crockett contends the State did not fully disclose Detective Cook’s training.
Specifically, she claims Detective Cook was dishonest when he stated he was
unfamiliar with the Reid Technique in light of Dr. White’s and Buckley’s
testimony. She further argues the State “assisted in the cover-up” of Detective
Cook’s alleged misrepresentations when attempting to impeach Dr. White’s
testimony. Brief of Appellant at 13. However, as the State properly asserts,
Crockett’s argument relies on testimony the trial court was not required to
credit and numerous assumptions we need not address. Put simply, Crockett
completely fails to point to any piece of evidence relevant to these proceedings
that was suppressed by the State. At both the suppression hearing and trial,
Detective Cook was questioned at length by both the State and Crockett
regarding the training he received at Wicklander-Zulawski and the methods he
utilizes in interviewing criminal suspects. Detective Cook remained consistent
with his testimony that he is neither familiar with nor utilizes the Reid
Technique. Even assuming Detective Cook misled the trial court as to his
knowledge and use of the Reid Technique, Crockett does not present any
evidence showing the State had knowledge of this misrepresentation and used it
against the defense when attempting to impeach Dr. White. We are hard-
pressed to see how the State suppressed evidence in this case and conclude the
State did not violate Brady.
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II. Admission of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
[16] Crockett challenges the voluntariness of her confession under the United States
Constitution. “If a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession
under the United States Constitution, the [S]tate must prove the statement was
voluntarily given by a preponderance of the evidence.” Pruitt v. State, 834
N.E.2d 90, 114 (Ind. 2005). The decision to admit a defendant’s statement is
within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of that discretion. Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Ind. 2000). In
reviewing the trial court’s decision to admit a defendant’s statement, “we do not
reweigh the evidence but instead examine the record for substantial probative
evidence of voluntariness.” Id.
B. Confession
[17] Crockett claims the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the statements
she made to Detective Cook because such statements were made involuntarily.
We disagree.
[18] “A statement is voluntary if, in the light of the totality of the circumstances,
the confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical
abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have
overcome the defendant’s free will.” State v. Keller, 845 N.E.2d 154, 165 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining
whether a statement is given voluntarily, the trial court must consider the
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totality of the circumstances, including police coercion; the length, location,
and continuity of the interrogation; and the defendant’s maturity, education,
physical condition, and mental health. Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 115.
[19] We have carefully reviewed the record and video recording of Crockett’s
interview with Detective Cook, and consistent with the trial court’s conclusion
and reasoning noted above, we fail to find any intimidation, threats, deception,
coercion or any other notable factors raised by Crockett invalidating the
voluntariness of her statements. In considering the totality of the
circumstances, we note Crockett was twenty-one-years old at the time. She had
completed her junior year of high school, but never graduated. Crockett was
suffering from a cough at the beginning of the interview and also self-reported
she suffered from post-partum depression and also anxiety, but as the trial court
noted, these issues do not appear to affect the voluntariness of her statements:
Crockett conversed easily with Det. Cook; she was not confused
by his questions or the topics he discussed. She responded
appropriately to the detective’s inquiries. While probably weary
and undoubtedly distressed, Crockett did not appear impaired by
either fatigue or the strain of her child’s situation. She was
sometimes weepy and sometimes subdued, yet she remained
attentive and engaged. On several occasions she corrected Det.
Cook when she felt he had misstated her responses . . . . There
was nothing either in Crockett’s demeanor or in her discussions
that suggested a particular vulnerability to interrogation.
Appellant’s App., Vol. 3 at 66.
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[20] Prior to the interview, Crockett was escorted from the hospital to the homicide
unit by law enforcement. During this time, she was not placed in handcuffs nor
was she arrested. Law enforcement then placed Crockett in an interview room3
and at no point during the interview did law enforcement restrain Crockett with
handcuffs or shackles. Rather, Detective Cook allowed Crockett to wrap
herself in a blanket and roam freely throughout the room. At the beginning of
the interview, Detective Cook read Crockett her Miranda rights, Crockett
indicated she understood, and Crockett thereafter waived those rights.
[21] Throughout the interview, Detective Cook was polite and respectful. We
certainly acknowledge Detective Cook raised his voice at times and pressed
Crockett for answers, but there is nothing exceptional about this circumstance
given the investigation into a grave injury to a child and this only occurred after
Detective Cook felt Crockett was being dishonest. Even as Dr. White observed,
Detective Cook did not make any promises, present false evidence, threaten
Crockett, or physically harm her.4 See Malloch v. State, 980 N.E.2d 887, 901-04
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming a trial court’s finding the defendant’s confession
to child molesting was voluntary on state and federal grounds despite the
detective asserting forty-nine times the defendant was awake and consciously
3
According to Detective Cook, the room was one of the largest interview rooms in the station.
4
Crockett also argues Detective Cook’s use of a doll was a manipulative tactic. The doll was originally
introduced so Crockett could demonstrate how she shook M.C. As the interview continued, however,
Detective Cook encouraged Crockett to treat the doll as a surrogate to her children. As the trial court noted,
this was a disturbing portion of the interview to view, but “Crockett never appeared to have confused the doll
with a human child.” Appellant’s App., Vol. 3 at 67 n.8.
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touched the child, challenging the defendant’s manhood, accusing the
defendant of committing disturbing acts, berating him, and making false
assertions regarding evidence), trans. denied.
[22] We further note the entire interview lasted only four and one-half hours,
including six breaks. Despite being free to leave or terminate the interview,
Crockett—on at least two occasions—ended a break early by requesting to
speak further with Detective Cook. We conclude the State proved by a
preponderance of the evidence Crockett’s statements were voluntary under the
United State Constitution.5
III. Inappropriate Sentence
[23] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, “The Court may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.” The defendant bears the burden of
persuading this court his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848
N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate
turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage
done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
5
To the extent Crockett also challenges her confession under the Indiana Constitution, we agree with the
trial court the State presented evidence beyond a reasonable doubt showing Crockett’s statements were
voluntary. See Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 114-15 (Ind. 2005) (noting the Indiana Constitution requires the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s statement was voluntarily given).
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case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role
of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers,” not achieve the perceived
“correct” result in each case. Id. at 1225.
[24] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature selected as
an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).
Here, Crockett was convicted of murder and battery resulting in serious bodily
injury, a Class B felony. A person convicted of murder shall be imprisoned for
a fixed term of between forty-five and sixty-five years, with the advisory
sentence being fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. In addition, a person
convicted of a Class B felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six
and twenty years, with the advisory sentence being ten years. Ind. Code § 35-
50-2-5(a). The trial court sentenced Crockett to sixty years executed for murder
and twenty years executed for battery resulting in serious bodily injury, to be
served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of eighty years executed in the
Department of Correction.
[25] As to the nature of the offenses, we note Crockett was the mother of two infant
children. Such a responsibility put her in a position of trust and care over the
children. After choking A.C. with a scarf and leaving her in a vegetative state
for the remainder of her life, Crockett also choked and killed her son, M.C. As
to the character of the offender, we note nothing exceptional apart from the
offenses she committed. Although Crockett claims she suffers from mental
illnesses and is a victim of domestic abuse, there is no evidence in the record to
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support these claims. We conclude Crockett’s sentence is not inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offenses and her character.
Conclusion
[26] We conclude the State did not commit a Brady violation, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting Crockett’s statements, and Crockett’s sentence
is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and her character.
Accordingly, we affirm.
[27] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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Nyesha Lashay Crockett v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion