[Cite as Bouska v. Bradshaw, 2017-Ohio-802.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
RICHARD BOUSKA : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
Petitioner : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 16CA53
MARGARET BRADSHAW, WARDEN :
:
Respondent : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Writ of Habeas Corpus - Judicial Sanction
JUDGMENT: Dismissed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 6, 2017
APPEARANCES:
For Petitioner For Respondent
RICHARD BOUSKA #673-652 JERRI L. FOSNAUGHT
Richland Correctional Inst. Assistant Attorney General
Box 8107 150 East Gay Street, 16th Floor
1001 Olivesburg Road Columbus, OH 43215
Richland County, Case No. 16CA53 2
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Petitioner, Richard Bouska, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
arguing he is entitled to release from prison. Respondent in turn filed a Motion to Dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
{¶2} Bouska was convicted in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas of
several felony offenses. The Cuyahoga County Court sentenced Bouska to 12 months
each on four counts and six months on one count. The sentences were ordered served
concurrent to one another for an aggregate sentence of 12 months.
{¶3} It is undisputed that Bouska was on post-release control at the time the
Cuyahoga County offenses were committed. Bouska was on post-release control due to
an earlier conviction and prison sentence out of the Lorain County Court of Common
Pleas.
{¶4} At the time of his sentencing, the Cuyahoga Court terminated Bouska’s post
release control and imposed two additional years in prison as a judicial sanction for
committing new offenses while on post-release control. The two year judicial sanction
was ordered to be served consecutive to the 12 months for the new offenses for a total
period of three years of incarceration.
{¶5} Ten months after the sentence was imposed in Cuyahoga County, Bouska
filed a motion to vacate his post release control supervision with the Lorain County Court
of Common Pleas. The Lorain County Court granted the motion without explanation. We
have not been provided with a copy of the motion, so we are unable to deduce the Lorain
County Court’s reasoning.
Richland County, Case No. 16CA53 3
{¶6} Petitioner argues the Cuyahoga County two year judicial sanction is void
because Petitioner’s post-release control was vacated by Lorain County.
{¶7} Habeas corpus, like other extraordinary writs, is not available when there is
an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul, 73 Ohio St.3d 185, 186, 652
N.E.2d 746 (1995); Luchene v. Wagner, 12 Ohio St.3d 37, 39, 465 N.E.2d 395 (1984).
{¶8} It is undisputed that Petitioner was on post-release control at the time the
Cuyahoga County Court imposed the judicial sanction. Petitioner has or had an adequate
remedy at law by way of appeal, petition for post-conviction relief, or motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.
{¶9} In a case very similar to the instant case, the Fourth District found, “Whether
the trial court in [the second case] properly sentenced Petitioner is not determinative in
deciding the availability of a writ of habeas corpus. Although Petitioner claims that the
court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him to a prison term, he has mistaken the alleged
impropriety of the trial court's judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, direct appeal
or post-conviction relief are the proper avenues to address such alleged errors in
sentencing. Womack v. Warden, 7th Dist. No. 04 BE 58, 2005-Ohio-1344, at ¶ 4.” Young
v. Brunsman, 2008-Ohio-64, ¶ 20 (4th Dist. Ross). See also State v. Grimes, 2015-Ohio-
3497, ¶ 3 (5th Dist. Muskingum), appeal allowed, 145 Ohio St.3d 1407, 2016-Ohio-899,
46 N.E.3d 702, ¶ 3 (2016) wherein the Appellant utilized a motion to vacate judicial
sanction to obtain review of the judicial sanction imposed pursuant to a void term of post
release control.
Richland County, Case No. 16CA53 4
{¶10} Because an adequate remedy at law exists or existed, a writ of habeas
corpus does not lie. We therefore decline to issue the writ and grant the motion to dismiss.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Delaney, J., and
Baldwin, J., concur