IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-2173
Filed March 8, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF E.L.,
Minor child,
S.L., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, David C.
Larson, District Associate Judge.
The mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her
child, E.L., born in November 2012. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g), (h), and (l) (2016).
AFFIRMED
Pamela A. Wingert of Wingert Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Gretchen Witte Kraemer,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Shannon L. Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, guardian ad litem
for minor child.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
The mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her
child, E.L., born in November 2012. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g), (h), and (l) (2016).
We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
E.L. was born in November 2012. E.L. was removed from the mother’s
care on two separate occasions due to her methamphetamine use. On July 23,
2014, E.L. was adjudicated a child in need of assistance, and on October 14,
2016, a termination hearing was held. On December 13, 2016, the court
terminated the mother’s parental rights and placed custody of E.L. with the
father. E.L. has yet to experience permanency.
E.L.’s exposure to methamphetamines began in utero. At birth, E.L.’s
mother was already involved with the Iowa Department of Human Services
(DHS) from an August 2012 child-abuse investigation related to active
methamphetamine use in the presence of the mother’s other child, B.L., E.L.’s
older sister.1 Because the mother was actively participating in substance abuse
treatment, E.L. was allowed to stay in the home. The mother and E.L.’s father
were not married at the time, but they resided together. The mother complied
with DHS services for the majority of 2013 until she relapsed on
methamphetamine in fall 2013. The mother was required to leave the home and
she participated in substance-abuse treatment for approximately six weeks.
1
On September 1, 2016, the mother’s parental rights to B.L. were terminated. E.L. and
B.L. have different fathers.
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E.L.’s father assumed physical care of both children, and the children
participated in protective daycare. After returning home, the mother discontinued
participation in DHS services.
In early 2014, a team meeting was held and DHS again provided services,
including drug screening. On five separate occasions, DHS scheduled the
mother and father for random drug testing. The father and mother failed to
provide any samples. Ultimately, DHS attempted to conduct an in-home drug
screen but the mother was unable to provide a sample, and the father was
unavailable. After receiving multiple phone calls related to the father and
mother’s alleged methamphetamine use, DHS filed a petition for removal. On
April 23, 2014, E.L. and B.L. were removed from the home and placed in family
foster services based on the concern that both parents were actively using
methamphetamine. On July 23, 2014, E.L. was adjudicated to be a child in need
of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2014).
Following removal, DHS offered multiple services, including family foster
care placement, reunification services, visitation services, substance abuse
treatment, random drug testing, and family safety, risk and permanency (FSRP)
services. In January 2015, the mother gave birth to another child, C.L., 2 and in
March 2015, the mother and father married. On April 21, 2015, custody of E.L.
and B.L. was returned to the father and mother. For the next few months E.L.’s
parents were making positive progress toward reunification. The mother was
2
The mother’s parental rights to C.L. were terminated on September 1, 2016. C.L. and
E.L. have different fathers.
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discharged from substance-abuse treatment, attending support meetings,
working part-time, and regularly meeting with FSRP workers.
DHS, however, was suspicious of relapse and attempted to test both
parties for illegal substances. Their attempts again failed. Over the summer and
fall of 2015, DHS scheduled eleven separate drug screenings. The mother and
father failed to provide a sample for any of them. On September 14, 2015, the
parents admitted to relapsing multiple times, and on September 15, 2015, the
court entered a removal order for E.L., C.L., and B.L. DHS again provided
multiple services to help the father and mother recover.
During the period leading up to the termination hearing, DHS reports
indicated the mother failed to comply with DHS services. She did not complete
any drug tests, missed intake meetings for her substance-abuse treatment, and
was consistently late for visitations. DHS reports indicated she was exposing the
children to her new boyfriend, who had an extensive criminal history, and she
was living with him in a one-bedroom apartment. Despite multiple attempts to
complete a walk-through of the new residence, DHS was unable to gain access
to verify the suitability of the living conditions.
On October 14, 2016, the termination hearing took place. As of the
termination hearing date, the mother had not completed a drug test, although she
admitted to marijuana use. The State presented evidence of the mother
purchasing methamphetamine from a known dealer. On December 13, 2016, the
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court issued an order terminating the mother’s parental rights and placing E.L. in
the custody of the father.3
The mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights.
II. Standard of Review.
We conduct a de novo review of proceedings terminating parental rights.
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). An order terminating parental
rights will be upheld if there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for
termination under Iowa Code section 232.116. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706
(Iowa 2010). Evidence is “clear and convincing” when there are no serious or
substantial doubts as to the correctness of conclusions drawn from it. Id. We
give weight to the factual determinations of the juvenile court, particularly
regarding the credibility of witnesses, although we are not bound by them. Id.
The primary consideration of our review is the best interests of the child. In re
J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006).
III. Discussion.
We review termination orders using the following three-step analysis:
The first step is to determine whether any ground for termination
under section 232.116(1) has been established. If we find that a
ground for termination has been established, then we determine
3
The district court discussed the rationale regarding placement of E.L. in the father’s
custody:
[S]ubsequent to E.L. being removed from [the father’s] care on
September 15, 2015, [the father] has worked hard on his substance
abuse recovery program and he has remained clean and sober.
Additionally, [the father] has been cooperative [FSRP] Services, he
attended all visitations with E.L., he completed a Love and Logic course,
he has been involved with Parents Connect, and he has been active in
the Parent Partner Program. [The father] is also active in his local
church, and he has built a strong support group. Based upon [the
father’s] progress, it was anticipated that E.L.’s custody would be returned
to the father by the end of October 2016.
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whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section
232.116(2) supports the termination of parental rights. Finally, if we
do find that the statutory best-interest framework supports the
termination of parental rights, we consider whether any [permissive
factors] in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of
parental rights.
In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219–20 (Iowa 2016) (citations omitted).
It is undisputed the State established grounds for termination under
section 232.116(1)(g), (h), and (l). Instead, the mother claims the court erred in
finding termination is in the best interest of E.L. She further claims the
permissive factors related to placement with a relative preclude termination of her
parental rights. We disagree.
A. Best Interests
Even when the statutory grounds for termination are satisfied, the juvenile
court must give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement
for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical,
mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). The juvenile court held the mother’s failure to participate in
services, her extensive history of substance abuse involving methamphetamine,
and the need for E.L. to experience stability were reasons termination was in
E.L.’s best interests. The mother argues termination is not in the best interest of
the child because she would continue to support E.L. financially and emotionally.
We disagree.
The mother’s limited emotional support of E.L. is insufficient to overcome
E.L.’s need for stability. Permanency and stability are essential elements to
E.L.’s best interests. See In re J.E., 726 N.W.2d at 802 (Cady, J., concurring
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specially). The record does indicate the mother’s strong bond and support of
E.L. during the supervised visitations the mother decided to attend. As the
juvenile court stated, “[The mother] has the ability to be a good parent when she
is not using controlled substances.” However, E.L. was exposed to
methamphetamine in utero and the mother has a history of methamphetamine
abuse. The mother refuses to submit to drug-testing services to demonstrate her
sobriety, and DHS was unable to verify whether the mother has a residence free
from illegal substances. Furthermore, E.L. has been in an unstable environment
since she was adjudicated a child in need of assistance in July 2014. She was
removed from the mother’s care on two separate occasions and has lived in
multiple foster homes. Psychological evaluations indicate E.L. suffers from fear
of being alone, anxiety, irritability, obsession with having enough food, and
occasional meltdowns induced by past traumatic experiences. The mother’s
continued destructive behavior is an indication that she is unable to provide E.L.
with the permanency and stability that are essential to E.L.’s best interests. See
In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (“Insight for the determination of the
child’s long-range best interests can be gleaned from ‘evidence of the parent’s
past performance for that performance may be indicative of the quality of the
future care that parent is capable of providing.’” (citation omitted)).
The mother’s financial support of E.L. is also insufficient to overcome
E.L.’s need for stability. Our primary interest is the long-range physical, mental
and emotional condition of the child. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 746 (Iowa
2011). Ending any potential financial support obligation by a termination order is
an inadequate reason to avoid termination. Id. at 748; In re L.S., 483 N.W.2d
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836, 840 (Iowa 1992) (“The fact that financial support, if any, by or through the
parents is cut off is an inadequate reason to alter [termination].”). At the time of
trial, E.L. was three years old and suffering from symptoms related to unspecified
trauma and stressor related disorder. The detrimental effect of trauma on
children is far-reaching, especially in the school setting. See Gene Griffin &
Sarah Sallen, Considering Child Trauma Issues in Juvenile Court Sentencing, 34
Child. Legal Rts. J. 1, 10 (2014) (“Trauma often has a significant impact on a
child's performance in school due to the fact that trauma robs the child of many of
the skills necessary to be productive in a school setting. Child trauma results in
neurological changes that may diminish memory, concentration, and language—
‘abilities that children need to function well in school.’” (citations omitted)).
Terminating the mother’s parental rights is in E.L.’s best interests.
B. Permissive Factors
Finally, we consider whether any of the permissive factors outweigh a
need for termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3). The Iowa Code allows the
court to decline to terminate if a relative has legal custody of the child. Id.
§ 232.116(3)(a). These factors are permissive, not mandatory. In re D.S., 806
N.W.2d 458, 475 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). “The court has discretion, based on the
unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child, whether to
apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child relationship.” Id. The
juvenile court considered whether the father’s custody of E.L. should prevent
termination but concluded termination is necessary. The mother argues it is in
E.L.’s best interest to maintain contact with E.L.’s sister and the mother’s
extended family. The mother, however, has already caused harm to E.L. by the
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mother’s methamphetamine addiction and her inability to provide a stable
environment. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency
after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by
hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
home for the child.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 112. We agree with the juvenile
court that the factors listed in section 232.116(3) should not preclude termination.
AFFIRMED