UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-7206
RAHSAN DRAKEFORD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DR. MULLINS; NURSE SCOTT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior
District Judge. (7:15-cv-00253-JLK-RSB)
Submitted: February 22, 2017 Decided: March 9, 2017
Before KEENAN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rahsan Drakeford, Appellant Pro Se. Rosalie Fessier,
TIMBERLAKE, SMITH, THOMAS & MOSES, PC, Staunton, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rahsan Drakeford commenced a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action
against Dr. Benny Mullins and Nurse S. Scott, claiming
deliberate indifference to his medical needs following a wrist
fracture suffered while Drakeford was incarcerated. Drakeford
appeals from the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to Mullins and Scott and dismissing the complaint, and
we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, “viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v.
Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“A prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170,
178 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976)). An inmate alleging a deliberate indifference claim
must establish that his medical condition was objectively
serious—that is, “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
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person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). * The inmate must also show
that the official subjectively knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Jackson, 775
F.3d at 178 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994)).
Drakeford alleged that Mullins, who treated him during the
thirteen days between his injury and surgery, did not timely
attend to his medical needs and was responsible for a delay in
scheduling the operation necessary to repair the fracture.
However, Mullins’ affidavit, which was supported by Drakeford’s
medical records, demonstrated that Mullins diligently monitored
Drakeford and prescribed him various pain medications while he
was awaiting surgery. When Mullins perceived that an orthopedic
consultation might delay the operation, he referred Drakeford to
another doctor, who performed the surgery two days later.
Drakeford also claimed that Scott refused him pain
medication. Scott explained in his affidavit that he twice
delayed administering pain medication to Drakeford in order to
*
Mullins and Scott do not dispute the district court’s
finding that Drakeford’s injury constituted a serious medical
need.
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comply with the prescription. This claim is borne out by
Drakeford’s medical records.
Drakeford did not offer any documentary evidence to refute
these accounts, nor was there any evidence that Mullins or Scott
consciously disregarded any risk to Drakeford’s well-being. To
the extent that Drakeford complains that additional, stronger,
or more frequent pain medication was required, this, without
more, is insufficient to prevail on a deliberate indifference
claim. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.
1985). Because Drakeford failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Mullins and Scott acted with a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834
(internal quotation marks omitted), the district court properly
granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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