J-S86027-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JEFFREY SCOTT WATERS
Appellant No. 620 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 31, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-CR-0000042-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED MARCH 10, 2017
Jeffrey Scott Waters appeals, pro se, from the March 31, 2016 order of
the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas dismissing as untimely his
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On August 27, 2014, Waters pled nolo contendere to two counts of
conspiring to obtain oxycodone by using forged prescriptions.1 On October
29, 2014, the trial court sentenced Waters to an aggregate term of 54 to
108 months’ incarceration and ordered him to pay costs of prosecution and
fines totaling $1,000.00. Waters did not file a post-sentence motion or a
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
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direct appeal, so his judgment of sentence became final on December 1,
2014, when the time for seeking appeal in this Court expired.
Waters filed his first PCRA petition on April 6, 2015, which the trial
court dismissed. Waters did not appeal. Waters filed the instant PCRA
petition on February 26, 2016. On March 8, 2016, the trial court filed a
notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Waters timely
objected, and the trial court issued a memorandum and order dismissing his
petition on March 31, 2016. Waters timely filed a notice of appeal.
Waters’ sole issue on appeal is whether the PCRA court improperly
dismissed his petition, which alleged an imposition of an illegal sentence.
Before addressing the merits of Waters’ PCRA petition, we must first
determine whether his petition is timely. Under Pennsylvania law, no court
has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v.
Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super. 2010); see also
Commonwealth v. Davis, 916 A.2d 1206, 1208 (Pa.Super. 2007)
(timeliness requirement of the PCRA is “mandatory and jurisdictional in
nature”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1167
(Pa.Super. 2001)). “[A] PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent
petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment
becomes final.” Monaco, 996 A.2d at 1079; see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
A judgment is “final at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
There are three exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar, establishing the
limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be
excused. Monaco, 996 A.2d at 1079 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)). For
one of the exceptions to apply, a petitioner must allege and prove one of the
following:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Further, a petition invoking one of these
exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have
been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2).
Waters’ judgment of sentence became final on December 1, 2014. He
had one year, or until December 1, 2015, to file a timely PCRA petition.
Waters’ second PCRA petition, filed on February 26, 2016, is patently
untimely. On appeal, Waters fails to allege any of the three exceptions to
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the one-year PCRA time bar. Therefore, we conclude that the PCRA court
properly dismissed his second PCRA petition as untimely.2
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/10/2017
____________________________________________
2
In Waters’ PCRA petition, he claimed the “new-facts” exception,
arguing that 18 Pa.C.S. § 109 was a “new fact” sufficient to trigger an
exception to the one-year time bar. Section 109 relates to a prosecution
being barred following a former prosecution for the same offense. This
statute became effective June 6, 1973; it cannot constitute a “new fact.”
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Com. v. Waters, J.
Combined Opinion