In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐3374
AMIR JAKUPOVIC,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
MARK C. CURRAN, JR., et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:16‐cv‐03636 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2017 — DECIDED MARCH 10, 2017
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, FLAUM, Circuit Judge, and
CONLEY, Chief District Judge.*
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Amir Jakupovic was charged in Lake
County, Illinois with telephone harassment. Before trial, the
state court ordered that Jakupovic first be detained and
then released on electronic surveillance. Jakupovic alleges
* Of the Western District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.
2 No. 16‐3374
that various state officials acted unlawfully in refusing to re‐
lease him on electronic surveillance because he lacked a Lake
County residence. The district court dismissed Jakupovic’s
claims with prejudice. We conclude the claims are jurisdic‐
tionally barred and vacate and remand with instructions to
dismiss without prejudice.
I. Background
Jakupovic resided in Cook County, Illinois. In September
2015, Jakupovic’s then‐girlfriend filed a domestic battery re‐
port against him in Cook County. Around the same time, the
girlfriend’s mother filed a telephone harassment report
against Jakupovic in Lake County. On September 25, the State
charged Jakupovic with telephone harassment in Lake
County. The trial court released Jakupovic after his brother
posted bond, and, on October 22, Jakupovic pled not guilty.
The trial court ordered that Jakupovic undergo an Ontario
Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (“ODARA”), pursuant to
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/110‐5(f). On November 17, the trial court
reviewed the ODARA report and ordered that Jakupovic first
be taken into custody and then placed under pre‐trial elec‐
tronic surveillance.
The Lake County Sheriff’s Department did not release
Jakupovic under electronic surveillance. As alleged, the de‐
partment required pre‐trial detainees to have a Lake County
residence in order to be monitored electronically. Lacking
such a residence, Jakupovic failed to meet this condition. The
next day, on November 18, Jakupovic filed an emergency mo‐
tion, arguing that the electronic monitoring condition on his
bond could not be satisfied because he was not a resident of
Lake County, and that, as a result, he could be subject to in‐
definite custody. The trial court denied Jakupovic’s motion. It
No. 16‐3374 3
then refused to reconsider the order, concluding that having
a Lake County residence for the purposes of electronic moni‐
toring was one of the conditions of Jakupovic’s bond and his
inability to meet that condition was insufficient grounds for
reconsideration. So the Lake County Sheriff’s Department
continued to detain Jakupovic. Shortly thereafter, Jakupovic
filed a motion to modify his bond conditions. The trial court
scheduled a hearing for November 25, but Jakupovic pled
guilty on November 23. Jakupovic did not file any appeals in
the state courts.
In March 2016, Jakupovic sued Mark Curran (Lake County
Sheriff and Director of the Lake County Jail), Terrence Barrett
(the jail’s Pretrial Unit Manager), Christine Hecker (Lake
County’s Principal Probation Officer), and Joseph Fusz (a
Lake County Assistant State’s Attorney) under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Jakupovic alleged that his six‐day detainment violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and constituted false
imprisonment under Illinois law. The district court granted
defendants‐appellees’ motion to dismiss Jakupovic’s com‐
plaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce‐
dure 12(b)(6). This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de
novo. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 382
(7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Proce‐
dure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss a complaint for fail‐
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To properly state a claim, a plaintiff’s com‐
plaint must contain allegations that plausibly suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a
speculative level.” Kubiak v. City of Chi., 810 F.3d 476, 480
4 No. 16‐3374
(7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kubiak v. City of Chi., Ill., 137
S. Ct. 491 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omit‐
ted). “We accept as true all of the well‐pleaded facts in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [ap‐
pellants].” Id. at 480–81 (citation omitted).
“[W]e are required to consider subject‐matter jurisdiction
as the first question in every case, and we must dismiss this
suit if such jurisdiction is lacking.” Aljabri v. Holder, 745 F.3d
816, 818 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Ill. v. City of Chi., 137 F.3d 474,
478 (7th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)). We conclude that,
under the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine, we have no jurisdiction
here. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); D.C.
Cir. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). Simply put:
Lower federal courts are not vested with appel‐
late authority over state courts. The Rooker‐Feld‐
man doctrine prevents lower federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by
state court losers challenging state court judg‐
ments rendered before the district court pro‐
ceedings commenced. The rationale for the doc‐
trine is that no matter how wrong a state court
judgment may be under federal law, only the
Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdic‐
tion to review it.
Sykes v. Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741–42
(7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see also Kelley v. Med‐1 Sols.,
LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) (“A state litigant seeking
review of a state court judgment must follow the appellate
process through the state court system and then directly to the
United States Supreme Court.”) (citation omitted). The initial
inquiry, then, “is whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set
No. 16‐3374 5
aside a state court judgment or whether he is, in fact, present‐
ing an independent claim.” Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,
374 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quota‐
tion marks omitted). To make this determination, we ask
whether the federal claims either “directly” challenge a state
court judgment or are “inextricably intertwined” with one. Id.
Claims that directly seek to set aside a state court judg‐
ment are de facto appeals that are barred without further anal‐
ysis. Id. But even federal claims that were not raised in state
court, or that do not on their face require review of a state
court’s decision, may still be subject to Rooker‐Feldman if those
claims are inextricably intertwined with a state court judg‐
ment. Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742 (citation omitted); see also Feldman,
460 U.S. at 482 n.16. While the latter concept is a “somewhat
metaphysical” one, the crucial point is whether the district
court is essentially being called upon to review the state court
decision. Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533 (citation and internal quota‐
tion marks omitted). Ultimately, the “determination hinges on
whether the federal claim alleges that the injury was caused
by the state court judgment, or alternatively, whether the fed‐
eral claim alleges an independent prior injury that the state
court failed to remedy.” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742; see also Long v.
Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1999). If we
determine that a claim is inextricably intertwined with a state
court judgment—that is, that the former indirectly seeks to set
aside the latter—then we must determine whether the plain‐
tiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state
court proceedings. Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533 (quoting Brokaw v.
Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 2002)). If so, the claim is
barred.
6 No. 16‐3374
Notably, the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine is a narrow one.
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (citing Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
“[F]ederal jurisdiction does not terminate automatically on
the entry of judgment in a state court,” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742
(citation omitted), as independent claims are jurisdictionally
firm, Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603 (citation omitted). For a federal
claim to be barred, “there must be no way for the injury com‐
plained of by [the] plaintiff to be separated from [the] state
court judgment.” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742 (citations omitted).
Jakupovic’s claims do not directly seek to set aside the
state trial court’s judgments regarding his electronic‐surveil‐
lance bond condition. Thus, we must determine whether his
claims are inextricably intertwined with those judgments, and
if so, whether he had a reasonable opportunity to raise these
issues in state court proceedings.
A. Inextricably Intertwined
Jakupovic argues that the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine does
not bar his claims, because he does not challenge the state
court’s judgments keeping him detained for lack of a Lake
County residence. Instead, he stresses, he challenges defend‐
ants‐appellees’ “procedure which forced the Plaintiff to unnec‐
essarily be detained in jail for [six] days.” However, when
“the injury is executed through a court order, there is no con‐
ceivable way to redress the wrong without overturning the
order of a state court. Rooker‐Feldman does not permit such an
outcome.” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 743.
Kelley and Sykes are instructive. In Kelley, the plaintiff ar‐
gued that it was not the state court’s award of attorney’s fees
that caused his injury, but rather the attorneys’ preceding
No. 16‐3374 7
fraudulent misrepresentations. 548 F.3d at 605. We concluded,
however, that the plaintiff’s claims were inextricably inter‐
twined with the state court’s judgment, despite the fact that
the allegedly unlawful actions occurred prior to that judg‐
ment, because “[w]e could not determine that defendants’
representations … related to attorney fees violated the law
without determining that the state court erred by issuing
judgments granting the attorney fees.” Id. Similarly, in Sykes,
the plaintiff asserted that her Americans with Disabilities Act
claims were independent from the state judge’s order denying
the plaintiff’s motion for reasonable accommodations, be‐
cause they focused on the state judge’s wrongful conduct—in‐
terrogating the plaintiff about her service dog and banning
the dog from the courtroom. 837 F.3d at 742. Nevertheless, alt‐
hough the judge’s conduct preceded the order, we found that
we lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims, because “[i]f the
judge violated the ADA by engaging in impermissible ques‐
tioning or wrongly banning [the dog] from her courtroom,
those alleged violations were also the basis of her order.” Id.
at 743.
Jakupovic’s claims meet the same fate. As alleged, defend‐
ants‐appellees executed the state court’s bond condition and
order, and detained Jakupovic for six days. To find defend‐
ants‐appellees’ conduct unlawful, we would have to deter‐
mine that the state court erred in keeping Jakupovic detained
for lacking a Lake County residence. As such, Jakupovic’s
claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judg‐
ments.
Jakupovic’s reliance on Burke v. Johnston, 452 F.3d 665 (7th
Cir. 2006), is misplaced. There, the state court denied the
plaintiff jail credit that he believed he was owed; but he did
8 No. 16‐3374
not challenge this decision, as he ultimately got the credit he
sought by raising the issue with the state’s department of cor‐
rections. Id. at 668. The plaintiff instead filed a federal lawsuit
against Department‐of‐Corrections officials for allegedly tak‐
ing too long to administratively grant the plaintiff his credit.
Id. That issue was neither presented to nor decided by the
state court, so the plaintiff’s claim was not inextricably inter‐
twined with any state court judgment. Id. Thus, we con‐
cluded, Rooker‐Feldman presented no jurisdictional bar. Id.
Here, unlike in Burke, the argument Jakupovic now presents
is in essence what he argued below: The residence require‐
ment may lead to indefinite detention. And the state court re‐
jected this argument; so defendants‐appellees executed the
state court’s bond condition and order and kept Jakupovic de‐
tained. Although Jakupovic alleges that defendants‐appellees
detained him under their own residence “policy,” we cannot
find that policy unconstitutional without also concluding that
the state court’s judgments, ordering the same residence re‐
quirement and detainment, were unlawful. See Kelley, 548 F.3d
at 605. So Jakupovic’s claims and the state court’s judgments
are inextricably intertwined.
B. Reasonable Opportunity to Raise in State Court
Although Jakupovic’s claims are inextricably intertwined
with the state court’s judgments, the claims are barred under
Rooker‐Feldman only if he had a reasonable opportunity to
raise the issues in state court proceedings. See Taylor, 374 F.3d
at 534–35; see also Kelley, 548 F.3d 605–06. “The ‘reasonable op‐
portunity’ inquiry focuses not on ripeness, but on difficulties
caused by ‘factor[s] independent of the actions of the oppos‐
ing part[ies] that precluded’ a plaintiff from bringing federal
No. 16‐3374 9
claims in state court, such as state court rules or procedures.”
Taylor, 374 F.3d at 534–35 (quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 558).
Jakupovic had at least three opportunities to raise in state
court the issues he now raises on appeal. First, he filed an
emergency motion challenging the state court’s bond condi‐
tion, alleging that it could lead to indefinite custody. The court
denied that motion. Second, Jakupovic asked the state court
to reconsider its ruling on the bond condition, but the court
denied that motion, too, and explicitly ordered that Jakupovic
continue to be detained because he did not have a Lake
County residence. Finally, Jakupovic filed a motion to modify
his bond conditions, and the state court scheduled a hearing
for one week later, on November 25; before the hearing, how‐
ever, Jakupovic pled guilty. That Jakupovic had a reasonable
opportunity to present to the state court claims that are inex‐
tricably intertwined with that court’s judgments deprives us
of subject‐matter jurisdiction.
C. Dismissal Without Prejudice
The district court dismissed Jakupovic’s claims with prej‐
udice. Because we conclude that Jakupovic’s claims are juris‐
dictionally barred under Rooker‐Feldman, the complaint
should be dismissed without prejudice. See Frederiksen v. City
of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438–39 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When the
Rooker‐Feldman doctrine applies, there is only one proper dis‐
position: dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction. A jurisdic‐
tional disposition is conclusive on the jurisdictional question:
the plaintiff cannot re‐file in federal court. But it is without
prejudice on the merits, which are open to review in state
court to the extent the state’s law of preclusion permits.” (cit‐
ing T.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997))).
10 No. 16‐3374
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the
district court and REMAND with instructions to dismiss
Jakupovic’s claims without prejudice for lack of subject‐mat‐
ter jurisdiction.