United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT March 21, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-31158
Summary Calendar
GARY SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:04-CV-539
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Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Gary Smith appeals the affirmance of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of his application for Supplemental
Security Income (SSI). He argues that the district court
erroneously concluded the he was not disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act because (1) his impairment meets or
exceeds the impairment listed at 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,
§ 12.06 for an anxiety disorder, and (2) his impairment makes him
unable to work. Substantial evidence in the record supports the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-31158
-2-
ALJ’s conclusion that Smith could not meet or exceed the listed
impairment because there was no evidence that Smith experienced
two of the conditions of 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,
§ 12.06B.
Regarding Smith’s allegation that he is unable to work, the
ALJ found Smith’s subjective complaints of functional limitations
to lack credibility. Because this finding is supported by
substantial record evidence, it is entitled to judicial
deference. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir.
1990). Moreover, the vocational expert testified that a person
with Smith’s age, education, and impairment could work at one of
over 50,000 jobs in Louisiana. Thus, the ALJ’s conclusion that
Smith could work is supported by substantial evidence. See
Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 273-74 (5th Cir. 2002).
Smith also argues that his case should be remanded based on
new material evidence that reveals that he is disabled. Smith
has not shown that the new evidence relates to the time period
for which benefits were denied, reveals more than a deterioration
of his impairments that were previously found not to be
disabling, or would have changed the outcome of the
Commissioner’s determination. Accordingly, no remand is
warranted based on the new evidence Smith submitted. See Ripley
v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995); Leggett v. Chater,
67 F.3d 558, 567 (5th Cir. 1995). The judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.