FILED
COURT OF APPEALS DIV I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
2017 MAR 13 h:i 8:01:.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of ) No. 74955-2-I
M.L., ) DIVISION ONE
Appellant. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
) FILED: March 13, 2017
BECKER, J. — M.L. appeals the order committing him to involuntary
treatment. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that
M.L. posed a likelihood of serious harm to others. We affirm.
Officers from the King County Sheriffs Office served an eviction notice on
appellant M.L. at his house on February 17, 2016. Based on M.L.'s behavior, a
deputy called a designated mental health professional to the house.
The next day, February 18, a designated mental health professional
petitioned for M.L.'s initial detention. The trial court granted the petition. M.L.
was admitted to Highline Medical Center for evaluation and treatment. The next
day, Highline Medical Center petitioned for 14 days of additional involuntary
treatment. The petition triggered the statutory requirement for a probable cause
hearing. RCW 71.05.240(1).
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The probable cause hearing was held on February 22, 2016. To commit a
person for 14-day involuntary treatment, the petitioner must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person, "as the result of mental disorder,
presents a likelihood of serious harm, or is gravely disabled." RCW 71.05.240(3)(a).
The petitioners proceeded only on their allegation that M.L. presented a
"likelihood of serious harm to others." That term means "a substantial risk that...
physical harm will be inflicted by a person upon another, as evidenced by
behavior which has caused such harm or which places another person or persons
in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm." RCW 71.05.020(27)(a)(ii). At the
hearing, Deputy Joseph Winters and Dr. Richard Thomas testified in support of
the petition. M.L. did not testify or present any evidence.
The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that M.L., as a result
of a mental disorder, presented a likelihood of serious harm to others. The court
entered an order committing M.L. for involuntary treatment for a period of 14
days. M.L. appeals. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that
he presented a likelihood of serious harm to others.
Where the trial court has weighed the evidence, our review is generally
limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings, and, if
so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court's conclusions of law and
judgment. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728 P.2d 138(1986).
Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-
minded person of the truth of the declared premise. Holland v. Boeing Co., 90
Wn.2d 384, 390, 583 P.2d 621 (1978). The party challenging a finding of fact
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bears the burden of demonstrating the finding is not supported by substantial
evidence. Nordstrom Credit, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 120 Wn.2d 935, 939-40,
845 P.2d 1331 (1993).
To support the finding that M.L. presented a likelihood of serious harm to
others, petitioners rely on the opinion of Dr. Thomas, who testified to that effect
at the hearing. Dr. Thomas, a licensed clinical psychologist, evaluated M.L. at
Highline Medical Center several days before the hearing. M.L. did not participate
in the evaluation. Dr. Thomas reviewed the medical charts and spoke with M.L.'s
treatment team.
The court permitted Dr. Thomas to read from and refer to several sources
of information about M.L., including the initial detention paperwork, a declaration
from a deputy sheriff concerning reports that M.L. had threatened to harm family
members and "to kill cops," and a sheriff's office bulletin listing instances of
M.L.'s history of assaults and threats. M.L. objected to this testimony as
hearsay. The court agreed it was hearsay and would not be considered as
substantive evidence. It was admitted as relevant for the basis of Dr. Thomas's
opinion.
Without objection, Dr. Thomas then read portions of the medical record at
Highline, where M.L. had been since the initial detention. This portion of his
testimony documented M.L.'s delusional statements and inappropriate language
and thus helped to prove M.L.'s mental disorder. The finding of a mental
disorder is not challenged. The controversy in this appeal is whether Dr. Thomas
provided substantive evidence that M.L.'s behavior presented a likelihood of
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harm to others. Again, given the petitioners' theory, the statutory definition
required proof of a "substantial risk" that M.L. would inflict physical harm upon
another,"as evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or which places
another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm." RCW
71.05.020(27)(a)(ii).
The only substantive evidence that M.L. had engaged in such behavior
was Dr. Thomas'testimony about an incident involving a milk carton. The
incident occurred on February 19. An emergency medical technician was
handing M.L. the milk he had requested. According to the chart notes, as
relayed by Dr. Thomas,"the patient punched the milk, exploding it all over both of
them. The patient continued to fight with [the technician]. They both fell to the
ground. The patient was actively trying to assault[the technician]." Two staff
members took M.L. to the ground, and he was put into four-point restraints. Dr.
Thomas testified that this incident factored into his opinion that M.L. presented a
substantial risk of harm to others because it showed he was impulsive and
"assaultive in the hospital."
Q. You say in the hospital. What's the importance of the setting?
A. Well, it's very important as if someone is assaultive in the
hospital setting, it shows that this behavior is continuing and is
acted upon. It's not just threats. This man is dangerous.
M.L. contends the evidence that he fought with a hospital staff person
insufficiently supports the finding that he presented a likelihood of serious harm
to others because the incident occurred shortly after he was admitted to the
hospital and his condition had improved by the time of the hearing. As evidence
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that his condition improved, M.L. cites this response by Dr. Thomas to a question
on cross-examination:
Q. Okay. And sitting here and observing my client today, you
didn't see any indications that looked like any type of physical
assault, correct?
A. That is correct.
A. I didn't see any assaultive behavior.
This response was not an acknowledgement by Dr. Thomas that M.L.'s
condition had improved. In fact, Dr. Thomas had just been asked on direct
examination to explain why he had "the opinion that the respondent still presents
a danger to others even though that happened three or four days ago?" He
answered that attacking a healthcare provider who was trying to help "is showing
exceedingly poor judgment, exceedingly poor impulse control. This is only three
days ago, and there's no insight."
The assault on the hospital technician, as described in the testimony of Dr.
Thomas, was sufficient to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, a
substantial risk that M.L. would inflict physical harm upon another, "as evidenced
by behavior which has caused such harm." RCW 71.05.020(27)(a)(ii). M.L. has
not met his burden to demonstrate the challenged finding is not supported by
substantial evidence.
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The 14-day commitment order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
•
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