[Cite as State v. Wood, 2017-Ohio-916.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 28037
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DOMINIQUE A. WOOD COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 14 02 0465
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 15, 2017
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Dominique Wood appeals her sentence for rape from the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Ms. Wood pleaded guilty to one count of rape under Revised Code Section
2907.02(A)(2) for digitally penetrating and performing cunnilingus on her five-year-old cousin.
The trial court sentenced her to eight years imprisonment. Ms. Wood has appealed her sentence,
assigning as error that it is clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT’S SENTENCE IS CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AS THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS MATTER AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE
RECORD DO NOT PROVIDE FOR THE SENTENCE OF EIGHT YEARS
INCARCERATION.
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{¶3} Ms. Wood asserts that the length of her prison sentence is excessive, arguing that
it is longer than necessary to fulfill the purposes of criminal sentencing. In reviewing a felony
sentence, this Court’s “standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “[This Court] may vacate or modify a felony sentence on
appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence” that: (1) “the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes,” or (2) “the sentence is otherwise
contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. “That is, [this
Court] may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law
only if [it] finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence.”
Id. at ¶ 23. Clear and convincing evidence is that “which will produce in the mind of the trier of
facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161
Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶4} In support of her argument, Ms. Wood notes that, at the time of the offense, she
was only 19, had no criminal history, had a consistent employment history, and had also taken
some college courses. She accepted responsibility for her acts, was remorseful, and fully
cooperated with police, even though she was too intoxicated at the time of the offense to
remember what happened. Ms. Wood also notes that a psychologist opined that her offense fell
outside the usual categories for female sex offenders and that it appeared to be situational and
unplanned. The psychologist also opined that Ms. Wood was amenable to treatment, that she
showed no indications of recidivism, and that there is only a low to moderate risk that she may
reoffend. Ms. Wood further notes that, although the victim’s mother described the pain the
victim has experienced since the offense, there is no objective evidence that the victim suffered
serious psychological harm.
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{¶5} A violation of Section 2907.02(A)(2) is a felony of the first degree, for which the
trial court must sentence the offender to a term of three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or
eleven years. R.C. 2907.02(B); R.C. 2929.13(F)(2); R.C. 2929.14(A)(1). At sentencing, the
prosecution noted that Ms. Wood was originally charged with violating Section
2907.02(A)(1)(b), for which she faced life imprisonment. It argued that, in exchange for her
guilty plea, the State had amended the indictment so Ms. Wood could avoid a life sentence.
Arguing that Ms. Wood, therefore, had already received a break, and noting that she had harmed
a close family member who trusted her, the prosecution argued that the court should sentence
Ms. Wood to eleven years, despite the “glowing” report she received from the psychologist.
{¶6} In determining Ms. Wood’s sentence, the trial court stated that it had considered
the plea negotiations, the presentence investigation, the testimony that was presented at the
sentencing hearing, and the letters and statements from the victim’s and defendant’s family. It
stated that, upon consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, the minimum sentence that
would protect the public and punish Ms. Wood without imposing an unnecessary burden on state
or local resources was eight years. In reaching that determination, the court explained that it had
considered Ms. Wood’s amenability for treatment and rehabilitation, the amount of punishment
required by statute, and the pain that the offense had caused. In its sentencing entry, the court
wrote that it had considered the record and oral statements as well as the principles and purposes
of sentencing under Section 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors under Section
2929.12.
{¶7} Upon review of the record, we cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that
it does not support the eight-year sentence imposed by the trial court. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d
516, 2016-Ohio-1002, at ¶ 23. As Ms. Wood concedes that her sentence is not otherwise
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contrary to law, there are no grounds for this Court to modify the sentence under Section
2953.08(G). Id. Ms. Wood’s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶8} Ms. Wood’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
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CARR, P. J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
RICHARD P. KUTUCHIEF, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.