FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 15 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTONIO PAZ-VALADEZ, AKA Juan No. 14-70092
Robles,
Agency No. A088-450-150
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 13, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and HUFF,*** District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Marilyn L. Huff, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
Antonio Paz-Valadez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s denial of cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252. Whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude
(“CIMT”) is a question of law we review de novo. Espino-Castillo v. Holder, 770
F.3d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petition for review.
The BIA did not err in determining that Paz-Valadez’s conviction for
knowingly possessing a false identification document with intent to defraud the
United States under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) is categorically a CIMT because
“intent . . . to defraud” is an element of the crime. See Blanco v. Mukasey, 518
F.3d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A crime involves fraudulent conduct, and thus is a
[CIMT], if intent to defraud is either explicit in the statutory definition of the crime
or implicit in the nature of the crime.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Espino-
Castillo, 770 F.3d at 864 (recognizing that “[a] court may not apply the modified
categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral
turpitude” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Paz-Valadez’s argument that his conviction is not a CIMT based on this
court’s decision in Beltran-Tirado v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000), is
foreclosed. See Espino-Castillo, 770 F.3d at 865 (explaining that Beltran-Tirado
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was, “at best, . . . an isolated exception to the prevailing rule that a conviction for a
fraud offense is categorically a [CIMT]”). The unique circumstances warranting
Beltran-Tirado’s “isolated exception” do not exist in this case. See Beltran-
Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1183.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), a non-permanent resident is not eligible
for cancellation of removal if he or she has been convicted of two or more CIMTs
not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The BIA correctly
determined that Paz-Valadez’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) and for
petty theft are CIMTs that render him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of
removal.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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