Petition of Edwin R. Jonas III for Reinstatement to the Bar of the State of Maine

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 48
Docket: Cum-15-345
Argued: April 5, 2016
Decided: March 16, 2017

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

PETITION OF EDWIN R. JONAS III FOR REINSTATEMENT
TO THE BAR OF THE STATE OF MAINE

SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶1] In 2013, Edwin R. Jonas III, who had been admitted to the Maine Bar

in 1987, petitioned for reinstatement to the bar from his administrative

suspension for failing to register in 1995. A single justice of the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court (Gorman, J.) ultimately denied Jonas’s petition for reinstatement.

Jonas now appeals to us, in our capacity as the Law Court,1 challenging the

processes employed by the Grievance Commission, the Board of Overseers of

the Bar, and the single justice in reviewing his petition for reinstatement. Jonas

also challenges the single justice’s evidentiary rulings during the de novo

hearing on his petition, and the Board’s and the single justice’s conclusion that

he failed to meet his burden to show that he was eligible for reinstatement.

1 We treat the single justice’s decision on the petition for reinstatement as the judgment of a trial

court and review as an appellate body. See 4 M.R.S. § 57 (2016); In re Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 1, 8
A.3d 666; In re Application of Feingold, 296 A.2d 492, 496 (Me. 1972).
2

[¶2] The record reflects that Jonas has engaged in more than two decades

of litigation with his ex-wife during which he was suspended from the bars of

three states, jailed for contempt, declared a vexatious litigant, and admonished

by a federal court for making frivolous arguments. We affirm the single justice’s

judgment declining to reinstate Jonas to the Maine Bar.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶3] The single justice’s factual findings, reported here, are supported by

witness testimony, the parties’ exhibits, and findings and judgments contained

in the decisions of other courts and disciplinary bodies before whom Jonas was

a party. Preliminarily, we note that this matter is complicated by the fact that,

following the completion of the proceedings, the applicable Maine Bar Rules

were repealed and replaced in their entirety with rules that substantially

changed the procedures for reinstatement since Jonas’s petition was filed.2 See

generally M. Bar R. (Tower 2015) (effective July 1, 2015). Except as otherwise

indicated, all references to the Maine Bar Rules are to the rules that were in

effect at the time of Jonas’s petition. See generally M. Bar R. (Tower 2014).

2 The Maine Bar Rules govern proceedings for attorney discipline and reinstatement, which are

initiated with the Board of Overseers of the Bar. See M. Bar R. (Tower 2014). Proceedings for the
admission of new attorneys to the bar are initiated with the Board of Bar Examiners and governed
by the Maine Bar Admission Rules, which have not materially changed since Jonas filed his petition.
 3

[¶4] Jonas was admitted to the Maine Bar in 1987. Because of his failure

to complete an annual registration, see M. Bar R. 6(b)(1), he was

administratively suspended from the Maine Bar in 1995.

[¶5] In 1990, Jonas and his wife, Linda Jonas, were divorced. Since then,

Jonas and Linda have been involved in highly contentious post-divorce

litigation. In 1995, while the parties were litigating competing post-judgment

motions, Linda alleged that Jonas was secretly liquidating assets and hiding the

proceeds in accounts in the Cayman Islands, and that he planned to move there

with the couple’s children. The New Jersey Superior Court ordered Jonas not

to transfer any assets valued over $15,000 and not to remove the children from

a five-state area.

[¶6] In direct violation of the court’s order, Jonas obtained a loan of

$130,000 secured by a mortgage on his residence and continued efforts to sell

commercial property that he rented out as a 7-Eleven building, eventually

deeding the store to his sister and a friend to be held in trust for the children.

In addition, Jonas secretly kept $438,000 in a bank account in the Cayman

Islands, and on September 15, 1995, he absconded with his children to the

Cayman Islands, where he enrolled them in school.
4

[¶7] After Jonas failed to appear at a hearing, the court issued a warrant

for Jonas’s arrest, placed the children in Linda’s custody, and took a number of

protective measures designed to ensure that Jonas complied with his financial

obligations imposed by previous court orders. Jonas continued to defy the

court’s orders regarding the payment of his support obligations. Shortly

thereafter, Jonas was briefly incarcerated for contempt of court. The New

Jersey Appellate Division upheld the series of actions taken by the trial court,

stating, “As evidenced by the record, [Jonas] time and again failed to abide by

the court’s orders and deliberately avoided paying alimony and other support

to the plaintiff.”

[¶8] As a result of his actions, the New Jersey State Bar suspended Jonas

for a period of six months beginning on September 2, 2005, for conduct

intended to disrupt a tribunal and conduct that was prejudicial to the

administration of justice. Jonas has not been reinstated in New Jersey.

[¶9] In 2006, Jonas was reciprocally suspended from the bar of

Pennsylvania for a period of six months based on the discipline imposed in New

Jersey. Jonas was reinstated to inactive status in Pennsylvania in 2014. In

2007, Jonas was reciprocally suspended from the Florida bar for a period of one

year for committing conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
 5

[¶10] After his suspension from the New Jersey bar, Jonas’s post-divorce

proceedings in New Jersey continued. Jonas failed to attend multiple hearings

during these proceedings. Based on Jonas’s “obstinate refusal to comply or

properly respond to court orders,” the Appellate Division dismissed an appeal

from Jonas, stating, “[Jonas’s] defiance is especially egregious in light of the fact

that he was an attorney-at-law of this State and was suspended in this state and

others for his willful evasion of court orders.”

[¶11] At some point prior to 2009, Jonas moved to Montana. When Linda

sought to domesticate the New Jersey judgments in Montana, Jonas

unsuccessfully launched a collateral attack on the judgments. The court

granted Linda’s motion to declare Jonas a vexatious litigant and found that in

attempting to defy the New Jersey judgments, Jonas had willfully abused his

litigation skills by filing “harassing, duplicative, vexatious, and frivolous”

lawsuits, had filed appeals in matters in which he had “no objective good faith

expectation of prevailing,” and had caused “needless expense and burden” to

Linda.

[¶12] During litigation that Jonas instituted in the United States District

Court for the District of Montana against Linda, her Montana attorney, and

others, Jonas was ordered to show cause why he should not be sanctioned
6

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for making frivolous

arguments. After Jonas failed to show good cause, the court issued a sanction

in the form of an admonishment dated August 7, 2014. A copy of its

admonishment was forwarded to the state bars of Maine, New Jersey, and

Pennsylvania. By the time the admonishment was forwarded to the Maine Bar,

Jonas’s reinstatement proceedings were already pending before the Maine

Board of Overseers of the Bar.

B. Procedural History of Jonas’s Petition for Reinstatement in Maine

[¶13] On September 20, 2013, Jonas filed a petition for reinstatement to

the Maine Bar with the Supreme Judicial Court and the Board of Overseers of

the Bar. The matter was assigned to a single justice of the Supreme Judicial

Court. Bar Counsel opposed the petition. On March 4, 2014, the Grievance

Commission held a hearing concerning the petition for reinstatement. The

Commission recommended to the Board that Jonas be conditionally reinstated

to the bar. Both Jonas and Bar Counsel objected to some aspect of the Grievance

Commission’s recommendations. In response, the Board created a “Special

Panel” of the Board to review the evidence adduced at the Commission’s

hearing, seek additional written arguments from the parties, and make a
 7

recommendation to the Board as a whole as to whether the Board should

recommend Jonas’s reinstatement.

[¶14] Once the Special Panel completed its work, the full Board met.3 The

Board found that Jonas did not meet his burden to establish that he should be

reinstated. The Board concluded that the Grievance Commission had failed to

consider the necessary factors in determining whether to recommend

reinstatement. On September 24, 2014, the Board recommended to the single

justice that Jonas’s petition for reinstatement be denied.

[¶15] After briefing and argument on several procedural issues, the

single justice scheduled a de novo hearing on Jonas’s petition in which the court

provided the parties an opportunity to present all relevant evidence and make

a record that was to be “created anew.”

[¶16] Prior to the hearing, Jonas filed a motion in limine seeking to

exclude evidence of any issues regarding Jonas’s conduct that were not raised

in the hearing before the Grievance Commission. The single justice denied the

motion, noting that Jonas had the burden to prove that he was eligible for

reinstatement by clear and convincing evidence, and concluding that “[d]ue

process does not require that the Board notify Mr. Jonas of those aspects of his

3 The record does not contain a report or other written record of the recommendation of the

Special Panel to the full Board.
8

burden that it anticipates challenging at the hearing, nor does due process limit

the Board from challenging any aspect of Mr. Jonas’s presentation.”

[¶17] A two-day bench trial was held on April 27 and 28, 2015. At the

trial, Jonas objected to the admission of prior court orders and decisions in

cases that involved him. The single justice overruled Jonas’s objections,

admitted the few orders and decisions ultimately offered by Jonas, and

admitted the many orders and decisions offered by the Board.

[¶18] On June 22, 2015, the single justice issued a judgment finding that

Jonas had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was

eligible for reinstatement. See M. Bar. R. 7.3(j)(5). In reaching this conclusion,

the single justice “considered the testimony of witnesses presented during the

de novo hearing in April, the documents admitted in evidence at that hearing,

the findings and conclusions made by various courts in prior proceedings in

which Jonas was a party, and the parties’ arguments.” The judgment also

indicated, “some of the cases [relied upon] were specifically provided by the

parties at hearing, and others were found in electronic databases that are

publicly available.”

[¶19] This appeal followed. See 4 M.R.S. § 57 (2016); In re Application of

Feingold, 296 A.2d 492, 496 (Me. 1972).
 9

II. DISCUSSION

[¶20] We begin by reviewing the procedures and standards that applied

to Jonas’s petition for reinstatement. In doing so, we interpret the meaning of

the Maine Bar Rules de novo, looking both to the plain language and to the

purpose of the rules. See Bailey v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 2014 ME 58, ¶¶ 16, 19-21,

90 A.3d 1137; Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Warren, 2011 ME 124, ¶ 25, 34 A.3d

1103. As we cautioned at the outset, many of the rules applicable here have

been superseded by the Bar Rules that went into effect in 2015.

A. Reinstatement Procedures

[¶21] Pursuant to the bar rules that applied to Jonas’s petition, “[a]n

attorney who ha[d] been suspended for non-disciplinary reasons” could

“petition to the Court for reinstatement.” M. Bar. R. 7.3(j)(4). If Bar Counsel

opposed the petition, the matter would “be immediately referred to the

Grievance Commission” for a hearing. M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5). During the hearing,

it was the petitioner’s burden to

present[] clear and convincing evidence demonstrating the moral
qualifications, competency, and learning in law required for
admission to practice law in this State[,] . . . [and] that it [wa]s likely
that reinstatement w[ould] not be detrimental to the integrity and
standing of the Bar, the administration of justice, or to the public
interest. Factors to be considered as to the petitioner’s meeting
that burden include[d] evidence that:
10

(A) The petitioner ha[d] fully complied with the terms of all
prior disciplinary orders;

(B) The petitioner ha[d] neither engaged not attempted to
engage in the unauthorized practice of law;

(C) The petitioner recognize[d] the wrongfulness and
seriousness of the misconduct;

(D) The petitioner ha[d] not engaged in any other
professional misconduct since resignation, suspension or
disbarment;

(E) The petitioner ha[d] the requisite honesty and integrity
to practice law; and

(F) The petitioner ha[d] met the continuing legal education
requirements . . . .

M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5).

[¶22] After a hearing, the Grievance Commission would “transmit to the

Board and to the petitioner its findings and recommendations by written

report, and provide the Board with any record it ha[d] made.” M. Bar

R. 7.3(j)(6). “After consideration of a party’s timely objection to the [Grievance

Commission’s] report the Board [would] file its recommendations and findings

with the Court, together with any record that ha[d] been made.” Id. After the

Board filed its recommendation and findings, the Supreme Judicial Court

would, “with or without hearing, grant or deny the petition for reinstatement

by written order.” Id.
 11

B. Standard of Evidentiary Admissibility

[¶23] Although the Bar Rules provided standards of evidentiary

admissibility that applied to disciplinary proceedings, see M. Bar R.

7.1(e)(2)(C), 7.2(b)(2), they did not expressly address the standards that would

apply in reinstatement proceedings, see M. Bar R. 7.3(j).4 Because attorneys

may petition for reinstatement from either disciplinary or nondisciplinary

suspensions, the same standards of evidentiary admissibility that applied to

disciplinary proceedings did not necessarily apply to all petitions for

reinstatement. Accordingly, we must first determine whether the Rules of

Evidence or the “reasonable person” standard, which applied in disciplinary

proceedings before a Grievance Panel, M. Bar R. 7.1(e)(2)(C), and in attorney

admission proceedings, M. Bar Admission R. 9(d)(5)(C), 9(d)(6)(C), applied to

the trial held by the single justice. See also 5 M.R.S. § 9057(2) (2016).

[¶24] We begin by reviewing the standard that applies to attorney

admission proceedings. If the Board of Bar Examiners holds a hearing on an

application for admission to the bar, “[e]vidence shall be admitted . . . if it is the

4 Similarly, the new Rules do not explicitly provide an evidentiary standard for reinstatement

proceedings before the Commission. See M. Bar R. 29(g) (Tower 2015); see also id. 14(a)(1)-(2)
(providing that the Rules of Evidence do not apply to disciplinary hearings before a Grievance
Commission Panel). We note, without deciding, that the new Rules appear to indicate that when the
Court holds a hearing on the Commission’s findings and recommendations in reinstatement
proceedings, the Rules of Evidence apply. See id. 14(b)(1); 29(h).
12

kind of evidence upon which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the

conduct of serious affairs.” M. Bar Admission R. 9(d)(5)(C). In such

proceedings, the new applicant has the burden to prove that the applicant is “a

person of good character,” is “fit to practice law,” and “possesses sufficient

learning in the law to practice as an attorney in this State.” M. Bar Admission

R. 8-10.

[¶25] If an applicant is denied a certification of good character and

fitness to practice law by the Board, the applicant may petition the Court for

admission pursuant to Rule 9(d)(6)(A). A single justice of this Court will then

conduct a de novo hearing during which the same reasonable person standard

of evidentiary admissibility applies. M. Bar Admission R. 9(d)(6)(C).

[¶26] Under the rules applicable to these proceedings, when a

suspended attorney petitioned for reinstatement to the bar, the process and the

petitioner’s burden were much the same as for an initial application, although

the applicable evidentiary standards were not explicitly addressed in the rules.5

Again, the petitioner was the moving party, not the Board of Overseers of the

5 As we noted, the Bar Rules provided standards of evidentiary admissibility only for disciplinary

proceedings. In disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Rules provided that hearings before the
Commission were subject to the reasonable person standard of admissibility, whereas hearings
before a single justice were subject to the Rules of Evidence, “[t]o the extent appropriate.” See M. Bar
R. 7.1(e)(2)(C), 7.2(b)(2).
 13

Bar. Because the procedural posture, allocation of burdens, and ultimate

consequences of reinstatement proceedings mirrored bar admission

proceedings, we conclude that the reasonable person standard of evidentiary

admissibility applied to reinstatement proceedings before the Commission and

the Board. See M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5) (providing that a petitioner seeking

reinstatement had the burden to show “the moral qualifications, competency,

and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this State”

(emphasis added)).

[¶27] In a single justice hearing on a reinstatement petition in which the

court, as anticipated by the Rule, did not provide the petitioner with the

opportunity for a full de novo factual presentation, the single justice’s

determination would be made based on a review of the record as it was

“developed before the Commission and the Board.”6 See In re Williams, 2010

ME 121, ¶ 8, 8 A.3d 666. Thus, the single justice’s determination could have

been based entirely on the record provided by the Board, and that record would

have been created, as we have just held, utilizing the reasonable person

admissibility standard rather than the Rules of Evidence.

6 Although we have previously held to the contrary, see, e.g., In re Application of Spurling, 595 A.2d

1062, 1065 (Me. 1991), the cases in which we did so involved bar admission rules that have been
superseded.
14

[¶28] Because here the single justice took the additional step of

providing Jonas with a complete de novo factual hearing instead of engaging in

a “de novo” review of the record, we must determine what standard of

evidentiary admissibility applied during Jonas’s de novo reinstatement hearing.

We conclude that the fact that the single justice provided Jonas a fully de novo

reinstatement hearing does not alter the kind of evidence upon which the

reinstatement determination may be made. Thus, the admission of evidence in

that proceeding was governed by the same reasonable person standard that

applied before the Commission and the Board, and that applies to

administrative proceedings and to attorney admission proceedings before a

single justice. The Rules of Evidence did not apply.7

C. Review of Jonas’s Arguments

[¶29] Having clarified the nature of the reinstatement proceeding and

the standard for the admissibility of evidence, we turn to Jonas’s arguments on

appeal. Among his many arguments, Jonas challenges (1) the processes

7 The new Bar Rules explicitly subsume reinstatement from an administrative suspension longer

than five years within the same process as is used for reinstatement from a disciplinary suspension
longer than six months. See M. Bar R. 4(i), 29 (Tower 2015). The new rules also provide different
criteria for reinstatement that have a greater disciplinary focus and are less similar to the criteria
applicable to attorney admissions. See id. 29(e). For example, to be reinstated, a petitioner no longer
has the burden to show the “moral qualifications, competency, and learning in law required for
admission.” Compare M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5) (Tower 2014) with M. Bar R. 29(e) (Tower 2015). As noted,
we do not opine on the standard of evidentiary admissibility that applies pursuant to the new Bar
Rules.
 15

employed by the Commission, the Board, and the single justice in reviewing his

petition for reinstatement; (2) evidentiary rulings made during the de novo

hearing of his petition; and (3) the Board’s and single justice’s conclusion that

he failed to meet his burden to show that he was eligible for reinstatement to

the Maine Bar. We discuss each argument in turn.

1. Procedural Issues

a. Special Panel

[¶30] Jonas first challenges the Board’s establishment of a “Special

Panel” of the Board to review the Commission’s recommendation to reinstate

Jonas to the Maine Bar as a violation of the Bar Rules and his due process rights.

[¶31] After the Board receives the recommendations and findings of the

Commission on a petition for reinstatement, “the Board . . . retains the ultimate

responsibility for evaluating such recommendations and findings and making

its own findings and recommendations to the Court.” Me. Bd. of Overseers of

the Bar Reg. No. 50, 1 Maine Manual on Professional Responsibility R-30 (2004).

If the petitioner or Bar Counsel objects, “the Board will . . . decide . . . what, if

any, procedure to establish for hearing the objections to the findings and

recommendations of the Commission or Panel.” Id. at R-30 to R-31. Thus,

although the regulation does not explicitly mention the creation of a “Special
16

Panel,” it requires the Board to make independent recommendations and

findings and gives the Board broad discretion to adopt an appropriate

procedure to consider objections to the Commission’s report.

[¶32] Turning to the purpose of the rules, we have previously noted that,

although the Court itself retains ultimate authority to regulate attorneys and

the practice of law in Maine, it has delegated some of that authority to the Board

of Overseers “to develop a record and issue recommendations in reinstatement

proceedings.” In re Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 5, 8 A.3d 666. The creation of a

Special Panel of the Board to review the Grievance Commission’s findings and

seek additional input from the parties is consistent with this purpose.

[¶33] Based on the language of the applicable Bar Rules and Board

Regulations and the purpose and role of the Board, it was neither inappropriate

nor a violation of Jonas’s due process rights for the Board to appoint a “Special

Panel” of the Board to review the Grievance Commission’s recommendation

and make its own recommendation to the full Board.8

8 Moreover, Jonas’s objections to the Board’s processes have been rendered moot by the single

justice’s decision to conduct a hearing during which Jonas and the Board were given the opportunity
to present their evidence anew.
 17

b. Reinstatement Factors

[¶34] Jonas next argues that because he was seeking reinstatement after

an administrative suspension, M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(4), the factors listed in M. Bar

R. 7.3(j)(5) did not apply to his petition. That argument is simply incorrect.

[¶35] The procedure set out in 7.3(j)(5) applied to all types of petitions

for reinstatement mentioned in section 7.3(j). See Bailey, 2014 ME 58,

¶¶ 16-17, 90 A.3d 1137; In re Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 6, 8 A.3d 666. This does

not mean that each factor would have similar weight in every case; rather, the

factors would be considered to the extent that they applied to the petitioner.

The Board and single justice appropriately applied the factors to determine

whether Jonas had met his burden to demonstrate eligibility for reinstatement.

c. Due Process

[¶36] In addition to his argument that the procedures violated the Bar

rules, Jonas argues that the procedures collectively violated his due process

rights. We review alleged procedural due process violations de novo. See State

v. Jones, 2012 ME 126, ¶ 35, 55 A.3d 432.

[¶37] We have previously held that due process in the context of bar

proceedings “consists of notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
18

heard, including the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.” See In re

Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 5, 8 A.3d 666.

[¶38] Jonas had both notice and the opportunity to be heard at every

stage of the proceedings. First, he had notice and the opportunity to present

his petition to the Grievance Commission. After the Grievance Commission—

and then the Board—issued recommendations, the single justice invited the

parties to address the process employed by the Grievance Commission and the

Board, where Jonas had the opportunity to brief and argue the procedural

issues. Jonas was then provided a full de novo hearing before the single justice.9

Before holding a hearing, the single justice allowed Jonas to file motions in

limine and heard his evidentiary arguments. At the hearing, Jonas was again

given the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and to

address the evidence offered by the Board. At each stage of the proceedings,

Jonas was represented by capable counsel. Jonas was not deprived of due

process at any stage of the proceedings. See In re Williams, 2010 ME 121,

¶¶ 5-9, 8 A.3d 666.

9 Neither party contests the propriety of the single justice holding a de novo hearing in this matter.
 19

2. Evidentiary Issues

[¶39] Jonas next argues that the single justice erroneously took judicial

notice of the facts found in judgments from other jurisdictions in which Jonas’s

conduct was assessed. See M.R. Evid. 201. We review evidentiary rulings for

clear error or abuse of discretion. State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 24, 58 A.3d

1032.

[¶40] As we have concluded, the Rules of Evidence did not apply in these

proceedings. Bar reinstatement proceedings required the single justice to

determine, inter alia, that the petitioner was of good moral character, and that

reinstatement would not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar.

See M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5). In such a proceeding, the single justice was bound to

consider the petitioner’s conduct as an attorney and litigant in determining

whether the petitioner was eligible for reinstatement. Judgments and orders

relating to prior litigation involving that attorney are uniquely relevant to that

determination. Thus, pursuant to the reasonable person standard of

admissibility, the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in

considering the extensive history of judgments and orders against Jonas. Cf. M.

Bar R. 7.3(h)(4) (“A final adjudication in another jurisdiction that an attorney

had been guilty of misconduct may be treated as establishing the misconduct
20

for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this State.”). Furthermore, as a

litigant in family matters and as an attorney facing potential discipline, Jonas

had the motivation and formal opportunity to offer evidence and argument.

Because of the process afforded in the prior proceedings and the nature of the

proceedings before the single justice, the facts found in the judgments that were

relied on by the single justice constituted the kind of information upon which a

reasonable person would rely. The single justice did not err or abuse her

discretion in considering the judgments involving Jonas, including the factual

findings contained in those judgments.10

10 Because the parties spent considerable energy addressing the use of judicial notice in this

matter, we briefly address the issue, despite its inapplicability to the proceedings before the single
justice. During a trial in which the Rules of Evidence apply, courts may “judicially notice,” and thereby
conclusively establish, facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute because [they] . . . [c]an be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
M.R. Evid. 201(b), (f). When a court takes judicial notice of a final judgment, from a Maine court or
another court of competent jurisdiction, however, that “notice” is limited to the existence of the
judgment, and the action of the court. “[A] court may take notice of another court’s order only for
the limited purpose of recognizing the ‘judicial act’ that the order represents or the subject matter of
the litigation.” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Int’l Star Class
Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1993); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Logistics Control Group Int’l, 762
F.2d 454, 459 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 201.3 at 57 (6th ed. 2007)
(“A court will take judicial notice [pursuant to M.R. Evid. 201(b)(2)] of pleadings, dockets, and other
records of that court in the same or in other lawsuits.”).

Contrary to the Board’s argument here, the factual findings contained within a judgment are not
appropriate subjects for judicial notice. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “If it were permissible for
a court to take judicial notice of a fact merely because it has been found to be true in some other
action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be superfluous.” Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553. The
collateral estoppel doctrine, also known as issue preclusion, “prevents a party from relitigating
factual issues already decided if the identical issue necessarily was determined by a prior final
judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in the prior
proceeding.” Kurtz & Perry, P.A. v. Emerson, 2010 ME 107, ¶ 16, 8 A.3d 677 (quotation marks
omitted). In the matter before us, however, the Board did not assert the applicability of collateral
 21

3. Jonas’s Burden

[¶41] To be reinstated, Jonas was required to demonstrate, by clear and

convincing evidence, that he possessed the moral qualifications, competency,

and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this State, as well

as to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was likely that

reinstatement would not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar,

the administration of justice, or the public interest. M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5). We

review a single justice’s factual findings for clear error. Bailey, 2014 ME 58,

¶ 16, 90 A.3d 1137. Because Jonas had the burden of proof, he can prevail only

if he can establish that the single justice was “compelled to find in his favor.”

See In re Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 10, 8 A.3d 666.

[¶42] Jonas argued that any misconduct that he committed leading to his

New Jersey suspension was part of his personal life and should not be

dispositive as to his moral character as an attorney. He continued to deny

responsibility for many of his actions. For example, he asserted that his

decision to abscond with his children in direct violation of the court’s order was

estoppel. See Conary v. Perkins, 464 A.2d 972, 975-76 (Me. 1983); Reed v. Tracy, 435 A.2d 745, 746
(Me. 1981).

Because the court, here, could rely on findings in other jurisdictions’ judgments pursuant to the
reasonable person standard of evidentiary admissibility, we need not determine whether collateral
estoppel would have applied in this case had the Board argued its applicability.
22

not premeditated, and that the New Jersey courts, his former wife, and her

attorney were biased and had formed a conspiracy against him. The single

justice found that these explanations were not credible.

[¶43] Furthermore, the Board offered ample evidence, upon which the

single justice could rely, to rebut Jonas’s contention that he has behaved

ethically since his suspension from the New Jersey bar in 2005. Specifically, the

evidence showed that Jonas has demonstrated a pattern of disrespect and

contempt for every level of the court system over many years, and in so doing

he has abused the very litigation skills that he now seeks to use in Maine.

[¶44] Based on the above evidence, the single justice did not err in

finding that Jonas failed to meet his burden of proving, by clear and convincing

evidence, that he recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of his

misconduct, M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5)(C), or that he has the requisite honesty and

integrity to practice law, M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5)(E). The single justice was not

compelled to find that Jonas possesses the moral qualifications, competency,

and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this State, and that

it is likely that reinstatement will not be detrimental to the integrity and

standing of the bar, the administration of justice, or the public interest. See

M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5); Bailey, 2014 ME 58, ¶ 57, 90 A.3d 1137. Jonas’s proven
 23

willingness to abuse his law license and legal skills, disrespecting multiple

tribunals and the truth, left the single justice little choice in this matter.

III. CONCLUSION

[¶45] The procedures employed at each stage of the proceedings in this

case complied with the Bar Rules and provided Jonas with extensive due

process. Jonas was provided ample notice and opportunity to present his case

at each level of the proceedings. There was no error in the single justice’s

consideration of the multitude of judgments and orders against Jonas. Over

more than two decades, Jonas incessantly abused his legal skills by initiating a

litany of frivolous, vexatious, and harassing litigation, and has shown

unremitting contempt for the legal system by continually and repeatedly

ignoring court orders.

[¶46] As the single justice found at the conclusion of the forty-four page

judgment,

When an attorney is admitted to the Maine bar, he swears that he
“will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless
or unlawful suit nor give aid or consent to the same” and that he
“will delay no man for lucre or malice.” 4 M.R.S. § 806 (2014). Jonas
has demonstrated just the opposite.

[¶47] The single justice was not compelled to find that Jonas had

demonstrated his eligibility for readmission to the Maine Bar.
24

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

James M. Bowie, Esq. (orally), Thompson & Bowie, LLP, Portland, for appellant
Edwin R. Jonas III

Aria Eee, Esq. (orally), Board of Overseers of the Bar, Augusta, for appellee
Board of Overseers of the Bar

Maine Supreme Judicial Court docket number Bar-13-16
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY