UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-6766
ZACKARY ALLEN BLANKENSHIP,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
LIEUTENANT SETZER, Supervisor at the Jail; SERGEANT LAWS,
Supervisor at Jail; SERGEANT SMITH, Supervisor at Jail;
STAFF SERGEANT CARSWELL, Supervisor at the Jail,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
MAJOR BILLY BOWMAN, Administrator at the Jail,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (1:15-cv-00126-FDW)
Submitted: March 6, 2017 Decided: March 16, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David M. Shapiro, NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago,
Illinois; Ameri R. Klafeta, EIMER STAHL LLP, Chicago, Illinois,
for Appellant. Sean F. Perrin, WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE,
LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Zackary Allen Blankenship appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants in his
civil action. Blankenship sued Sergeant Ginger Laws and
Sergeant Josh Smith, officers at the Burke Catawba District
Confinement Facility (“Burke-Catawba”), alleging that their
refusal to permit him to carry his Bible on the transport van to
Catawba County Jail (“County Jail”) interfered with the practice
of his religion. 1 Defendants moved for summary judgment prior to
discovery, arguing that their actions were reasonably related to
a legitimate governmental interest. With regard to
Blankenship’s First Amendment claim, the district court granted
Defendants’ motion, concluding that Defendants’ actions survived
rational basis review. The court also determined that
Blankenship had not alleged a claim under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc
to 2000cc-5 (2012), and that, even if he had, Defendants’
actions did not impose a substantial burden on Blankenship’s
religious exercise. 2 On appeal, Blankenship argues that the
1
Blankenship’s complaint contained other causes of action
against other staff members, but he does not pursue those claims
on appeal.
2
The complaint was filed on a prison-issued form for
actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The form states
that the complainant “MAY, BUT NEED NOT, GIVE LEGAL ARGUMENTS OR
(Continued)
3
district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendants with respect to his First Amendment and RLUIPA
claims. We vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same standard as the district court . . .
[and] construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
. . . the non-movant[s].” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775
F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate
if “there is no genuine dispute as to material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
We conclude that Blankenship adequately alleged a RLUIPA
claim. Blankenship’s pro se complaint must be afforded liberal
interpretation. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam). In his complaint, Blankenship averred that Defendants
refused to allow him to take his Bible on the transport van on
several trips to the County Jail, and that those actions
violated his exercise of religion. These facts, along with the
CITE ANY CASES OR STATUTES.” (J.A. 7). Blankenship’s failure
to cite RLUIPA in that complaint cannot defeat his claim; this
is especially so because the facts supporting a RLUIPA claim are
in the complaint, and Blankenship cited RLUIPA in his response
to the Defendants’ answer.
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grievances he attached to the complaint, gave Defendants fair
notice that Blankenship was alleging a RLUIPA claim. See
Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 776 F.3d 214, 222 (4th Cir. 2015)
(discussing fair notice).
Turning to Blankenship’s substantive RLUIPA claim, see 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), it is undisputed that Blankenship’s
activities qualify as religious exercise and that he sincerely
holds his beliefs. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862
(2015) (describing plaintiff’s initial burden). Thus, the
burden shifts to Defendants to show that that the challenged
policy “[is] in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest[] and . . . [is] the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 863;
see Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006)
(discussing substantial burden). Therefore, the only issue on
appeal is whether Defendants’ actions substantially burdened
Blankenship’s exercise of religion and, if so, whether
Defendants met their burden of proof.
Defendants did not permit Blankenship to bring his Bible
with him during transport to County Jail. Although the drive
from Burke-Catawba to County Jail is one hour in duration,
Blankenship spent 3 to 4 days at County Jail during each of his
three visits. Thus, he was deprived of his personal Bible for
5
10 days in total. 3 Because Blankenship asserted that his
religion requires him to read and study the Bible daily,
deprivation of a Bible for longer than a period of 24 hours
forced him to modify his behavior and violate his religious
beliefs in order to attend his mandatory court dates. See id.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Blankenship,
Defendants placed a substantial burden on the exercise of his
religion. Id.
Although Defendants’ asserted security interest in banning
nonlegal items on the transport van constitutes a compelling
governmental interest, Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 178 (4th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1829 (2016), we cannot
conclude on the present record that the policy is the least
restrictive means available to achieve that interest.
Blankenship proposed alternative means of protecting the
health and safety of individuals during transport, including
having guards search his Bible or placing nonlegal materials in
the front of the van away from prisoners. Given that
Burke-Catawba allows legal papers on the transport van but does
not allow any nonlegal papers, it is reasonable to infer that
3
We recognize that Blankenship’s own statements do not
clearly establish whether he had access to a Bible while held at
County Jail. However, interpreting the facts in the light most
favor to Blankenship, he did not have access to a Bible during
his time at County Jail.
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Burke-Catawba conducts at least a cursory search of any
materials that prisoners bring onto the transport van.
Defendants’ evidence does not explain how the burden of
searching a Bible would significantly add to the time or
resources expended during the search process. Moreover,
Defendants offered no evidence that Blankenship’s remaining
proposal was not viable, and Defendants did not “even assert
that the [p]olicy was the least restrictive means of furthering
the identified compelling interests.” Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d
197, 204 (4th Cir. 2012). Defendants have therefore failed to
offer sufficient proof that the policy banning nonlegal
materials on the transport van was the least restrictive means
available to ensure safety. Id.
Turning next to Blankenship’s First Amendment claims,
prisoners maintain their constitutional right to freedom of
religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348
(1987). Thus, “reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all
prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear of penalty.”
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972). Consequently,
states may not adopt “policies that impose a substantial burden
on a prisoner’s right to practice his religion.” Wall v. Wade,
741 F.3d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 2014). “However, free exercise
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restrictions that are reasonably adapted to achieving a
legitimate penological objective are permissible.” Id. at 499.
In determining whether such a policy passes constitutional
muster, we apply the test developed in Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 89-92 (1987) (setting forth four factors courts
consider in analyzing First Amendment claim). See Wall, 741
F.3d at 499. Although we conclude that—on the present record—
all but the first Turner factor weigh in favor of Blankenship,
we recognize that further discovery may well demonstrate that
there are no practical alternatives to the challenged policy and
that Blankenship’s proposed alternatives are not feasible.
However, Defendants have not yet presented any such evidence.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the constitutional
violation was de minimis. The “de minimis . . . threshold is
intended to weed out only inconsequential actions,” Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472-73 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Given the importance of the Bible to
Christianity and Blankenship’s religious practice, the burden
placed on him by Defendants’ actions significantly impeded
Blankenship’s ability to practice his religion for several days
at a time. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 257 (3d Cir.
2003). Therefore, Defendants’ actions cannot be deemed
inconsequential.
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Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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