UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4744
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID KEITH STOVER, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:16-cr-00030-IMK-MJA-1)
Submitted: March 14, 2017 Decided: March 16, 2017
Before FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
L. Richard Walker, Senior Litigator, Clarksburg, West Virginia;
Kristen M. Leddy, Research & Writing Specialist, FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER OFFICE, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Betsy
Steinfeld Jividen, Acting United States Attorney, David J. Perri,
Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Keith Stover, Jr., pled guilty to possession of firearms
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
The district court downwardly departed from the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Stover to 36 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Stover contends that the court erred in
failing to grant a downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1
(2016). We affirm.
Because Stover did not object to the court’s decision not to
grant the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, our review is
for plain error. United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292
(4th Cir. 2012); see Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121,
1126-27 (2013) (describing plain error review). Under the
Guidelines, a defendant is eligible for a reduction of his offense
level if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for
his offense.” USSG § 3E1.1. When determining whether a defendant
is deserving of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, a
court considers, among other factors, whether the defendant
voluntarily terminated or withdrew from criminal conduct. USSG
§ 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(B); see United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236,
240 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The decision to grant an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction often depends on the actions of the
defendant following his or her arrest or plea.”).
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Here, Stover did not terminate or withdraw from criminal
conduct after his arrest. Instead, he twice drove with a revoked
license, once while intoxicated. Stover avers that a reduction
for acceptance of responsibility was nevertheless warranted
because this new criminal conduct was unrelated to the offense
conduct. We have never adopted such a rule, and we decline to
recognize one here. The court warned Stover that engaging in any
additional criminal conduct while on pretrial release would
disqualify him for the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did
not plainly err in declining to grant the reduction.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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