MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 17 2017, 8:24 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jill M. Acklin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Shelbyville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Miguel A. Garcia-Cheverez, March 17, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1606-CR-1469
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
The Honorable Stanley Kroh,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G03-1502-F1-5898
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Following a jury trial, Miguel Garcia-Cheverez was convicted of three counts of
Level 1 felony child molesting. On appeal, Garcia-Cheverez argues that several
statements made by the State during closing argument—statements to which he
raised no objection—constitute prosecutorial misconduct and that such
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error warranting reversal of his
convictions.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] During the evening of November 1, 2014, Garcia-Cheverez, then twenty-four
years old, had been drinking at the home of his uncle and his five cousins,
including ten-year-old R.R.A. Later that night, Garcia-Cheverez’s uncle
permitted Garcia-Cheverez to stay and sleep on the couch because he had been
drinking. R.R.A. testified that her father asked her to take a pillow to Garcia-
Cheverez. R.R.A. did as her father asked, and when she was returning to her
room, Garcia-Cheverez asked her to “[c]ome here.” Transcript at 72. R.R.A.
went over to Garcia-Cheverez, who told her to lie down on the couch. He then
removed his pants, but left his “short pants” on. Id. Garcia-Cheverez then put
his finger into R.R.A.’s vagina. R.R.A. testified that she felt a “little bit” of
pressure and pain. Id. at 73. Garcia-Cheverez then licked R.R.A.’s genitalia
and put his tongue in her vagina. He then instructed R.R.A. to put her mouth
on his penis, which she did. R.R.A. told Garcia-Cheverez she needed to use
the bathroom and while in there, she washed out her mouth. When R.R.A.
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returned, Garcia-Cheverez asked her if she wanted to do more, and R.R.A. said
“No.” Id. at 75. R.R.A. then went back to her room.
[4] R.R.A. was briefly in her room before she decided to go and tell her parents
that Garcia-Cheverez had touched her “private part.” Id. at 77. R.R.A. “was
shaking, she was in tears, nervous” when she told her parents what had
happened. Id. at 278. R.R.A.’s mother followed R.R.A. back to her room,
where her mother looked at her genitalia and noticed blood on her vagina and
underwear. R.R.A. started crying and said “I am sorry.” Id. at 48. R.R.A.’s
older sister helped their father call the police. After being confronted by
R.R.A.’s father, Garcia-Cheverez left the house.
[5] R.R.A.’s mother took R.R.A. to the hospital where she was examined by a
sexual assault nurse. The examination showed an area of bruising and a one
centimeter laceration to her hymen that extended to her vaginal wall. The
nurse observed blood in R.R.A.’s underwear, but did not observe blood on her
external or internal genitalia. Male DNA from sperm cells that matched the
DNA profile of Garcia-Cheverez was found on R.R.A.’s underwear.
[6] On February 19, 2015, Garcia-Cheverez was charged with three counts of Level
1 felony child molesting and one count of Level 6 felony sexual battery. A jury
trial was held on June 9 and 10, 2016. The jury found Garcia-Cheverez guilty
of all three child molesting counts and not guilty of sexual battery. On June 24,
2016, the trial court sentenced Garcia-Cheverez to thirty-five years with five
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years suspended to probation for each conviction and ordered the sentences to
be served concurrently. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion & Decision
[7] On appeal, Garcia-Cheverez challenges his convictions on grounds of
prosecutorial misconduct, pointing to three different statements by the
prosecutor during closing argument. Garcia-Cheverez acknowledges that he
did not object to the prosecutor’s statements or request an admonishment at
trial. To avoid waiver, he argues that the prosecutor’s statements constitute
fundamental error. See Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ind. 2002)
Fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the
most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been
procedurally barred, not to provide a second bite at the apple for defense
counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or strategically fail to preserve an error. See
Baer v. State, 942 N.E.2d 80, 99 (Ind. 2011) (noting it is “highly unlikely” to
prevail on a claim of fundamental error relating to prosecutorial misconduct).
[8] To establish prosecutorial misconduct, we must “determine (1) whether the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under
all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to
which he or she would not have been subjected.” Booher, 773 N.E.2d at 817
(quoting Coleman v. State, 750 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. 2001)). The gravity of peril
is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s
decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct. Id. For
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prosecutorial misconduct to constitute fundamental error, it must “make a fair
trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary
principles of due process [and] present an undeniable and substantial potential
for harm.” Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002).
[9] First, Garcia-Cheverez argues that the deputy prosecutor improperly asked the
jurors to put themselves in the victim’s place. The statement, in context,
follows:
[Garcia-Cheverez] put his finger inside her private part, which
she clarified, she means vagina when she says that. She felt
pressure when he put his finger in there and she felt pain. That’s
also consistent and clear, but that’s consist [sic] with a ten year
old’s, now 12 year old’s experience of that particular act. If you
think about it you’re not required to abandon your common
sense as jurors, not at all. But if you think about, think about how
that would feel, pressure and pain.
Id. at 448 (emphasis supplied).
[10] Garcia-Cheverez directs us to McBride v. State, 785 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003), trans. denied. We find the prosecutor’s statement in this case is
distinguishable from the challenged statements in McBride.1 Here, the
1
In McBride, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider “[if] this was your son or daughter that was sitting in
the cab of the truck, or if this was you, and somebody fired on your child twice like that, what would you call
it?” 785 N.E.2d at 320. This court found that the statement was “ill-advised and inappropriate” because it
was “potentially misleading” in that the jury was asked to put themselves in the victim’s shoes thereby
shifting the emphasis to the victim. Id. Despite the finding of misconduct, however, the court concluded that
such did not rise to the level of fundamental error. Id.
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prosecutor did not ask the jury to put themselves in the place of the victim, but
instead, asked the jury to use their common sense and good judgment to assess
whether the victim was credible when she explained that Garcia-Cheverez
caused her to feel pressure and pain when he put his finger in her vagina. In
other words, the prosecutor was not asking the jurors how they would feel if
this was done to them, but rather, whether R.R.A.’s statement was consistent
with how a twelve-year old would describe what had occurred to her when she
was ten years old. There is nothing improper in this regard with the
prosecutor’s statement. Garcia-Cheverez has failed to establish error, let alone
fundamental error.
[11] Garcia-Cheverez next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
personally vouching for the credibility of R.R.A. At trial, R.R.A. testified that
Garcia-Cheverez digitally penetrated her, performed oral sex on her, and had
her perform oral sex on him. When she came back from the bathroom, Garcia-
Cheverez asked her if she wanted to do “more.” Transcript at 75. During
closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
And then he asked if she wanted to do more, that’s what she
testified to. The defendant asked her if she wanted to do more.
It’s not something a kid comes up with. And the reason it’s not
something a kid comes up with out of nowhere is because it’s what
happened. It’s what he said to her. It wouldn’t occur to a child, oh, let’s
do more. It doesn’t.
Id. at 449 (emphasis supplied).
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[12] This statement is not an example of vouching on the part of the prosecutor. Cf.
Schlomer v. State, 580 N.E.2d 950, 957 (Ind. 1991) (prosecutor’s statement, “I
believe Detective McGee when he tell[s] us what happened,” held improper).
The prosecutor did not state her personal opinion as to the credibility of R.R.A.
Rather, the prosecutor’s statement is a direct reference to very specific
testimony from R.R.A. By emphasizing this testimony, the prosecutor was
urging the jury to consider the evidence in conjunction with R.R.A.’s age in
assessing her credibility. This does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.
Even if such statement constituted improper vouching, Garcia-Cheverez clearly
has not met his burden of establishing fundamental error.
[13] Garcia-Cheverez’s third argument is that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by expressing her personal opinion about his guilt or innocence. See Ellison v.
State, 717 N.E.2d 211, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Ind. Professional
Conduct Rule 3.4(e)). He directs us to this statement made by the prosecutor
during closing argument:
We’re not asking that you find an innocent man guilty, not at all.
We’re asking you to find that man guilty (pointing) and the
reason we’re asking you to do that is because he is.
Transcript at 455.
[14] Even if we assume that the prosecutor’s statements in this regard amounts to
misconduct, the harm done to Garcia-Cheverez does not rise to the level of
fundamental error. Where there is overwhelming independent evidence of a
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defendant’s guilt, error made by a prosecutor during the closing argument is
harmless. Jerden v. State, 37 N.E.3d 494, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Here,
R.R.A. provided compelling testimony that Garcia-Cheverez committed three
separate acts of sexual abuse against her. Her testimony was buttressed with
evidence that R.R.A. had bruising and a tear in her hymen, there was blood in
her underwear, and male DNA from sperm cells that matched the DNA profile
of Garcia-Cheverez was found on R.R.A.’s underwear. Garcia-Cheverez does
not dispute the evidence against him, which was overwhelming. Thus, even if
we assume the prosecutor improperly remarked to the jury regarding her
personal opinion as to guilt or innocence, any error is at most harmless and
therefore not fundamental.
[15] In sum, Garcia-Cheverez has failed to establish that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct that rises to the level of fundamental error. 2
[16] Judgment affirmed.
[17] Riley, J. and Crone, J., concur.
2
Garcia-Cheverez presents the same arguments in challenging each of the prosecutor’s statements as
violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. As our Supreme Court has stated, like the
federal plain error doctrine, “[o]ur fundamental error doctrine is equal to the task” of reviewing claims not
preserved or procedurally defaulted. Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Here,
even if the federal standard were applicable, the same result obtains.
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