NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMELIA FINLEY, No. 16-15432
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02609-DLR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
S. FAX, Officer #51243; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Amelia Finley appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest and imprisonment, and excessive
force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Furnace
v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Finley’s false
arrest and imprisonment claim because Finley failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants’ conduct of detaining Finley was
unreasonable under the circumstances. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802
(1971) (“[W]hen the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they
reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second
party is a valid arrest.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Finley’s excessive
force claim because Finely failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-97 (1989) (setting forth
the objective reasonableness standard for excessive force determinations).
Because the district court properly determined that no reasonable jury could
find that Finley’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, we reject as without
merit Finley’s challenge to the district court’s additional determination that
defendants Fax and Anderson were not sufficiently involved in the encounter.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Finley’s request for
leave to file a sur-reply because the district court reviewed the briefing and found
no new issues raised in defendants’ reply that necessitated further argument. See
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1314 (9th Cir. 1982)
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(setting forth standard of review).
Finley’s motion for leave to file an amended notice of appeal (Docket Entry
No. 3) is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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