16-487
Coleman v. Ducate, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 21st day of March, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 ROBERT D. SACK,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 PAUL A. ENGELMAYER,
10 District Judge.1
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13
14 WILLIAM B. COLEMAN,
15 Plaintiff-Appellant,
16
17 -v.- 16-487
18
19 SUSAN DUCATE, M.D., EDWARD BLANCHETTE,
20 M.D., SCOTT ERPHY, BRIAN MURPHY, and
21 PETER MURPHY,
22 Defendants-Appellees.
23
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
25
1
Judge Paul A. Engelmayer, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
1
1 FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM S. PALMIERI, New Haven, CT.
2
3 FOR APPELLEES: LYNN D. WITTENBRINK, Assistant
4 Attorney General, for George
5 Jepsen, Attorney General,
6 Farmington, CT.
7
8 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
9 for the District of Connecticut (Squatrito, J.).
10
11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
12 DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
13
14 William B. Coleman appeals from the judgment of the United
15 States District Court for the District of Connecticut
16 (Squatrito, J.), denying his motion to reopen his case and his
17 motion for the reconsideration of that denial. We assume the
18 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
19 history, and the issues presented for review.
20 Coleman, a British citizen, was convicted of multiple crimes
21 at trial in 2005, see State v. William C., 103 Conn. App. 508,
22 510 (2007), and was a relatively prolific litigant while
23 incarcerated, see, e.g., William C. v. Commissioner, 126 Conn.
24 App. 185 (2011); Coleman v. Semple, No. 3:11-cv-512 (JBA), 2012
25 WL 2515541 (D. Conn. 2012); Coleman v. Blanchette, No.
26 3:11-cv-1632 (WIG), 2012 WL 3822022 (D. Conn. 2012); Coleman
27 v. Waterbury States Attorneys Office, No. UWYCV125016284, 2012
28 WL 6634609 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 2012). In January 2013,
29 he filed (pro se) the complaint in the present case, alleging
30 various forms of mistreatment at the hands of prison officials
31 dating to 2007.
32 The March 2013 order granting Coleman leave to proceed in
33 forma pauperis warned him that failure to notify the court of
34 an address change could result in dismissal. In June 2013, the
35 district court issued its initial review order, dismissing some
36 claims and allowing others to proceed. That order, too, warned
37 Coleman that failure to notify the court of an address change
38 could result in dismissal.
2
1 In June 2014, Coleman was discharged from state custody and
2 deported to the United Kingdom. Mail sent by the court shortly
3 thereafter was returned as undeliverable with a notation that
4 Coleman was no longer in custody. On July 28, 2014, the district
5 court dismissed the case without prejudice, noting that Coleman
6 could move to reopen if he provided his current address and
7 demonstrated good cause for having failed to do so earlier.
8 On April 16, 2015--ten months after Coleman’s discharge from
9 state custody and eleven months after his last activity in this
10 case--Attorney William S. Palmieri filed an appearance. A
11 motion to reopen the case followed four months after that, on
12 August 17, 2015. The district court denied the motion,
13 observing that although Coleman’s deportation “may well have
14 constituted good cause in July 2014,” App’x 14, it did not excuse
15 the delay of more than a year--or the four months of delay that
16 followed the appearance of counsel. The district court also
17 denied Coleman’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
18 However it may be styled, a motion to reopen a case that
19 was closed by an earlier order is, in effect, a motion for relief
20 from an order under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
21 Procedure. We review the denial of Rule 60 motions (and motions
22 for reconsideration) for abuse of discretion. Stevens v.
23 Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2012). We also review for abuse
24 of discretion a district court’s exercise of its inherent power,
25 formalized by Rule 41(b), to dismiss for failure to comply with
26 an order or for failure to prosecute. Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d
27 569, 575 (2d Cir. 2009). A court abuses its discretion when its
28 “decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the
29 wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding,
30 or when its ruling cannot be located within the range of
31 permissible decisions.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
32 Coleman identifies no such error of law or clearly erroneous
33 finding of fact, and his arguments that the district court’s
34 rulings cannot be located within the range of permissible
35 decisions are unpersuasive. Coleman was twice warned that he
36 must apprise the court of any change in address. His discharge
37 from state custody and removal to the United Kingdom might well
38 constitute good cause for some period of delay, but it does not
39 account for the actual length of the delay in this case and he
3
1 offers no further justification for it. Nor does he offer any
2 plausible explanation for the four-month period of inactivity
3 between the appearance of counsel and the motion to reopen. From
4 the last activity before Coleman was discharged until the filing
5 of the motion to reopen, fifteen months elapsed without any
6 substantive action in this case on the part of the plaintiff.
7 The district court’s ruling that the plaintiff failed to
8 demonstrate good cause for delay sufficient to warrant reopening
9 the case was within the range of permissible decisions.
10 Accordingly, and finding no merit in appellant’s other
11 arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
12 FOR THE COURT:
13 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
4