IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1388
Filed March 22, 2017
BALAH HASSON RUSHING,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. Gamble,
Judge.
Balah Rushing appeals the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Gary D. Dickey of Dickey and Campbell Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vogel, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2017).
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MAHAN, Senior Judge.
In 2014, Balah Rushing pled guilty to second-degree robbery and was
sentenced to serve ten years in prison, with a mandatory minimum of seven
years. See Iowa Code § 902.12 (2013). At the time he committed the offense,
Rushing was eighteen years and seven months old. Rushing did not appeal his
conviction. In 2015, Rushing filed an application for postconviction relief, relying
on State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 76-77 (Iowa 2013), and claiming his sentence
was “unlawful due to his young age and . . . in violation of the due process and
cruel and unusual punishment clauses in the Iowa Constitution and the United
States Constitution.” See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Iowa Const. art. I, § 17.
Following a hearing, the district court denied Rushing’s claim, observing “Null
and its progeny have only applied to juvenile offenders.” On appeal, Rushing
asks this court to “exercise its independent judgment” and extend the holding of
State v. Lyle to “youthful offenders under age twenty-one.” See 854 N.W.2d 378,
400 (Iowa 2014) (holding all mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile
offenders are unconstitutional).
Like the district court, we are not free to ignore controlling supreme court
precedent. See State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). In Null,
836 N.W.2d at 71, as well as State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013),
and State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121 (Iowa 2013), the court created a
constitutional right to an individualized sentencing hearing for juveniles
sentenced to a lengthy term of years without the meaningful opportunity for
release. The court’s rationale was based primarily on two facts: (1) “new”
scientific evidence showing “the human brain continues to mature into the early
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twenties”; and (2) a finding that young people generally “lack the ability to
properly assess risks and engage in adult-style-self-control.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at
55. Subsequently, in Lyle, the court extended Pearson, Ragland, and Null, and
held “all mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for youthful offenders
are unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause in article I,
section 17 of our constitution.” 854 N.W.2d at 400. The court reasoned that
“[m]andatory minimum sentences for juveniles are simply too punitive for what
we know about juveniles.” Id. But the court in Lyle specifically stated:
[O]ur holding today has no application to sentencing laws affecting
adult offenders. Lines are drawn in our law by necessity and are
incorporated into the jurisprudence we have developed to usher the
Iowa Constitution through time. This case does not move any of
the lines that currently exist in the sentencing of adult offenders.
854 N.W.2d at 403; see State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016)
(declining to abandon the reasoning and holding in Lyle).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Rushing’s application
for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.