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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
WAJID S. DESHIELDS
Appellant No. 1526 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 29, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002673-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MARCH 22, 2017
Appellant, Wajid D. DeShields, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division,
following his jury trial conviction for delivery of cocaine. We affirm.
On March 28, 2014, Appellant was charged through a criminal
complaint with delivery of cocaine,1 possession with intent to deliver
cocaine,2 and three counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. 3 Following
pre-trial proceedings, Appellant’s possession with intent to deliver cocaine
charge was dismissed and the possession of drug paraphernalia charges
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1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
2
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
3
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
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were severed from the remaining delivery of cocaine charge. Appellant
proceeded to a jury trial on the delivery of cocaine charge on. The jury was
unable to reach a unanimous verdict causing the trial court to declare a
mistrial. Appellant’s second trial on the same charge commenced three
months later in July 2015.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Officer Adam
Bruckhart, Officer Michelle Hoover, Deputy Edward Bowers, Officer Patrick
Gartrell, Jesse Coy, and Kevin Real. Officer Bruckhart testified that on
February 20, 2014, the York County Drug Task Force arranged a controlled
buy between a confidential informant, Real, and Appellant. Real contacted
Appellant by cellphone to arrange a delivery of a half-ounce of cocaine at
Real’s residence. Officer Bruckhart and Deputy Bowers searched Real and his
residence for drugs, money or weapons prior to Appellant’s arrival, and did
not find any drugs or weapons.
Upon Appellant’s arrival, the Task Force placed Real under constant
surveillance. Officer Bruckhart testified that Real was out of his sight for
approximately seven seconds, but that another officer had Real in his sight
at that time. Officer Hoover and Officer Gartrell observed Real meet with
Appellant, but did not observe the exchange between the parties. Once
Appellant left Real’s residence, Real turned over a substance that both
parties stipulated contained cocaine. The officers searched Real again and
found that the money they supplied Real was gone and that no other drugs
were found on his person.
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Real’s testimony corroborated the officers’ testimony. Real revealed
that he agreed to cooperate with the police in exchange for a reduction in his
own sentence. Additionally, he confirmed that the police searched him and
his residence before and after his meeting with Appellant. Real testified that
he contacted Appellant because he had previously received cocaine from
Appellant in the past. Real indicated that upon Appellant’s arrival for the
drug deal, he walked up to Appellant and shook his hand. During this
handshake, Real testified he handed Appellant the police supplied money
and Appellant handed him the cocaine Real later turned over to the officers.
Appellant took the stand in his own defense. Appellant alleged that he
worked as a “bookie” and met Real that day in relation to Real’s gambling
debt. Appellant confirmed that he received money from Real, but claimed he
did not give Real any drugs.
Coy, an intelligence analyst with the York County District Attorney’s
Office, confirmed that his review of Appellant’s phone revealed text
messages that appeared to be gambling bets. However, Coy did not find any
text messages from Real to Appellant that suggested Real used Appellant as
his bookie.
Following deliberations, the jury convicted Appellant and sentenced
him to a term of twenty-one to forty-two months’ imprisonment. Appellant
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filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied. This appeal
follows.4
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Specifically, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth’s
evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Real and Appellant exchanged
money for cocaine, rather than payment of a gambling debt. See Appellant’s
Brief, at 3.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence implicates the following
principles:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
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4
Appellant first appealed his judgment of sentence on October 29, 2015.
However, Appellant’s first appeal to this Court was dismissed in August 2016
due to Appellant’s counsel’s failure to file an appellate brief. Subsequently,
the trial court granted Appellant’s petition for reinstatement of his appellate
rights nunc pro tunc. On September 15, 2016, Appellant filed a notice to
appeal to commence the instant appeal.
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all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted).
The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the
Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
*****
(30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture,
delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or
deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered
under this act. . . .
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
After reviewing the testimony presented at trial, we conclude that the
jury was entitled to credit Real’s testimony that he received cocaine from
Appellant in exchange for the police supplied money. Appellant’s claim that
the money he received from Real was for payment of a gambling debt was
clearly rejected by the members of the jury, which was their prerogative.
The jury was permitted to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented
by Appellant. See Hansley, 24 A.3d at 416. We therefore conclude that
Appellant is due no relief on this issue.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/22/2017
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