J. S02007/17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
QUADIR JEFFRIES, : No. 1335 EDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, March 23, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0009922-2010
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND MOULTON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 23, 2017
Appellant, Quadir Jeffries, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
March 23, 2016, following revocation of his probation. We vacate the
judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
The Honorable Frank Palumbo has summarized the history of this
matter as follows:
Appellant was on probation following a guilty
plea before the Honorable Paula Patrick to 18 Pa.C.S.
[§] 6106, firearms not to be carried without a
license. Appellant pled guilty on September 27,
2010 and was sentenced on December 3, 2010 to a
period of four years of reporting probation. On
February 23, 2014, Appellant was arrested on
charges of robbery, conspiracy, burglary, aggravated
assault, and violation of the Uniform Firearms Act,
with an alleged criminal act date of January 18,
2014.
J. S02007/17
Briefly stated, the facts of that case involved a
home invasion armed robbery of a fifty-seven
year-old victim, who was ambushed via a
co-conspirator. Appellant pistol whipped the victim
while screaming for money. The victim’s neighbor
opened the door to his room and was shot in the arm
by a co-defendant. Appellant took money and drugs,
and shot out a camera while fleeing. Notes of
Testimony, 3/23/16, p. 7-10.
Appellant was tried before a jury. Appellant
was convicted and on February 17, 2016, the
Honorable Glenn Bronson sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of twenty to forty years of
incarceration. In the interim, Judge Patrick has been
assigned to the civil trial division and jurisdiction
over Appellant’s supervision was transferred to this
court. At a violation hearing on March 23, 2016, this
court revoked probation and sentenced Appellant to
a period of three [and one-half] to [seven] years of
incarceration, consecutive to Judge Bronson’s
sentence. This appeal followed. Appellant filed his
notice of appeal on April 20, 2016. On April 22,
2016, this court ordered Appellant to file a Concise
Statement of Matters (hereinafter Statement)
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed his
Statement on May 20, 2016[.]
Trial court opinion, 6/8/16 at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:
1. Whether [t]he sentencing court erred as a
matter of law, abused its discretion and
violated general sentencing principles when,
following a revocation of probation, the court
imposed a statutory maximum sentence,
ordered to be served consecutively?
2. Whether the court abused its discretion in
conducting the violation of probation [(“VOP”)]
hearing and sentencing Appellant to the
statutory maximum when counsel admitted on
the record that he was not prepared to proceed
-2-
J. S02007/17
and had no file, had only met the Appellant
that morning and had no information or
witnesses present?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
We will address appellant’s second issue first. Appellant complains
that the trial court should have granted a continuance. Appellant argues
that his attorney was unprepared and knew nothing about the case.
(Appellant’s brief at 17-18.) Appellant met his attorney for the first time
immediately prior to sentencing. (Id. at 17.) Defense counsel had no
evidence or witnesses to present. (Id. at 18.) According to appellant, he
did not even know why he was in the courtroom on March 23, 2016. (Id. at
17-18.) Appellant contends that under the circumstances, he was denied his
right to a fair sentencing hearing as well as his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 23.)
Initially, we note the following:
Appellate review of a trial court’s
continuance decision is deferential. The
grant or denial of a motion for a
continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be
reversed only upon a showing of an
abuse of discretion. As we have
consistently stated, an abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of
judgment. Rather, discretion is abused
when the law is overridden or
misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as
shown by the evidence or the record[.]
-3-
J. S02007/17
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 628 Pa. 524, 529-30,
104 A.3d 466 (2014) (quotations marks, quotation,
and citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Norton, 144 A.3d 139, 143 (Pa.Super. 2016).
However, the trial court exceeds the bounds of its
discretion when it denies a continuance on the basis
of “an unreasonable and arbitrary insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request
for delay[.]” [Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77
A.3d 663, 672 (Pa.Super. 2013)] (quotation marks
and quotation omitted). Accordingly, we must
examine the reasons presented to the trial court for
requesting the continuance, as well as the trial
court’s reasons for denying the request. See id.
Id.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 106, “Continuances in
Summary and Court Cases,” provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(A) The court or issuing authority may, in the
interests of justice, grant a continuance, on its
own motion, or on the motion of either party.
(D) A motion for continuance on behalf of the
defendant shall be made not later than
48 hours before the time set for the
proceeding. A later motion shall be
entertained only when the opportunity therefor
did not previously exist, or the defendant was
not aware of the grounds for the motion, or
the interests of justice require it.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 106 (A), (D).
Appointed counsel, Matthew Hellerman, Esq., did not request a
continuance until the day of sentencing. The public defender who had
previously been representing appellant was unavailable and,
-4-
J. S02007/17
Attorney Hellerman was assigned at the last minute. Attorney Hellerman
explained,
Your Honor, I spoke to [appellant] this morning in
the booth just briefly. I was -- I met him for the first
time today. I don’t have a file on this case.
Apparently, the Public Defender’s Office was
appointed at the last listing with -- Ms. Fensterer was
present. She requested a date. I never received
any information. After speaking with [appellant], he
didn’t know what he was here for today. I wasn’t
able to have his family come in to be here for him,
as they typically would be. He didn’t know he had a
violation hearing today or that’s what he was being
brought for.
Mr. Mischak represented him on these direct
violations. Mr. Mischak has filed post-trial motions
and he would like Mr. Mischak to be present to
represent him on this, Your Honor.
So that is my request at this point.
THE COURT: As --
[ANDREW] NOTARISTEFANO[, ESQ., ADA]: We dealt
with that at the last listing. We dealt with all of that
at the last listing.
THE COURT: Okay, but --
MR. NOTARISTEFANO: Mr. Mischak said he wasn’t
going to represent [appellant]. There was a
conversation. The defendant’s mother was in the
courtroom; she was spoken to. The court staff called
Mr. Mischak’s Office. There was a conversation with
Ms. Fensterer. Your Honor appointed her. You gave
her the time to prepare for it. I provided her the
pre-sentence investigation [(“PSI”)] [report] as well
as the Sentencing Memorandum. They’ve had all the
information since the last listing, which was
approximately a month ago. They knew where he
was. He was kept locally for various reasons. He
-5-
J. S02007/17
wasn’t shipped up to SCI Forest as the state system
had planned and it was all dealt with and he knows
that, and Your Honor, knows that, and the PD’s
Office knows it. Maybe not this Assistant Public
Defender, but it was discussed and the PD’s Office
does know that.
MR. HELLERMAN: And in that case, like I said, I
wasn’t present for any of that, Your Honor.
Ms. Fensterer never told me anything about this
case. I don’t know if she knew she would not be
here today, so it’s my position that at the very least
Ms. Fensterer should be here to handle it, if not
Mr. Mischak. I’m just simply relaying my client’s
request. If it’s denied, then we’ll proceed.
Notes of testimony, 3/23/16 at 13-15.
Judge Palumbo denied the request for a continuance, but indicated
that he would consider appellant’s argument to run his VOP sentence
concurrently with his sentence on the new charges. (Id. at 16-18.)
Attorney Hellerman made an argument for concurrent sentences but noted
that he was hindered by his lack of information concerning appellant’s case.
(Id. at 17-18.) Judge Palumbo addressed this issue in his Rule 1925(a)
opinion as follows:
Here, Appellant was listed for a violation
hearing on February 16, 2016 and the public
defender was appointed after court staff contacted
Appellant’s trial counsel and was informed that trial
counsel was not retained for the probation violation.
The case was continued and the Commonwealth’s
attorney passed a copy of the [PSI] report and the
Commonwealth’s sentencing memorandum.
Appellant’s family was present at the February 16
court date and aware of his March 23 hearing. At
the revocation hearing, the assigned defender was
again provided with copies of the [PSI] report, the
-6-
J. S02007/17
Commonwealth’s sentencing memorandum, and the
probation summary. Counsel had an opportunity to
confer with Appellant prior to the revocation hearing.
Under the aforementioned circumstances, the court’s
decision to go forward with the revocation hearing
was not an abuse of discretion and no relief is due.
Trial court opinion, 6/8/16 at 6.
We must respectfully disagree. While Attorney Hellerman had a copy
of the Commonwealth’s sentencing memorandum and the PSI report, he was
wholly unfamiliar with appellant’s case and had just met him that morning.
He did not have a case file and was given no information from
Attorney Fensterer. (Notes of testimony, 3/23/16 at 13.)
Attorney Hellerman did not have the opportunity to secure witnesses to
testify on appellant’s behalf. (Id.) It is clear from the transcript that
Attorney Hellerman was unaware of appellant’s background and individual
circumstances, as well as any potential mitigating evidence, and was
thoroughly unprepared to proceed at the VOP sentencing hearing.
While the Commonwealth characterizes the continuance request as
untimely, Attorney Hellerman could not have made it sooner as he was just
assigned appellant’s case that day. It is unknown from the existing record
why Attorney Fensterer was unable to appear on appellant’s behalf, but
certainly whatever happened, it was not appellant’s fault. In the interests of
justice and to safeguard appellant’s rights to effective representation and
due process, Attorney Hellerman’s continuance request should have been
granted. There was no apparent prejudice to the Commonwealth by
-7-
J. S02007/17
granting the request. For these reasons, we are compelled to vacate the
judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.1 Given our disposition
of appellant’s second issue, it is unnecessary to address the first issue.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/23/2017
1
Appellant does not dispute that he was in violation of his probation where
he was convicted of new charges.
-8-