United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 12, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-41654
Summary Calendar
CLARENCE EUGENE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TRAVIS E. PRIMROSE,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 9:04-CV-123
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Before KING, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Clarence Eugene Jones, Texas prisoner # 675128, appeals the
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) dismissal of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983
civil rights action for failure to state a claim and as
frivolous. Jones filed the civil rights complaint against Sgt.
Travis E. Primrose, a correctional officer at the Stiles Unit,
alleging that Sgt. Primrose used unnecessary and excessive force
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-41654
-2-
against Jones by grabbing him by the throat, twisting his arm
behind his back, and causing Jones to stretch upward, which
caused severe pain, internal injuries, and the breaking of
stitches.
We have reviewed de novo the dismissal for failure to state
a claim. See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999).
To state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff
must allege that the force was not “applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, [but] maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm,” and that he suffered an injury. See
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Jones made such
allegations.
In determining that Jones did not suffer any injury, it does
not appear that the magistrate judge accepted as true Jones’s
allegations that one of his stitches broke, he was bleeding, and
he suffered severe pain and internal damage. See Harris v.
Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999); Williams v. Luna, 909
F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1990). Whether prison personnel determined
that Jones did not require medical care or surgery for his injury
is not relevant to whether Jones alleged an injury, which he did.
Whether that allegation of injury is constitutionally cognizable
requires consideration of the Hudson factors. See Baldwin v.
Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 838-39 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Hudson,
503 U.S. at 7). Although the magistrate judge noted the Hudson
No. 04-41654
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factors, there is no analysis of these factors as applied to
Jones’s allegations.
From the record before us, we are unable to conclude that
Jones can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief. Dismissal of the complaint,
therefore, was premature. Accordingly, the judgment appealed is
VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent herewith. ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS ARE DENIED.