J-S07043-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
WILLIAM AMOS CRAMER, :
:
Appellant : No. 942 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 25, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-49-CR-0000530-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 28, 2017
William Amos Cramer (“Cramer”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of four counts of aggravated
assault and one count each of assault by life prisoner, attempted murder,
possession of an instrument of crime, and prohibited offensive weapons.1
We affirm.
On August 31, 2014, Cramer was an inmate at the State Correctional
Institution at Coal Township (“SCI-Coal”), serving a life sentence for first-
degree murder. The victim, Francisco Charriez (“Charriez”), was a
corrections officer at SCI-Coal. The trial court set forth the relevant facts as
follows:
[On August 31, 2014, Charriez] was on duty in the [SCI-Coal]
yard[,] instructing inmates to return to their units. [Charriez]
described how [Cramer] snuck up behind him and applied a
1
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4); 2704; 901(a);
907(a); 908(a).
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choke hold. Yelling “die nigger,” [Cramer] started to cut
[Charriez’s] throat with a razor; punched his face near the right
temple; … gouged him with the razor near his right eyelid; [and]
then [] walked away laughing and chanting something.
Fortunately, [Charriez] was successfully treated for his life
threatening wounds, and survived the attack; however, now he
suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder.
[Charriez], Puerto Rican by descent, denied any
provocation whatsoever. [Charriez stated that Cramer] wasn’t
an inmate in [Charriez’s] unit, and [Charriez] had never even
spoken to [Cramer] at any time.
Another correctional officer related that he was about ten
to fifteen yards away when he noticed [Charriez and Cramer]
“square off.” [This correctional officer stated that a]lthough [he
was] focused on assisting with getting [Cramer] restrained
[following the attack], he saw [Cramer] throw a white object
away, which was [] never found.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/12/16, at 2-3 (unnumbered).
After Cramer was placed in custody, prison authorities transported him
to the State Correctional Institution at Dallas, where he was interviewed by
Pennsylvania State Trooper Charles Prula (“Trooper Prula”). According to
Trooper Prula, Cramer had stated that the confrontation began when Cramer
accidentally bumped into Charriez, at which time Charriez noticed that
Cramer had a tattoo of a swastika and asked Cramer if he was a white
supremacist. N.T., 11/19/15, at 104-05. Cramer replied that he was, in
response to which, Cramer alleged, Charriez called Cramer a “cracker,”
which is commonly known as a derogatory reference. Id. at 105. Trooper
Prula described what next transpired as follows:
Cramer told me at that point, he decided to lay [in] wait for
[Charriez]. [Cramer] indicated that everything was
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premeditated and that he did try to kill [Charriez]. [] Cramer
told me that he walked around the [SCI-Coal] track until he was
able to come up behind [Charriez] and then [Cramer] used his
hand and his forearm, placed it over [Charriez’s] forehead,
pulled his neck back[,] and then tried to cut his throat. After
that, [] Cramer stated that he threw the weapon onto the
basketball court. He described it … as a razor with a handle.
Id. (paragraph break omitted); see also id. at 107 (wherein Trooper Prula
reported that Cramer had stated to him, “I tried to slice [Charriez’s] throat
with the razor, I tried to kill him.”).
Cramer testified in his own defense at trial, and stated that he was
passing out “pro-white” literature when he bumped into Charriez. Id. at
117. Cramer stated that after engaging in a verbal altercation with Charriez,
Cramer went to Charriez’s supervisor to complain about Charriez. Id.
Cramer then returned to Charriez and asked Charriez to leave him alone, at
which time Charriez called Cramer a “cracker” and threw Cramer’s literature
on the ground. Id. Cramer testified that in response to
some things [said by Charriez,] I felt that I had to defend
myself. … My life was in jeopardy in a prison society like this[,]
and [Charriez] was just releasing information and, you know,
putting my history out there and that was endangering my life,
so I acted. Did I intend to kill him? No, that wasn’t true. Did I
say it? I did. I was angry. People say things when they get
mad. I didn’t mean it.
Id. at 118 (paragraph break omitted).
On January 8, 2015, a Police Criminal Complaint (hereinafter “the
Complaint”) was filed charging Cramer with six counts: one count each of
assault by life prisoner, attempted murder, possession of an instrument of
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crime, and prohibited offensive weapons; and two counts of aggravated
assault (under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3) (concerning aggravated assault –
bodily injury – of a correctional officer in the performance of duty) and
2702(a)(4) (concerning aggravated assault with a deadly weapon)). On
June 8, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a Criminal Information (hereinafter
“the Information”) against Cramer, charging him with the above-mentioned
offenses, as well as two additional aggravated assault charges (hereinafter
collectively referred to as “the additional aggravated assault charges”),
under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) (concerning aggravated assault – serious
bodily injury) and 2702(a)(2) (concerning aggravated assault – serious
bodily injury – of a correctional officer in the performance of duty). The
matter proceeded to a jury trial,2 at the close of which the jury found
Cramer guilty of all eight counts charged in the Information.
On January 25, 2016, the trial court sentenced Cramer to an
aggregate term of twenty to forty years in prison, to run consecutively to his
underlying life sentence. Cramer thereafter filed a timely post-sentence
Motion, which the trial court denied. Cramer filed a timely Notice of Appeal,
2
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Cramer’s standby
counsel objected at sidebar, alleging lack of adequate notice of the additional
aggravated assault charges contained in the Information. N.T., 11/19/15, at
147-48. The trial court overruled the objection. Id. at 149.
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along with a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of
on appeal.3
Cramer now presents the following issues for our review:
A. Whether the [trial] court erred by allowing the prosecutor to
file [the I]nformation with two added counts[,] without
serving [Cramer] or his counsel[,] when every defendant has
a right to due process and equal protection under the law?
B. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding sufficient evidence
where there was no video confirmation of the alleged assault
and the alleged victim’s testimony changed at trial from his
prior versions[;] no experts were called to support lay
opinions[;] and the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the specific intent required?
Brief for Appellant at 5 (capitalization omitted).
Cramer first argues that he was denied due process of law when the
Commonwealth purportedly added the additional aggravated assault charges
at trial, without notice to Cramer. Id. at 14; see also id. at 17-18
(asserting that “[t]he verdict slip added the [additional aggravated assault]
charge[s] over objection of [Cramer]”). Accordingly, Cramer urges, he is
“entitled to a new trial, since the [additional aggravated assault] charges
clouded the entire defense presented by [Cramer], and he was not
adequately able to prepare prior to trial [concerning] all [of] the charges
lodged against him.” Id. at 18. We disagree.
Contrary to Cramer’s assertion, the additional aggravated assault
charges were not added at trial; rather, they were included in the
3
The trial court did not order Cramer to file a Rule 1925(b) concise
statement.
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Information. Moreover, Cramer concedes that the Commonwealth filed the
Information with the Prothonotary in June 2015, five months prior to trial,
but failed to serve him with a copy. Brief for Appellant at 15. Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 562 provides that “[t]he clerk of courts shall,
upon request, furnish each defendant against whom an information or
informations have been filed[,] with a copy of the information or
informations filed against the defendant.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 562 (emphasis
added). Cramer has not alleged that he ever requested a copy of the
Information. Additionally, it is of no moment that the Complaint charged
Cramer with only, inter alia, two counts of aggravated assault. The
additional aggravated assault charges were contained in the Information,
which was the charging document.4 Accordingly, Cramer’s first issue lacks
merit.
Next, Cramer asserts that the jury’s verdicts were not supported by
4
In any event, Cramer was put on adequate notice of the additional
aggravated assault charges by virtue of the other six charges set forth in the
Complaint (and bound over at his preliminary hearing).
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sufficient evidence and must therefore be overturned.5 See Brief for
Appellant at 18-26. Specifically, Cramer summarizes his claim as follows:
The verdict went against the sufficiency of the evidence where
[Cramer] claimed he had no intent to kill [Charriez;] where there
was no video confirmation that [Cramer’s] original intention was
to create any bodily injury[;] where [Charriez] was taken by
surprise and unable to definitively surmise [Cramer’s] original
intention[;] where [Cramer] claimed he was trying to protect his
religion, his life, and his beliefs[;] where the fight and injuries
escalated thereafter[;] and where no weapon was found.
Id. at 18-19; see also id. at 23 (maintaining that “[Charriez] likely
threatened or provoked [Cramer,] undermining the support for a guilty
verdict.”). Cramer further asserts that “[Charriez’s] injuries were not likely
life threatening[,] and since no expert testified … that the injuries were such,
the element of injury[,] and specifically[,] ‘serious bodily injury[,]’ was not
proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. [Charriez] had four small
gashes.” Id. at 22. Additionally, though Cramer concedes that he had
5
We observe that Cramer does not specify which of his eight convictions he
is challenging as being unsupported by sufficient evidence. Though we
decline to find waiver of Cramer’s claim on this basis (particularly where the
trial court did not order a Rule 1925(b) concise statement), this defect
hinders our review of Cramer’s claim. Accord Commonwealth v. Gibbs,
981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding that the defendant had
waived his sufficiency of the evidence challenge where he did not, in his
court-ordered Rule 1925(b) concise statement, specify the convictions he
was challenging and/or the element or elements upon which the evidence
was purportedly insufficient, and the defendant’s appellate brief was
similarly undeveloped). Moreover, in lieu of reciting herein the Crimes Code
definitions of the several crimes of which Cramer was convicted, we simply
refer to the applicable provisions. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1)-(4);
2704; 901(a); 907(a); 908(a).
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admitted to Trooper Prula that he cut Charriez with a razor with the intent to
kill him, Cramer recanted this admission at trial. Id. at 21-22, 24.
Our standard of review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well
settled:
Our standard of review is whether the evidence admitted at trial,
and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, were sufficient to enable the fact[-]finder to
conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 71 A.3d 998, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
and brackets omitted).
In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. … Furthermore, when reviewing a
sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution
the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.
Gibbs, 981 A.2d at 281 (citation omitted). Finally, “the finder of fact[,]
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
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Initially, to the extent that Cramer challenges that the jury should
have believed his account of the events of August 31, 2014, and disbelieved
the account of Charriez, this claim goes to the weight of the evidence, not
the sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d
155, 160 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that a claim that the jury should have
believed appellant’s version of the event rather than that of the victim goes
to the weight, not the sufficiency of the evidence). Here, the jury, as fact-
finder, was free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony presented, and
credibility determinations are solely within its province. See
Commonwealth v. Rabold, 920 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. Super. 2007). Further,
to the extent that there were conflicts in the testimony, the jury ostensibly
accepted the testimony proffered by the Commonwealth’s witnesses, and
found Cramer’s account of the assault to be incredible, and his justifications
for his actions unavailing. See id. We decline Cramer’s invitation to assume
the role of the fact-finder, and to reweigh the evidence on appeal and
disturb the jury’s credibility determinations. See id.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that Cramer confessed to Trooper
Prula that Cramer had used a razor to cut Charriez, with the intent to kill
him. N.T., 11/19/15, at 105, 107. Though Cramer recanted his confession
at trial, the jury, acting within its sole province, ostensibly disbelieved
Cramer’s self-interested recantation and determined that he, in fact,
possessed the intent to kill Charriez. Cramer’s admission as to his intent
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undermines his claim on appeal that there was insufficient evidence of his
intent (i.e., from video surveillance or Charriez’s testimony). Moreover,
even though the weapon that Cramer had used was never recovered,
Cramer’s admission that he had used a razor (along with Charriez’s injuries
and an eyewitness’s testimony that he saw Cramer discard an object
immediately after the attack) was amply sufficient to establish that Cramer
possessed and used a prohibited weapon. We conclude that the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to
establish all elements of the offenses of which Cramer was convicted beyond
a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dale, 836 A.2d 150,
152, 154-55 (Pa. Super. 2003) (upholding the defendant’s convictions of
attempted murder and multiple counts of aggravated assault where the
defendant, an inmate in state prison, tried to kill another inmate in the
prison yard by cutting his throat with a razor, and rejecting the defendant’s
sufficiency challenge as to the requisite specific intent and severity of the
victim’s wounds). Accordingly, Cramer’s second issue lacks merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/28/2017
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