15-3238-pr
Lewis v. Cavanugh
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 30th day of March, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
KACEY LEWIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 15-3238-pr
THOMAS CAVANUGH, JAMES DICKEY,
AND ROBERT LIQUINDOLI,
Defendants-Appellees,
CITY OF WATERBURY, MICHAEL
GUGLIOTTI,
Defendants.
FOR APPELLANT: Kacey Lewis, pro se, Uncasville, Connecticut.
FOR APPELLEES: Joseph A. Mengacci, Office of the Corporation
Counsel, City of Waterbury, Waterbury,
Connecticut.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut (Vanessa L. Bryant, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment entered on September 30, 2015, is AFFIRMED in part
and VACATED in part and REMANDED.
Kacey Lewis, proceeding pro se, appeals from a trial judgment in favor of
defendants on his claims of excessive force in effectuating arrest and unlawful
interrogation, and from summary judgment on his claim of deliberate indifference to
medical needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He argues that he established a sufficiently
serious injury to preclude summary judgment on his deliberate-indifference claim. As to
his remaining claims, he contends, inter alia, that the district court abused its discretion by
denying a continuance after pro bono counsel was permitted to withdraw on the first day of
trial, requiring Lewis to proceed pro se without adequate time to prepare or secure
witnesses. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to
explain our decision to affirm in part and vacate in part.
1. Summary Judgment
We review a summary judgment award de novo, resolving all ambiguities and
drawing all inferences in favor of the non-movant, and we will affirm only if the record
reveals no genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty
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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986); Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167,
171–72 (2d Cir. 2015). At the same time, we are mindful that “conclusory allegations or
denials . . . cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none would
otherwise exist,” nor can “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts.”
Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, whether or not relied
upon by the district court. See Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.
2016).
To avoid summary judgment on a claim of deliberate indifference to the medical
needs of a pretrial detainee, a plaintiff must adduce evidence that the alleged deprivation
“pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849
F.3d 17, 30, 34 n.9 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hill v. Curcione,
657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (requiring showing that alleged deprivation of medical
care was objectively “sufficiently serious, in the sense that a condition of urgency, one that
may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Lewis failed to make this showing because, assuming the admissibility of his
own statement, the record does not support a finding of urgency, demonstrating only that
Lewis reported that his “head was swollen” and that he was “dizzy, nauseous,” and “seeing
double,” Lewis Aff. ¶ 22, Lewis v. Cavanugh, No. 3:10-cv-112-VLB (D. Conn. Dec. 18,
2014), ECF No. 76-2, and later was treated only for bruising and minor abrasions.
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We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment on Lewis’s
deliberate-indifference claim on the merits.
2. Denial of Continuance
Because of the logistical difficulties inherent in administering trials, courts are
afforded “a great deal of latitude in scheduling.” Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because a continuance “can be highly
disruptive to the courts and the parties, especially when granted close to the start of trial,”
and particularly when a jury is implicated, they are disfavored “except for compelling
reasons.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, district courts are “entrusted
with broad discretion” to decide whether the proffered justifications outweigh the
disruption and delay. Id. at 93. We therefore review the denial of a continuance for
abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only upon “a showing both of arbitrariness and of
prejudice to the defendant.” Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 99–100 (2d
Cir. 2001). In this context, prejudice is established if the denial “substantially impaired
the presentation of [the] case.” Dow v. Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d
329, 341–42 (2d Cir. 1986).
We conclude that Lewis was prejudiced by the denial of even a brief continuance in
this case. The district court correctly recognized that rescheduling trial after a jury had
been selected in a case that was already five years old militated against a lengthy
adjournment, a conclusion reinforced by Lewis’s role in precipitating his counsel’s
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withdrawal. But these circumstances did not require starting the trial within hours of
counsel’s withdrawal, affording Lewis no advance notice that he would have to present his
case pro se and no time to prepare even his opening statement, much less an evidentiary
presentation. Given that Lewis had already examined some of the defendants in other
proceedings, the court was not obliged to grant a lengthy adjournment in light of the other
circumstances noted. But the denial of any continuance—even one of only 24
hours—must be deemed prejudicial here to a plaintiff who had no notice that he would
have to proceed pro se. See Dow v. Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d at
342. We are therefore obliged to vacate the judgment entered after trial and to remand for
further proceedings.1
3. Conclusion
Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part the September 30, 2015
judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
order.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
1
Because we conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying a continuance, we
need not reach Lewis’s evidentiary challenges or his challenge to the jury instructions.
Nor do we address the parties’ apparent failure to resolve Lewis’s
unconstitutional-interrogation claim during the bench trial, which the district court should
address on remand.
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