J-A02024-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
EVAN CASTELLANOS,
Appellant No. 1074 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered March 4, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001114-2015.
BEFORE: OTT, RANSOM, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED MARCH 30, 2017
Appellant, Evan Castellanos, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after he pleaded guilty to criminal attempt to commit criminal
homicide.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history
as follows:
[O]n January 22, 2016, at a pretrial conference prior to the
February Criminal Trial list, [Appellant] entered a negotiated
guilty plea to one count of criminal attempt to commit homicide,
graded as a first-degree felony. The guilty plea included a
sentence bargain of 16 to 35 years’ imprisonment. At the time
of the negotiated plea, this Court inquired as to the applicable
sentencing guideline ranges. Guilty Plea Counsel informed the
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1
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901 and 2501.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Court that, using the [basic] sentencing matrix [with an offense
gravity score (OGS) of 14 and a prior record score (PRS) of 1]
the standard guideline range was 84 months to the statutory
limit – [480] months.[2] However, the [Commonwealth] noted
that the deadly weapon used matrix was applicable. Under the
deadly weapon used matrix, with the same OGS and PRS, the
guidelines increased to 102 months to the statutory limit.
Therefore, the sentence bargain of 16 years (192 months) to 35
years (420 months) was within the standard range.
The Court went through a detailed guilty plea colloquy with
[Appellant] prior to accepting the plea as free and voluntary. We
also accepted the written guilty plea colloquy which was
purported to have been filed out and signed by [Appellant].
The [Commonwealth] summarized the fact pattern –
[Appellant] drove to the victim’s residence in Bethlehem and
invited the victim to come outside to meet with him while
[Appellant] sat in the passenger seat of the car. When the
victim came out of the house and approached the automobile,
[Appellant] extended his arm out of the window and shot the
victim in the chest with a .357 revolver. [Appellant] fled the
scene and was on the run until he was apprehended in Florida
and extradited to Northampton County. After [Appellant] heard
the recitation by the Commonwealth and acknowledged that it
was an accurate statement as to his crime, the Court asked
several follow-up questions including a general inquiry as to the
motive for the shooting of the victim who allegedly had been
[Appellant’s] friend. [Appellant] volunteered that he shot the
victim because “he had raped a girl named Jordan”.
The Court also informed [Appellant] that his guilty plea
was expected to be a final resolution in this matter.
[Appellant] answered all the Court’s questions raised
during the guilty plea proceeding. Clearly, his responses
indicated that his plea was free and voluntary and that no one
had forced or coerced him to plead guilty. When the Court
indicated that it was prepared to impose the sentence bargain
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2
Appellant pleaded guilty to attempt to commit criminal homicide resulting
in serious bodily injury. Accordingly, the statutory maximum sentence is
forty years. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(c).
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contemporaneously with the guilty plea, guilty plea counsel
asked if the Court would delay sentencing in order to give
[Appellant’s] family time to come to Northampton County to
participate at sentencing. That request was granted. We set
sentencing for March 4, 2016.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/16, at 1-2.
On February 25, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. Within the motion, he asserted the following:
1. [Appellant] did not understand [the] Basic Sentencing
Matrix[.]
2. [Appellant] was not [made] aware of Basic Sentencing
Matrix[.]
3. [Appellant] was [coerced] into entering a guilty plea to a
charge he was not guilty of[.]
4. [Appellant] believes the plea was illegally induced[.]
5. [Appellant] believes he was sentence[d] outside [the]
sentencing guidelines[.]
6. [Appellant] was abandon[ed] by [his] lawyer[.]
7. [Appellant] requested pre-[trial] motions to be filed before
entering any guilty plea[.]
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 2/25/16, at 1-2. By letter dated February
29, 2016, the Commonwealth filed its response.
Appellant appeared for sentencing on March 4, 2016. At that time, the
trial court indicated to the parties that Appellant had filed the motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and that guilty plea counsel, who had been
privately retained by Appellant, had filed a motion to withdraw. The
Commonwealth then argued why it would be prejudiced should Appellant be
permitted to withdraw his plea, and guilty plea counsel informed the court of
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his displeasure with Appellant’s decision. The trial court then directly asked
Appellant why he wished to withdraw his plea, and Appellant responded,
“Your Honor, I’m not guilty of that charge and I believe like the lawyer took
advantage of my mental state.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 3/4/16, at 16.
When asked about his mental state and what medication Appellant had been
taking, Appellant said, “It’s like [X]anax[,]” although he did not know the
product name. Id. Appellant further informed the court that he himself
never filled out the written guilty plea. Finding Appellant “not credible,” id.
at 17, the trial court denied Appellant’s withdrawal motion, and imposed the
negotiated sentence.
This timely appeal follows. Both Appellant and the trial court have
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue:
Whether the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion in
denying Appellant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea prior to
sentencing despite Appellant’s plausible proclamation of
innocence by asserting he was not guilty of the charge and
the fact that the Commonwealth would not have been
substantially prejudiced by the withdrawal?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
There are significantly different standards of proof for defendants who
move to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing and for those who move to
withdraw a plea after sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Kirsch, 930
A.2d 1282, 1284-1285 (Pa. Super. 2007). Recently, our Supreme Court has
clarified the pre-sentence standard of proof in Commonwealth v.
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Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2015). The high court first noted the
standard it had established many years ago in Commonwealth v. Forbes,
299 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1973):
[T]his Court’s Forbes decision reflects that: there is no
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; trial courts have
discretion in determining whether a withdrawal request will
be granted; such discretion is to be administered liberally
in favor of the accused; and any demonstration by a
defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a
grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice
to the Commonwealth.
Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1291-1292 (citing Forbes, 299 A.2d at 271)
(footnote omitted).
At issue in Carrasquillo was “whether the common pleas courts must
accept a bare assertion of innocence as a fair and just reason for
withdrawal.” Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1289. Our Supreme Court then
discussed the interpretation this Court has given Forbes and subsequent
Supreme Court pronouncements, and it acknowledged “the legitimate
perception of a per se rule arising from this Court’s decisions.”
Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1292. The high court then stated its
disagreement with the application of such a “bright-line” rule:
Presently, we are persuaded by the approach of other
jurisdictions which require that a defendant’s innocence claim
must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair
and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea. More
broadly, the proper inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal
motion is whether the accused has made some colorable
demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting
withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice. The
policy of liberality remains extant but has its limits, consistent
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with the affordance of a degree of discretion to the common
pleas courts.
Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1292 (citation omitted).
Stated succinctly, our Supreme Court in Carrasquillo concluded that
“a bare assertion of innocence is not, in and of itself, a sufficient reason to
require a court to grant such a request.” Id. at 1285. Finally, the high
court concluded that, given its disposition, it need not discuss the issue of
prejudice to the Commonwealth. Id. at 1293 n.9.
The trial court in this case found the fact pattern presented analogous
to that involved in Carrasquillo:
Here, we evaluated the credibility of [Appellant’s] assertion
of “innocence.” He provided no justification or support for his
not guilty claim other than the claim that he didn’t understand
the guilty plea proceeding. Frankly, anyone would review the
guilty plea transcript could reach only one conclusion, that
[Appellant’s] plea was free, knowing, and voluntarily and further
that his acknowledgement of his guilt was beyond the general
acquiescence of the facts where a defendant simply agrees to
the Commonwealth’s presentation of the facts. Here,
[Appellant] offered his justification, his motivation, for
committing this crime.
There was nothing about [Appellant’s] assertion of a lack
of understanding of the guilty plea proceeding [sic] nor any
support for the bald assertion that he was “not guilty.”
Certainly, there is nothing in this record which supports a
plausible demonstration of innocence which would provide a fair
and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Without
any credible record to justify the withdrawal of the guilty plea,
we were unwilling to exercise our discretion. Finally, we note
that our decision rests squarely within the four corners of the
most recent pronouncement by our Supreme Court on this issue
found in Carrasquillo.
Trial Court’s Opinion, 5/24/16, at 4-5. We agree.
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Appellant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Just as our
Supreme Court in Carrasquillo held that a bare assertion of innocence is
insufficient to permit a pre-sentence plea withdrawal, the bare assertion that
the innocence claim is “plausible” is likewise insufficient. As the high court
stated in Carrasquillo, a criminal defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty
plea prior to sentencing must make “some colorable demonstration, under
the circumstances” that “permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote
fairness and justice.” Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1292. Appellant has failed
to so in this case.3
Finally, we reject Appellant’s argument regarding the lack of
“substantial prejudice” to the Commonwealth. As in Carrasquillo, we need
not reach this issue unless Appellant has presented a plausible basis for his
claim of innocence. See id., supra.
In summary, because Appellant failed to establish a plausible claim
regarding his innocence, the trial court properly denied his pre-sentence
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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3
We also reject Appellant’s alternative claim that we should remand so that
“a more thorough record could be made regarding his assertion of
innocence.” Appellant’s Brief at 6. Appellant has already been given an
opportunity to present a colorable claim that the circumstances should have
allowed for the pre-sentence withdraw of his plea.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/30/2017
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