UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4363
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRANDON CARDEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:15-cr-00152-FL-1)
Submitted: March 27, 2017 Decided: March 30, 2017
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, First Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine
L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brandon Cardez appeals his 28-month sentence imposed
following a guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(g)(1), 924 (2012). On appeal,
Cardez challenges the reasonableness of the district court’s
upward departure under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 4A1.3, p.s. (2016). For the following reasons, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “When reviewing a departure, we
consider whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with
respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with
respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range.” United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 529 (4th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reasonableness has both procedural and substantive
components. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In assessing procedural
reasonableness, we consider factors such as whether the district
court properly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range,
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and
sufficiently explained the sentence imposed. Id. “Where the
defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for
imposing a different sentence than that set forth in the
advisory Guidelines, a district judge should address the party’s
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arguments and explain why he has rejected those arguments.”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). If no procedural errors
exist, we consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence,
evaluating “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51.
Under that standard, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it applied USSG § 4A1.3, p.s.
That section encourages upward departures when “reliable
information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history
category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the
defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the
defendant will commit other crimes.” USSG § 4A1.3, p.s.
Here, the district court found that Cardez’s criminal
history category underrepresented his past crimes, some of which
had been consolidated for judgments, and that Cardez seemed
likely to commit future crimes. While Cardez committed most of
his crimes as a juvenile, the district court considered that
factor among others. The court also considered Cardez’s past in
rejecting more lenient sentences, including supervision with
outpatient drug treatment. Based on the court’s consideration
of all relevant factors and the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it sentenced Cardez.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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