[Cite as State v. Patton, 2017-Ohio-1197.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 2016-CA-37
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2016-CR-70
:
PAUL W. PATTON : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 31st day of March, 2017.
...........
MEGAN M. FARLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0088515, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark
County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Fourth Floor, Springfield, Ohio
45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JOYCE M. DEITERING, Atty. Reg. No. 005776, 8801 North Main Street, Suite 200,
Dayton, Ohio 45415
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
WELBAUM, J.
-2-
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Paul W. Patton, appeals from his conviction in the Clark
County Court of Common Pleas after pleading guilty to one count of breaking and
entering. In support of his appeal, Patton contends that his guilty plea was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Patton also contends that his conviction
is against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons outlined below, the
judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On February 16, 2016, the Clark County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Patton with one count of breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13(A),
a felony of the fifth degree. Following his indictment, Patton appeared before the trial
court on April 15, 2016, and pled guilty to the breaking and entering charge. On May 10,
2016, the trial court sentenced Patton to twelve months in prison to be served
consecutively to a sentence Patton received in Clark County Case No. 2015-CR-0201.
Patton now appeals from his conviction, raising two assignments of error for this court’s
review.
First Assignment of Error
{¶ 3} Patton’s First Assignment of Error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT’S UNKNOWING AND INVOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA.
{¶ 4} Under his First Assignment of Error, Patton contends that he did not
-3-
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his guilty plea because the trial court failed
to establish that he had a full understanding of the constitutional rights he was waiving
upon pleading guilty. Specifically, Patton contends that his tenth-grade level of
education prevented him from understanding the trial court’s allegedly “lengthy” and
“barely comprehensible” explanation of rights. Patton also contends that the trial court
failed to notify him that the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of the breaking and entering offense at trial in order to find him guilty. Patton
further contends that the trial court failed to ensure that he understood the effect of his
guilty plea.
{¶ 5} In order to be constitutionally valid and comport with due process, a guilty
plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Bateman, 2d Dist.
Champaign No. 2010CA15, 2011-Ohio-5808, ¶ 5, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). “ ‘In considering whether a guilty plea was
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, an appellate court examines the totality of
the circumstances through a de novo review of the record to ensure that the trial court
complied with constitutional and procedural safeguards.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State v.
Redavide, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26070, 2015-Ohio-3056, ¶ 10, quoting State v.
Barner, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 10CA9, 2012-Ohio-4584, ¶ 7.
{¶ 6} “In order for a plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the trial court
must comply with Crim.R. 11(C).” (Citation omitted.) State v. Russell, 2d Dist. Clark
No. 10-CA-54, 2011-Ohio-1738, ¶ 6. “Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process that a trial
court must use before accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest.” State v. Veney,
120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 8. “By following this rule, a
-4-
court ensures that the plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Cole, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 26122, 2015-Ohio-3793, ¶ 12, citing Redavide at ¶ 12.
{¶ 7} Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court may not accept a defendant’s
guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally and:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty
involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or
for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court,
upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands
that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the
defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶ 8} “The trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), as it pertains to
the waiver of constitutional rights.” Russell at ¶ 7, citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d
239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31. However, the trial court need only
substantially comply with the non-constitutional notifications required by Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Cole at ¶ 12, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564
N.E.2d 474 (1990). “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the
-5-
circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and
the rights he is waiving.” (Citations omitted.) Nero at 108.
{¶ 9} After a thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court strictly
complied with the notice requirements in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) pertaining to the waiver of
constitutional rights, including the waiver of the requirement for the State to prove Patton’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Although Patton claims that specific advisement
was not made, the record of the plea hearing establishes otherwise. The trial court
specifically advised Patton that: “At trial you cannot be found guilty unless the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to every member of the jury each and every element
of the offense.” Plea Hearing Trans. (Apr. 15, 2016), p. 8. The same advisement was
also provided in the plea form, which Patton signed and told the trial court he reviewed
and understood.
{¶ 10} We further find that the trial court’s explanation of the constitutional rights
that Patton was waiving upon pleading guilty was not “barely comprehensible” to a person
of Patton’s education level. The record establishes that the trial court’s explanation was
clear and that Patton expressed no confusion with regards to the explanation at the plea
hearing.
{¶ 11} Contrary to Patton’s claim otherwise, the trial court also specifically advised
Patton of the effect of his guilty plea as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). Specifically, the
trial court advised Patton that: “By pleading guilty, you admit the truth of the facts the
prosecutor put on record; you admit that you committed the offense of breaking and
entering, a felony of the fifth degree * * *[.] Do you understand that?” Plea Hearing
Trans. (Apr. 15, 2016), p. 8. Patton thereafter indicated that he understood the effect of
-6-
his guilty plea, which was also provided to him in the plea form.
{¶ 12} The only omission we could find in the trial court’s plea colloquy was the
non-constitutional advisement that the court could proceed to judgment and sentence
upon the acceptance of Patton’s guilty plea. However, that advisement was also
contained in the plea form, which again, Patton indicated he read and understood. As
we recently discussed in State v. Miller, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27079, 2017-Ohio-478,
a trial court is deemed to have substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) under such
circumstances. Id. at ¶ 13-16. See also State v. Summerall, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
02AP-321, 2003-Ohio-1652, ¶ 12 (finding the trial court substantially complied with
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) despite its failure to advise the defendant at the plea hearing that the
court may proceed to judgment upon completion of the guilty plea process, because “in
the written guilty plea form, which [defendant] acknowledged that he understood and
which was explained to him by his counsel, he was informed that the trial court may
proceed with sentencing immediately”).
{¶ 13} For the foregoing reasons, we find that Patton’s guilty plea to breaking and
entering was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, Patton’s First
Assignment of Error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 14} Patton’s Second Assignment of Error is as follows:
DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION FOR THE OFFENSE [OF] BREAKING AND
ENTERING, IN VIOLATION OF ORC 2911.13(A) IS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE
-7-
OVERTURNED.
{¶ 15} Under his Second Assignment of Error, Patton claims his conviction for
breaking and entering is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 16} It is well-established that a guilty plea waives a defendant’s right to
challenge sufficiency or manifest weight of the evidence, as a guilty plea is a complete
admission of guilt. State v. Dalton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24953, 2012-Ohio-3386,
¶ 7, citing Crim.R. 11(B)(1) and Huber Heights v. Duty, 27 Ohio App.3d 244, 500 N.E.2d
339 (2d Dist.1985) and State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d
51. Accord State v. Pierre, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23245, 2009-Ohio-3125, ¶ 11; State
v. Jamison, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21165, 2006-Ohio-4933, ¶ 38. Therefore, by
entering a plea of guilty, Patton surrendered his right to have the State prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jamison at ¶ 38; see also State v. Williams, 6th Dist. Lucas
No. L-02-1221, 2004-Ohio-4856, ¶ 12.
{¶ 17} Because Patton’s guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt that waived
his right to challenge the manifest weight of the evidence, his Second Assignment of Error
is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 18} Having overruled both of Patton’s assignments of error, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
.............
DONOVAN, J. and FROELICH, J., concur.
-8-
Copies mailed to:
Megan M. Farley
Joyce M. Deitering
Hon. Richard J. O’Neill