FILED
APRIL 4, 2017
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of ) No. 33221-7-111
) (consolidated with
DAMIAN T. JOHNSON ) No. 33633-6-111)
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) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
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PENNELL, J. -Damian Johnson was convicted of first and second degree assault.
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l A 60-month mandatory minimum sentence was imposed on the first degree assault
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conviction based on judicial findings that had not been submitted to the jury. Because the
I imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence in such circumstances violated Mr.
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Johnson's constitutional.rights, we grant relief from this sentence as requested in Mr.
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Johnson's personal restraint petition. All other claims are denied.
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No. 33221-7-111; 33633-6-111
In re Pers. Restraint ofJohnson
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are set forth in our opinion addressing Mr. Johnson's direct
appeal. See State v. Johnson, No. 32014-6-111 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2014)
(unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/320146.unp.pdf. Our prior
opinion affirmed Mr. Johnson's conviction, but remanded for resentencing. On remand,
Mr. Johnson was resentenced to 161 months of confinement for the first degree assault
conviction with a 60-month firearm enhancement, and 29 months of confinement for the
second degree assault conviction with a 36-month firearm enhancement. His total term of
confinement is 257 months. The term of confinement for the two assault convictions runs
concurrently, with the two firearm enhancements running consecutively. The amended
judgment and sentence also indicates Mr. Johnson was subject to a 60-month mandatory
minimum for the first degree assault charge under RCW 9.94A.540(l)(b).
At his resentencing on March 24, 2015, Mr. Johnson orally made a CrR 7.8(b)(2)
motion for a new trial, followed two days later with the filing of a written motion. The
trial court ultimately ordered that the motion be transferred to this court, pursuant to
CrR 7.8(c)(2), for consideration as a personal restraint petition. Mr. Johnson attempted to
appeal the trial court's transfer order. After that appeal was referred to the commissioner
to determine appealability, Mr. Johnson filed a motion to dismiss. On June 18, 2015, the
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In re Pers. Restraint ofJohnson
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I commissioner granted the dismissal motion in a notation ruling. Mr. Johnson then filed a
I second personal restraint petition on July 20, 2015. Shortly thereafter, the two petitions
were consolidated for review. On January 22, 2016, Mr. Johnson filed a separate motion
l seeking an evidentiary hearing regarding his claims.
ANALYSIS
Imposition of mandatory minimum sentence
Mr. Johnson was convicted of first degree assault and a 60-month mandatory
minimum was imposed by the trial court. For a mandatory minimum to apply to a first
degree assault charge, the defendant must have "used force or means likely to result in
death or intended to kill the victim." RCW 9.94A.540(l)(b). This mandatory minimum
sentence does not automatically attach to any first degree assault conviction because the
finding necessary to impose a mandatory minimum is different than the finding necessary
for a conviction. Compare RCW 9.94A.540(l)(b) with RCW 9A.36.01 l(l); see also
State v. Dyson, 189 Wn. App. 215, 223-28, 360 P.3d 25 (2015), review denied, 184
Wn.2d 1038 (2016) (explaining the distinction between the statutes). Crucial to this case,
any additional facts necessary for the trial court to impose a mandatory minimum must be
found by the jury. See id.; Alleyne v. United States,_ U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155,
186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013 ). Here, the jury did not make any finding as to the imposition of
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No. 33221-7-111; 33633-6-111
In re Pers. Restraint ofJohnson
the mandatory minimum.
In light of the lack of jury findings, the State concedes that the sentencing court
improperly imposed a mandatory minimum sentence. Nevertheless, because Mr. Johnson
received a sentence in excess of the minimum term of 60 months, the State claims relief is
improper because Mr. Johnson has not suffered any prejudice. Our ruling in Dyson holds
otherwise. We follow Dyson. 189 Wn. App. at 228.
As was true in Dyson, Mr. Johnson was prejudiced by imposition of a 60-month
mandatory minimum sentence because it hindered his ability to receive early release
credits. Id.; see also RCW 9.94A.540(l)(b), (2). By including a mandatory minimum as
part of Mr. Johnson's sentence, the trial court imposed a penalty harsher than what would
otherwise have been sustained. Just as a sentence of life without the possibility of parole
is more severe than a life sentence, see Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), a sentence depriving a defendant from eligibility for early
release time is harsher than one that leaves open this possibility.
Mr. Johnson's lost opportunity for early release time is not something that can be
disregarded as merely a "collateral consequence." In the criminal context, a collateral
consequence is a penalty "in addition to the penalties included in the criminal sentence."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 369 (10th ed. 2014). Typically, a collateral consequence is
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No. 33221-7-III; 33633-6-III
In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson
one imposed civilly, as a result of immigration law, property forfeiture, or professional
licensing standards. Id. A direct consequence, in contrast, is one that has a "definite,
immediate and automatic effect" on a defendant's sentence. State v. Conley, 121 Wn.
App. 280, 286, 87 P.3d 1221 (2004). Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter
9.94A RCW, the lost opportunity for early release credit is an automatic consequence of
the trial court's decision to impose a mandatory minimum sentence. Conley, 121 Wn.
App. at 286; RCW 9.94A.540(2). This makes the lost opportunity for early release credit
a direct consequence of the conviction.
Because Mr. Johnson was harmed by the improper imposition of a mandatory
minimum sentence, he is entitled to relief.
Jury instructions
Mr. Johnson advances two arguments with respect to jury instructions. One deals
with his objection to the trial court's transferred intent instruction. This argument was
rejected on direct appeal and Mr. Johnson has not established any reason for us to re-
examine our prior decision. In re Pers. Restraint a/Gentry, 137 Wn.2d 378, 388-89, 972
P.2d 1250 (1999). The other argument deals with what Mr. Johnson characterizes as
conflicting instructions regarding what constitutes a "deadly weapon" and what the State
must prove to establish the defendant was "armed with a firearm." We find no conflict.
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No. 33221-7-III; 33633-6-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofJohnson
The deadly weapon definition applied to the elements of second degree assault. The
firearm instruction pertained to the special verdicts. 1 The instructions correctly stated the
law and made clear which definition pertained to which issue. Read as a whole, they are
neither misleading nor confusing. We therefore reject Mr. Johnson's claims regarding
instructional error.
Remaining contentions
Mr. Johnson alleges his conviction was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct as well
as ineffective assistance of counsel. He also claims relief is warranted based on newly
discovered exculpatory evidence. Mr. Johnson's arguments regarding misconduct by the
prosecutor and defense counsel are largely conclusory, and thus insufficient to justify
relief. In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 18, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). Mr.
Johnson criticizes the prosecutor's occasional use ofleading questions as well as portions
of closing argument. However, any errors appear to have been minor and defense
counsel's failure to object would appear to be strategic. With respect to the allegation of
newly discovered evidence, Mr. Johnson fails to show that the evidence was actually
unknown or unknowable at the time of trial. For example, Mr. Johnson makes much of
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Because a firearm is defined as a deadly weapon per se, RCW 9.94A.825, the
firearm instruction did not need to refer to the concept of a deadly weapon or its
definition. State v. Samaniego, 76 Wn. App. 76, 882 P.2d 195 (1994).
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No. 33221-7-III; 33633-6-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofJohnson
an affidavit from Kelly Johnson which purported to supply him an alibi. However, Mr.
Johnson has not presented competent evidence suggesting defense counsel was unaware
of Kelly Johnson's potential testimony prior to trial. 2 In re Pers. Restraint ofRice, 118
Wn.2d 876, 885-86, 828 P.2d 1086 (1992). Accordingly, the allegedly new evidence
does not meet the criteria for relief either on its own, In re Personal Restraint of
Faircloth, 177 Wn. App. 161, 165-66, 311 PJd 47 (2013) (newly discovered evidence
must have been unknown prior to trial), or based on ineffective assistance of counsel,
State v. Byrd, 30 Wn. App. 794, 799, 638 P.2d 601 (1981) (decision not to call a known
witness tactical).
Mr. Johnson requests an evidentiary hearing to elicit evidence that would shore up
his claims. However, a reference hearing "is not a discovery device to determine if there
is available evidence." In re Pers. Restraint of Mendez Moncada, 197 Wn. App. 601,
605, _PJd _ (2017) (emphasis added). Mr. Johnson has presented no evidence
defense counsel was aware of Ms. Johnson, and it is his burden to provide more than
speculative arguments. Id.; In re Rice, 118 Wn.2d at 885-86. The motion for an
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To the contrary, a May 30, 2013, report of proceedings appended to Mr.
Johnson's petition confirms trial was postponed so that defense counsel could interview
an alibi witness. Personal Restraint Petition, In re Pers. Restraint ofJohnson, No._33633-
6-III, Appendix 7, at 5-9 (Wash. Ct. App. Jul. 20, 2015).
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In re Pers. Restraint ofJohnson
evidentiary hearing is denied.
CONCLUSION
We vacate Mr. Johnson's first degree assault sentence and remand to the trial court
for resentencing without the mandatory minimum. All other arguments are rejected and
the motion for an evidentiary hearing is denied.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Pennell, J.
I CONCUR:
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33221-7-III (Consol. with 33633-6-III)
KORSMO, J. (dissenting)- For the reasons stated in my Dyson dissent, I continue
to believe that any error here was harmless. State v. Dyson, 189 Wn. App. 215, 229, 360
P.3d 25 (2015) (Korsmo, J., dissenting). The Sixth Amendment jury trial right extends
only to the "punishment" resulting from a jury finding--the minimum and maximum
terms of incarceration, as well as monetary fines. Id. at 232. It does not extend to the
consequences of punishment such as the opportunity to earn early release credits. The
standard range here, as in every first degree assault case in this state, exceeds the
mandatory minimum term created by RCW 9.94A.540(1)(b).
While that is sufficient to explain my reason for dissenting, the majority opinion
also reasons that the potential loss of the opportunity for earned early release time is a
direct consequence of the minimum term finding. RCW 9.94A.540(2). That fact is of no
consequence in this context. The constitution itself does not protect the right to earn
"good-time" credits. In re Pers. Restraint of Lain, 179 Wn.2d 1, 15,315 P.3d 455 (2013)
(citing authorities). When probation and release statutes create a right, it is one
enforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. This, however, is a case involving
error under the Sixth Amendment. Thus, other consequences of a conviction or sentence
are of no consequence unless they also constitute "punishment" under the Sixth
No. 33221-7-III; 33633-6-III
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j Amendment jurisprudence. The loss of opportunity to earn early release credits is a
I collateral matter as far as the Sixth Amendment is concerned. It is of no consequence
here.
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The error was harmless. Accordingly, I dissent.
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