UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 4 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
CHARLES T. CLAGETT, III, AKA Charles No. 14-55051
Thomas Clagett, III,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:08-cv-06251-JFW-MAN
Central District of California,
v. Los Angeles
J. WOODRING, Terminal Island FCI; et al., ORDER
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: BERZON, CHRISTEN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
The memorandum disposition filed December 28, 2016, is amended by the
memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this order. With this amendment,
Appellees’ petition for panel rehearing is DENIED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 4 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES T. CLAGETT, III, AKA No. 14-55051
Charles Thomas Clagett, III,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:08-cv-06251-JFW-MAN
v. AMENDED
MEMORANDUM*
J. WOODRING, Terminal Island FCI; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 8, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: BERZON, CHRISTEN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Charles T. Clagett III appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
several prison employees, who he claims violated his constitutional rights and were
therefore liable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Reviewing de novo, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 436 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir.
2006), we affirm in part and reverse in part.
1. We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Joseph
Woodring, a former warden, and Robert Young, a former associate warden, on
Clagett’s First Amendment claim for retaliation. In the prison context, Clagett
must establish the following elements regarding this claim: “(1) [a]n assertion that
a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that
prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise
of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a
legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir.
2005). The district court found that Clagett raised a genuine dispute regarding the
first four elements but that he failed to show the lack of a legitimate penological
goal for his reassignment. We disagree.
Defendants claim that Clagett was reassigned from the education department
to food service due to the suspicions of prison staff that he was improperly
performing legal work in the prison law library. While this would be a legitimate
penological interest if found to be true, see Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th
Cir. 1995), Clagett’s evidence raises a genuine dispute as to whether there was any
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legitimate correctional interest motivating Defendants’ decision. See Shepard v.
Quillen, 840 F.3d 686, 692 n.7 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that even were a legitimate
correctional interest relevant, the plaintiff had raised a triable issue of fact on
whether the defendant’s actions had been improperly motivated by retaliation
rather than that legitimate penological purpose). Clagett’s transfer occurred shortly
after his administrative complaint was denied and shortly after he filed his
complaint in this action. Clagett also declares that Woodring threatened him for
filing grievances on the morning of the day he was transferred; that the head of the
education department told him his performance was excellent and that the transfer
decision had been made by higher-level staff; and that medical staff told him that
they were pressured to clear him for the new position in food service.
On appeal, Defendants point to several declarations that hint at misconduct
by Clagett, but these declarations were too vague to support a grant of summary
judgment in favor of Defendants. For example, Young said that he learned of
Clagett’s misconduct through Woodring—who in turn had learned of it from
education department staff—but Woodring had no recollection of Clagett’s
transfer. No declarant from the education department claims to have ever told
Woodring about Clagett’s misconduct. No staff member claims to know who
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actually initiated Clagett’s transfer. Lastly, no staff member suggests why, after a
stint in food service, Clagett was transferred back to the education department even
though he had supposedly engaged in misconduct in his previous stint there.
Defendants’ evidence does not dispel a genuine dispute about whether there was an
absence of a legitimate penological goal for Clagett’s reassignment.
2. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Dr. Evelyn
Castro on Clagett’s Eighth Amendment claim. To prove an Eighth Amendment
violation for inadequate health care, Clagett must show that Dr. Castro was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976), when she cleared him for food service work. While Clagett
was previously ineligible for food service due to his hepatitis diagnoses, that
ineligibility was no longer the case due to a policy change. Further, other inmates
with serious physical limitations worked in food service, including those with
walkers and in wheelchairs. Clagett alleges that he suffered distress from the
specific assignment he received, which forced him to stand and bend. Dr. Castro,
however, had no authority over specific assignments within food service. Her
action was limited to medically clearing Clagett for assignment to food service and
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therefore did not constitute deliberate indifference.1
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
1
We note that Clagett’s replacement brief did not challenge the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on all claims against Pratap Misra, as well as several
of Clagett’s other claims: a First Amendment claim against Castro; an Eighth
Amendment claim against Woodring and Young; and Fifth Amendment claims
related to the inadequate provision of bedding materials. We therefore need not
address them here.
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