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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RONALD C. SNEE,
Appellant No. 1406 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 23, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-02-CR-0014837-2014
BEFORE: MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED APRIL 05, 2017
Appellant, Ronald C. Snee, appeals from the denial of his first petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
We affirm.
We take the following facts from our independent review of the
certified record. On October 28, 2014, Detective Thomas DeTemple and
Detective Romano1 of the Allegheny County Police Department observed
Appellant and another individual, in a vehicle, and acting suspiciously, in an
area known to be “frequented by drug addicts and thieves.” (Affidavit of
Probable Cause, 10/28/14, at 2). Upon approaching the car, Detective
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Detective Romano’s first name is not identified in the certified record.
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Romano observed four bags of heroin between Appellant’s legs, in plain
view. (See id.). Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, the detective found
five additional bags of heroin in Appellant’s pocket. The same day, the
Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count each of possession of a
controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia.2 Appellant entered a
negotiated guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance on November
4, 2014, and, in return, the Commonwealth withdrew the possession of
paraphernalia charge. The same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
two years of probation, pursuant to the plea’s terms.
On June 9, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. Appointed
counsel filed an amended petition and a supplement thereto on November
13 and 19, 2015, respectively. On August 23, 2016, the PCRA court denied
Appellant’s petition, after a hearing. Appellant timely appealed.3
Appellant raises one issue for our review: “Did Appellant’s plea counsel
render ineffective assistance in his stewardship of Appellant’s case by
permitting [him] to enter a plea of guilty upon a colloquy lacking a factual
basis?” (Appellant’s Brief, at 3).
Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is well-settled:
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2
35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (32).
3
On October 14, 2016, Appellant filed a timely concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal, pursuant to the PCRA court’s order. The court filed
an opinion on December 5, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review
is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
record and we do not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is
supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.
Similarly, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the
PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have
no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference
to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of
law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary. . . .
Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
[T]o succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, a petitioner must
demonstrate that: the underlying claim is of arguable merit;
counsel had no reasonable basis for the act or omission in
question; and he suffered prejudice as a result, i.e., there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome of the proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Laird, 119 A.3d 972, 978 (Pa. 2015) (citations
omitted). “[F]ailure to prove any of these prongs is sufficient to warrant
dismissal of the claim without discussion of the other two.”
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 877 A.2d 433, 439 (Pa. 2005) (citation
omitted).
Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry
of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the
ineffectiveness caused appellant to enter an involuntary or
unknowing plea. In determining whether a guilty plea was
entered knowingly and intelligently, a reviewing court must
review all of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that
plea.
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Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 806-07 (Pa. 2014) (citation
omitted).
Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty
plea was aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of
proving otherwise. [W]here the record clearly demonstrates that
a guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during which it became
evident that the defendant understood the nature of the charges
against him, the voluntariness of the plea is established.
Commonwealth v. Rush, 909 A.2d 805, 808 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
A court must conduct an on-the-record colloquy into the following
areas:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges
to which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the
right to trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed
innocent until found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of
sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the
terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts
such agreement?
Id. at 808-09 (citation omitted).
Appellant maintains that, because the “plea colloquy lacked a factual
basis . . . counsel was ineffective in permitting [him] to enter a guilty
plea[.]” (Appellant’s Brief, at 5). We disagree.
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Appellant pleaded guilty to “[k]nowingly or intentionally possessing a
controlled . . . substance.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(16). At the guilty
plea hearing, while introducing the case, the court’s clerk stated that
defense counsel and the Commonwealth stipulated to the criminal complaint
and affidavit of probable cause. (See N.T. Guilty Plea, 11/04/14, at 2). The
factual basis established by the affidavit of probable cause was that, on
October 28, 2016, Detective Romano observed four bags of heroin between
Appellant’s legs, in plain view, and he seized five more bags of heroin from
Appellant’s pocket during the search incident to arrest. (See Affidavit of
Probable Cause, at 2).
The trial court confirmed that Appellant heard and understood the
charge against him, and he expressly admitted that he was pleading guilty
because he was guilty of the offense. (See N.T. Guilty Plea, at 4, 6).
Additionally, Appellant signed the negotiated plea agreement, which
specifically stated that he was pleading guilty to possessing heroin. (See
Negotiated Plea Agreement, 11/04/14, at 1). The court confirmed that
Appellant reads, writes, and understands English, and that he answered the
questions in the written negotiated guilty plea colloquy honestly and
correctly. (See N.T. Guilty Plea, at 3).
Further, Appellant affirmed that he was satisfied with counsel’s
representation and that counsel fully explained the nature of the charge to
which he was pleading guilty. (See id. at 3-4). Appellant also stated that
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he understood the maximum penalties associated with the charge, and that
nobody “forced, threatened or coerced [him] to enter [a] guilty plea” or
promised him anything other than the plea agreement itself. (Id. at 4). In
the written negotiated guilty plea colloquy, in addition to the above matters,
Appellant agreed that he understood the jury trial rights he was losing by
pleading guilty, including the fact that the Commonwealth would have to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Negotiated Plea Colloquy,
at 3-4; see also id. at 1-7).
Based on the foregoing, although the underlying facts contained in the
affidavit of probable cause were not read into the record, after reviewing “all
of the circumstances surrounding the entry of th[e] plea[,]” we conclude it is
“evident that [Appellant] understood the nature of the charges against him,”
and entered a knowing and voluntary plea. Fears, supra at 807 (citation
omitted); Rush, supra at 808. Therefore, Appellant has failed to establish
the underlying merit of his claim. See Laird, supra at 978; Robinson,
supra at 439. Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court’s finding, that
plea counsel did not render ineffective assistance, is supported by the record
and free of legal error. See Rigg, supra at 1084. Appellant’s issue lacks
merit.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/5/2017
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