UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4286
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DENNIS OWEN PAULSEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior
District Judge. (3:15-cr-00286-MBS-1)
Submitted: March 27, 2017 Decided: April 10, 2017
Before MOTZ, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Wells Dickson, Jr., WELLS DICKSON, P.A., Kingstree, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William E. Day, II, Assistant United
States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dennis Owen Paulsen appeals his conviction and 41-month
sentence imposed after his jury trial for knowingly and
willfully stealing money from the Department of Veterans Affairs
and the Social Security Administration by accepting payments to
which he knew he had no entitlement, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (2012). On appeal, Paulsen’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that he found no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
six aspects of the proceedings below. Paulsen filed a
supplemental pro se brief expanding on some of the issues raised
by counsel. The Government elected not to respond. Taking each
of the six issues in turn, we conclude that the district court
did not commit any reversible errors and affirm.
First, Paulsen raises as an affirmative defense the five-
year statute of limitations for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 641.
Because Paulsen engaged in “a recurring, automatic scheme of
embezzlement” from 1997 to 2015, his offense must be treated as
a continuing one for which the statute of limitations tolls
during the pendency of the scheme. See United States v. Smith,
373 F.3d 561, 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2004). Thus, although the
grand jury did not indict Paulsen until 2015, the statute of
limitations does not bar any part of the scheme.
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Second, Paulsen argues that the district court erred when
it denied his motion to dismiss for lack of venue. We review a
district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of venue
de novo. United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir.
2012). “[A]ny offense against the United States begun in one
district and completed in another, or committed in more than one
district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in
which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.” 18
U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2012). Here, Paulsen started the offense in a
district in Virginia, but completed it in the District of South
Carolina. Thus, under § 3237, the district court did not err
when it denied Paulsen’s motion to dismiss based on lack of
venue.
Third, Paulsen challenges the district court’s limits on
the cross-examination of three prosecution witnesses. We review
such limits for abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith,
451 F.3d 209, 220 (4th Cir. 2006). The district court
“possesses wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-
examination, premised on such concerns as prejudice, confusion,
repetition, and relevance.” Id. at 221. Here, the district
court acted within its discretion to limit cross-examination on
topics such as an unrelated divorce, administrative hearing, and
income. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion.
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Fourth, Paulsen argues that the district court should have
given four jury instructions. We review a district court’s
refusal to give particular jury instructions for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 308 (4th
Cir. 2012). We will reverse on this basis only if the omitted
instruction was “(1) correct; (2) not substantially covered by
the court’s charge; and (3) dealing with some point in the trial
so important, that failure to give the requested instruction
seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct his
defense.” Id. Paulsen requested instructions on the
requirements for disability, but no party disputed that Paulsen
had some disability from 1997 to 2015. Instead, as the district
court found, the issue at trial concerned whether Paulsen
received greater disability benefits than his condition
warranted. Because the charges regarding disability did not
affect an issue important, or even relevant, to the trial, we
conclude that the district court did not commit reversible
error. See id.
Fifth, Paulsen claims that the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict. We review de novo the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting a conviction. United States v.
Barefoot, 754 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2014). A defendant
challenging evidentiary sufficiency bears a heavy burden.
United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 630 (4th Cir. 2015). We
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will “uphold a defendant’s conviction if, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government, there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the verdict.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence means
“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Under § 641, the Government had to prove four elements:
(1) Paulsen took money; (2) the money came from the United
States; (3) Paulsen intended to convert the money for his own
use or gain; and (4) Paulsen knew he was not entitled to the
money. 18 U.S.C. § 641. Paulsen only argues that the
Government failed to prove intent. However, the inconsistencies
between Paulsen’s conduct at medical appointments or benefits
hearings and all other times would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that Paulsen was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Cornell, 780 F.3d at 630. Such a
factfinder could also conclude from the record that Paulsen’s
entrapment defense lacked merit. Thus, the jury had sufficient
evidence to support its guilty verdict.
Finally, Paulsen argues that the district court imposed an
unreasonable sentence. We review sentences for reasonableness,
applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
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United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Reasonableness has
procedural and substantive components. Id. In assessing
procedural reasonableness, we consider factors such as whether
the district court properly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines
range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and
sufficiently explained the sentence imposed. Id.
If no significant procedural errors exist, we consider the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence, evaluating “the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. We presume reasonable
sentences within the Guidelines range. United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
Applying this standard, we conclude that the district court
imposed a reasonable sentence. The record reveals no procedural
sentencing errors, and the court imposed a within-Guidelines
sentence, which we presume reasonable absent a rebuttal of that
presumption. See Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Paulsen, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Paulsen requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Paulsen.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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