Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1421
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ADAM HILL,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Molly Butler Bailey and Strike, Gonzales & Butler Bailey on
brief for appellant.
Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, and Benjamin
M. Block, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
April 10, 2017
Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Adam Hill pleaded
guilty to possession with intent to distribute both heroin and
cocaine in and around Sanford, Maine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
The district court determined that his guideline sentencing range
(GSR) was 84 to 105 months, and sentenced Hill to serve a sentence
at the nadir of the range: 84 months. Hill appeals. We summarily
affirm. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
We recently described the parameters under which an
appellate court reviews criminal sentences: "In general,
sentencing claims are addressed under a two-step pavane. See
United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008). First,
we address those claims that affect the procedural integrity of
the sentence. See id. Second, we address any residual question
as to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See id."
United States v. Rodríguez-Adorno, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir.
2017) [No. 16-1114, slip op. at 11-12]. Both steps are implicated
in this appeal.
Hill does not challenge the district court's
construction of his GSR. He does, however, lodge two claims of
sentencing error. The first claim is procedural in nature: he
says that the district court failed appropriately to consider the
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because this claim of
error was not raised below, review is for plain error. See United
States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001).
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Contrary to Hill's importunings, the record reflects
that the district court carefully considered the section 3553(a)
factors. The court identified several aggravating factors, mulled
some mitigating factors (including, for example, the poor health
of Hill's father and Hill's addiction), and weighed the results
of its findings.
It is apodictic that "a sentencing court has broad
discretion to weigh and balance the section 3553(a) factors."
Rodríguez-Adorno, ___ F.3d at ___ [slip op. at 13] (citing United
States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2013)). The
court "is not required to address those factors, one by one, in
some sort of rote incantation when explicating its sentencing
decision." United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir.
2006). In this instance, Hill's claim of error reduces to nothing
more than a complaint that the sentencing court did not assign
various factors the weight that Hill would have preferred. That
complaint is empty: "such qualitative judgments fall comfortably
within a sentencing court's purview." Rodríguez-Adorno, ___ F.3d
at ___ [slip op. at 14] (citing United States v. Bermúdez-
Meléndez, 827 F.3d 160, 165 (1st Cir. 2016); Flores-Machicote,
706 F.3d at 23).
This leaves only Hill's asseveration that his sentence
is substantively unreasonable. The heartland of review for
substantive reasonableness is an exploration of whether the
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district court furnished a "plausible sentencing rationale" and
reached a "defensible result." Martin, 520 F.3d at 96. "In the
course of such a review, an appellate court is generally not at
liberty to second-guess a sentencing court's reasoned judgments."
Rodríguez-Adorno, ___ F.3d at ___ [slip op. at 16] (citing United
States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 2011)); see Martin,
520 F.3d at 92 (noting that there is more than one reasonable
sentence in any given case).
We assume, favorably to Hill, that our review is for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d
223, 228 & n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 258 (2015).
We discern none. For one thing, the court's rationale was cogent.
The court noted such considerations as the gravity of Hill's
offense, the fact that Hill attempted to transfer his "source" to
another drug dealer, his "high-risk" of recidivism, and his
repeated violations of the conditions of a supervised release term
that trailed in the wake of his earlier federal conviction and
sentence. In view of these (and other) considerations, the court
reasonably concluded that the need to protect the public and
promote respect for the law made an 84-month sentence the "right
sentence."
For another thing, the court juxtaposed this plausible
sentencing rationale with an easily defensible result. After all,
a defendant who aspires to challenge a within-guidelines sentence
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as substantively unreasonable bears a heavy burden. See United
States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir. 2006). This
burden is heavier still where, as here, the challenged sentence
is at the bottom of a properly configured GSR. Cf. United States
v. Trinidad-Acosta, 773 F.3d 298, 309 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining
that a defendant's burden is heavier when the sentence imposed is
below the applicable GSR). Hill has not come close to carrying
this burden: the nature and circumstances of the crime, combined
with his sordid criminal past, placed a bottom-of-the-range
sentence beyond reproach. That sentence was well within the
universe of reasonable sentences for the offense of conviction.
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated
above, Hill's sentence is summarily
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
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