MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 17 2017, 6:08 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara J. Simmons Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Eaphram Lincey, April 17, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1609-CR-2185
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David Seiter, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Pro Tempore
Trial Court Cause No.
49G10-1507-CM-26403
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Following a traffic stop, Eaphram Lincey was convicted of driving while
suspended and possession of marijuana. He now appeals, arguing that the
police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. Because the officer
testified that Lincey did not stop at a stop light and a stop sign—both
infractions—the trial court did not err in finding that reasonable suspicion
existed for the traffic stop. We therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Just after midnight on July 26, 2015, Indianapolis Police Department Officer
David Wisneski was patrolling the northside near 38th Street and Arlington
Avenue when he encountered Lincey operating a motorcycle with a female
passenger. The motorcycle was “wobbling” and traveling unusually slow, so
Officer Wisneski decided to slow down and see if there was a problem. Tr. Vol.
II pp. 7, 44. When Lincey made a right turn at a red light without first coming
to a stop, Officer Wisneski decided to follow Lincey. Id. at 8. Officer Wisneski
then saw Lincey make a left turn at a stop sign without coming to a stop or
putting his foot down. Id. at 9, 48, 55-56. At this point, Officer Wisneski
decided to initiate a traffic stop. During the traffic stop, Officer Wisneski
learned that Lincey’s license was suspended. Officer Wisneski also smelled the
odor of alcohol coming from Lincey. Officer Wisneski informed Lincey of
Indiana’s implied-consent law, and Lincey agreed to take a certified breath test
at the station. Before Lincey was transported, he was searched incident to his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1609-CR-2185 | April 17, 2017 Page 2 of 5
arrest for driving while suspended. During that search, marijuana was found in
his pants pocket. He was then taken to the station, where a warrant had to be
obtained for a blood draw.
[3] Thereafter, the State charged Lincey with Count I: Class A misdemeanor
operating while intoxicated endangering a person; Count II: Class A
misdemeanor driving while suspended; Count III: Class B misdemeanor
possession of marijuana; and Count IV operating a vehicle with an alcohol
concentration equivalent (ACE) to at least .08. Before trial, Lincey moved to
suppress the evidence against him, arguing that the officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to stop him. After a hearing at which Officer Wisneski
testified, the trial court denied the motion. A bench trial was then held. Lincey
renewed his motion to suppress during trial, and Officer Wisneski, Lincey, and
the female passenger testified during the in-trial suppression hearing. The trial
court again denied the motion. The court acknowledged that there was
conflicting testimony regarding whether Lincey stopped at both the stop light
and the stop sign; however, the court believed Officer Wisneski and found that
the traffic stop was valid. Trial resumed, and the trial court acquitted Lincey of
operating while intoxicated and operating with an ACE of at least .081 but
found him guilty of driving while suspended and possession of marijuana.
1
The trial court acquitted Lincey of operating with an ACE of at least .08 because the blood draw was done
“outside the three (3) hour window.” Tr. p. 116. And the trial court acquitted Lincey of operating while
intoxicated because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lincey was intoxicated. The
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[4] Lincey now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Lincey contends that Officer Wisneski did not have reasonable suspicion to
stop him and therefore the trial court erred in admitting evidence stemming
from the stop. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV. Our jurisprudence reflects two
types of police encounters that implicate Fourth Amendment protection:
investigatory stops and custodial arrests. State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1184
(Ind. 2014). An investigatory stop is generally brief in duration and is
constitutionally permissible so long as the officer “has a reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” Id.
(quotations omitted). If an officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation,
he has probable cause—and thus also the lesser included reasonable suspicion—
to stop that driver. Id.
[6] Lincey acknowledges that Officer Wisneski stopped him based on the officer’s
belief that Lincey “committed two traffic infractions by not coming to a stop at
a stop light and a stop sign.” Appellant’s Br. p. 11. And Lincey does not
dispute that failing to stop at a stop light and a stop sign are infractions.
However, Lincey argues that the officer’s belief was “mistaken[]” and asks us to
court explained that although Lincey was wobbling and driving slowly, there was evidence of potholes in the
road.
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credit his own suppression-hearing testimony. Id. Lincey testified at the second
suppression hearing that he in fact stopped at both the red light and the stop
sign, but Officer Wisneski testified otherwise. The trial court believed Officer
Wisneski. In reviewing a trial court’s reasonable-suspicion determination, we
do not reweigh the evidence and consider conflicting evidence most favorably
to the trial court. See Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ind. 2003) (“The
reasonable suspicion inquiry is highly fact-sensitive and is reviewed under a
sufficiency of the evidence standard. Like any matter of sufficiency of the
evidence, the record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that
supports the trial court’s decision. We do not reweigh the evidence and we
consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.”
(quotation omitted)). Because Officer Wisneski testified that Lincey did not
stop at a stop light and a stop sign, thus committing two traffic infractions, the
trial court did not err in finding that reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic
stop.2 We therefore affirm the trial court’s admission of evidence stemming
from that stop.
[7] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.
2
Lincey also challenges the traffic stop under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Although the
standards are different, his argument is the same: the trial court should have believed his testimony instead of
the officer’s testimony.
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