IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0157
Filed April 19, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF S.G. and J.G.-P.,
Minor children,
S.P., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mary L. Timko,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
The mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental rights to her children. AFFIRMED.
Zachary S. Hindman of Mayne, Arneson, Hindman, Hisey & Daane, Sioux
City, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Gretchen Witte Kraemer,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Joseph W. Kertels of Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, guardian ad litem
for minor children.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
The mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental rights to her children, J.G.-P. and S.G., born in 2010 and 2012,
respectively.1 The mother maintains there was not clear and convincing
evidence the children could not be returned to her care at the time of the
termination hearing and termination is not in the children’s best interests.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) and the juvenile court
first became involved with this family in 2011, when the mother—then sixteen
years old—was adjudicated delinquent for committing the acts of interference
with official acts and minor in possession of alcohol. J.G.-P. was already almost
one year old, and soon thereafter, the mother became pregnant with S.G. The
mother was struggling with her mental health and was having difficulties in her
relationship with the children’s father. At the time, the mother lived with her
mother, who was also lacking stability and appeared to have difficulty providing
for the basic needs of the mother and her siblings.
S.G. was born in June 2012, and both children were adjudicated children
in need of assistance (CINA) in October 2012.
The mother received and engaged in some services, including finding a
home for the family, working toward a high-school-equivalent degree, and
learning parenting and planning skills. The children remained with their parents
and they appeared to be healthy and well cared for.
1
The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He does not appeal.
3
At a dispositional review hearing in February 2014, the mother reported to
the court that she had ended her relationship with the children’s father because
she suspected he was using illegal drugs again. At the time, the mother was not
employed and had not been attending school. The court indicated that over the
next six months, it expected the mother to continue to seek employment,
complete her education, maintain stability in her housing, and provide medical-
insurance coverage for the children.
The State filed an application for removal in July 2014, claiming the
mother had been avoiding contact with DHS and had been driving without a
license. The mother had apparently moved to California with the children without
telling DHS or the court, and it had been a number of months since she had
made contact.2 Both children were removed from the mother’s care and placed
in the custody of DHS for placement in foster care on August 12, 2014.
In the months following the children’s removal from her care, the mother
was inconsistent in attending visits with the children. She reported she did not
have a job, admitting that she lost it because she “just stopped going.”
Additionally, the mother blamed the department for removing her children and
stated she “needed her children back to keep her out of trouble.” The mother did
not have housing of her own, and she was not receptive to admonitions from the
court reminding her of things she needed to do to have the children returned; the
2
At the termination hearing, the mother continued to maintain that she went with the
maternal grandmother on a visit to California so the children could meet their great-
grandparents. The mother maintained she always intended to return to Iowa with the
children. When she was asked why she applied for benefits in California, the mother
claimed she did it because her mother told her to.
4
mother maintained she had done everything she needed to do. At a dispositional
review hearing in February 2015, the court stated it
needs to see honesty and consistency from [the mother]. The
court needs to see [her] being on time for every visit. The court
needs to see [the mother] achieving employment as well as
diligently and consistently working on her GED. The court needs
to find that [she] has maintained stability in her housing situation in
that she is the only one residing in that home and that no one else,
including any other family members besides [J.G.-P.] and [S.G.],
stay in that home overnight or reside therein. The court needs to
have verification that [the mother] is able to provide medical
coverage for the children and their medical and dental needs are
met.
In July 2015, the mother admitted to being pregnant with her third child.
At a hearing, the court noted that she failed to return phone calls or texts from
service providers, missed visits, and remained unemployed. Also, the court
noted the mother had been receiving services for a number of years, and found,
“[The mother] is unable to demonstrate much stability in her own life. At this
point, the case is ripe for a permanency hearing.”
A permanency hearing took place in October 2015, and the court noted
the mother had made “remarkable progress in her willingness to accept guidance
and make the necessary changes to follow through with the family case plan and
expectations.” The mother had located new housing, was working part-time,
participating in a program to learn job skills, and making strides in completing her
high-school-equivalent degree. The mother had also been consistent with her
visits with the children and demonstrating parenting techniques she had learned.
Because of the progress she had made, the State, guardian ad litem (GAL), and
DHS social worker all agreed the mother should be given additional time to work
toward reunification. Still, the juvenile court warned the mother that, “given the
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history of this case, this would be the last opportunity she may have to have the
children placed with her.” Visitations were supposed to begin increasing time
spent in the mother’s home.
Also in October 2015, the mother gave birth to her third child by cesarean
section.3 The mother got a very serious infection following the procedure, and
she was largely unable to comply with the service plan until mid-December 2015.
Still, in mid-January 2016, the children began a transition plan, where the
children were to go to daycare at the foster family’s during the day and then stay
at the mother’s home at night. However, the mother did not take the children to
the foster parents’ home; instead, she kept the children home with her and she
missed school. Due to her absences, she was discharged from the educational
program. In mid-February, a service provider made an unannounced visit to the
mother’s house, and a man was sleeping on the mother’s couch. It appeared to
the provider that the man was living in the mother’s apartment because what
appeared to be the man’s clothing was in the living room. The mother was not
supposed to have anyone else living in the home with her and the children. The
mother admitted the man was the father of her youngest child, but she
maintained he was not living with her and never had. Additionally, around the
same time, DHS learned the mother had not been taking the children to their
therapy appointments while they were in her care. A few days later, on February
16, 2016, DHS removed the children from the mother’s care for the second and
final time. According to the social worker, when the children were removed, S.G.
expressed she was afraid at the mother’s house and asked the worker to call the
3
This child is not at issue in this appeal.
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foster mother. J.G.-P told the worker he had wanted to see his foster mother but
his mother would not take him there.
The mother filed a motion entitled, “Motion to Return Children to Mother”
on March 9, 2016. In it, she maintained there was not sufficient or adequate
reason for the children’s removal from her care by DHS. She argued the children
should be allowed to bond with their new sibling.
In March, when the worker was talking to the children, S.G. described
“bad people” as the man that hit and was mean to her mother. J.G.-P. stated
that a man and woman hit his mother using their hands and his mother had
pushed them out the door and locked it. The children also told the therapist
about a “scary man that came and yelled and stole things.” At the termination
hearing, the mother testified the youngest child’s father “was being disrespectful,
so [she] told him to get out. . . . [A]nd [she] just gave him all his stuff and told him
don’t come back anymore. [She] kicked him out.” When the mother was then
asked again if the man had been living or staying with her, she stated he “never
does” but she gave him “[w]hatever he had. The little things, like his shirts and
his backpack that he carried.”
At the April 2016 permanency review/modification hearing the mother’s
motion was considered. Additionally, the social worker reported the children
were suffering emotionally due to continued visits with the mother. The worker
requested that the visits be left to the discretion of DHS, the GAL, and the
children’s therapist. The court found the request was reasonable and ordered
future visits to be discretionary.
7
In May, the social worker stopped by the mother’s home, and the mother
refused to let her into the apartment. The social worker believed that she
smelled drugs coming from the apartment, and the mother was asked to submit
to drug testing. The mother refused. She later testified that she had not been
doing drugs and explained her refusal by stating that she did not believe DHS
had the right to ask her to test.
The State filed the petition to terminate the mother’s rights to J.G.-P. and
S.G. in June 2016. The termination hearing took place over three days, one
each in July, September, and November 2016.
At the July hearing, the mother testified that she had not been to therapy
in a number of months, and she no longer believed she needed it because she
was not “sixteen years old anymore.” She was two weeks into her third job of the
year, and her testimony about those jobs—where she was employed, when, and
for how many hours—was at odds with her testimony at earlier hearings. The
mother was no longer pursuing her high-school-equivalent degree. The
children’s therapist also testified. She stated that the children appeared to be
bonded with their mother but not attached. She explained the distinction as
follows:
A bond is generally described as having that—that caring
feeling about somebody that you have been close with, like a
parent to a child or, um, a parent to a family member, a child with a
family member, a child with a sibling. Attachment is more
developed over time as in having their needs met. A child will go to
a person that they are attached with to get basic needs met.
The therapist also reported that in a recent session—since the children had
returned to the foster parents’ home—S.G. had indicated she was sad and did
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not want to leave her foster mother, while J.G.-P. had indicated that he wanted to
keep seeing his mother, but he wanted to live with the foster parents.
At the September hearing date, the mother had another new job that she
was a “few weeks” into. She testified she was already planning on leaving that
job for better paying employment elsewhere. She testified that she had lost her
previous job after the July hearing date because she was sad and did not go to
work. Since the previous hearing, she had started attending therapy again. She
was not actively pursuing a high-school-equivalent degree, and she did not
intend to restart the program anytime soon.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to both children
pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (f) (2016).
The mother appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
We review the termination of parental rights de novo. In re D.W., 791
N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010).
III. Discussion.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to
section 232.116(1)(e) and (f). We may affirm the court’s order on any ground we
find supported by the evidence, see D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707, and here we
consider whether the statutory grounds have been met under subsection (f). The
mother maintains the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the children could not be returned to her care at the time of the termination
hearings. See Iowa Code § 232.116(f)(4); see also In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489,
495 (Iowa 2000) (“At the time of the termination hearing, there was clear and
9
convincing evidence the children could not be returned to the care of [the
parent].”).
The mother maintains the children can be returned to her care; she
focuses on the progress she has made since DHS first became involved with the
family. We acknowledge the mother had made some progress, but we also note
that DHS had been involved with the family for approximately five years at the
time the mother’s rights were terminated. The mother had still failed to meet a
number of the goals established to improve stability for the children. The mother
did not complete any of the educational programs in which she enrolled, and she
had given up trying to obtain a high-school-equivalent degree. She had
maintained the same home for over a year before the termination, but it also
appeared she had allowed at least one other individual to live with her—in
violation of the court’s expectations. According to the mother’s testimony, by
September 2016, she had left three different jobs since January 2016, and she
intended to leave her then-current employment as well. The mother lost at least
one of the jobs because she “got sad” and quit going. This occurred almost
immediately after the mother decided she no longer needed—and did not plan to
attend—therapy. The mother maintained she was able to care for the children
full-time, but when they were returned to her care for an “extended visit,” the
mother quit attending the education program in which she was enrolled, refused
to take the children to daycare, and failed to take the children to their therapy
appointments. Additionally, during that approximately three-week visit, the
children witnessed a “scary man” who yelled at and may have struck the mother.
The children were distressed enough by the event to tell both the social worker
10
and their therapist about it. The mother argues she is better equipped to care for
the children than she was at the beginning of the case. But the statutory time
period set by the legislature has passed; in fact, the children had been out of the
home over two years by the last date of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(f)(3) (setting the time period for the length of the time a child over
four has been removed from their parents care at “twelve of the last eighteen
months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days”); see also C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495 (“Once the
limitation period lapses, termination proceedings must be viewed with a sense of
urgency.”). And we are still not confident the mother has the protective capacity
or the stability to provide a safe home for the children.
The mother also maintains termination of her parental rights is not in the
best interests of the children. The mother maintains she has a “powerful bond”
with the children. As we noted above, as the children’s therapist testified, the
children did share a bond with their mother, but they were attached to their foster
parents. At the time of the termination hearing, the children had lived with the
foster parents for over two years—about half of S.G.’s life. Both children
expressed to the therapist that they did not want to leave their foster mother,
while J.G.-P had even expressed that he wanted to live with the foster mother
and visit the mother. The children are bonded with the mother, but she cannot
meet their needs regarding stability and permanency. Termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2) (“The court shall give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to
the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
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and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.”);
see also In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring
specially) (“A child’s safety and the need for a permanent home are now the
primary concerns when determining a child’s best interests.”).
The mother has not argued that any of the permissive factors in section
232.116(3) weigh against termination of her rights, and we do not find that any
are compelling. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014) (stating
factors are permissive, not mandatory); see also In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39
(Iowa 2010) (“Finally, before terminating a parent’s parental rights, the court must
consider if any of the [permissive factors] contained in section 232.116(3) allow
the court not to terminate.”).
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to both S.G. and
J.G.-P.
AFFIRMED.
In the Interest of S.G. and J.G.-p., Minor Children, S.P., Mother
Combined Opinion