IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0079
Filed April 19, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF K.M.,
Minor Child,
R.M., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Page County, Amy L. Zacharias,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights. AFFIRMED.
Justin R. Wyatt of Woods & Wyatt, P.L.L.C., Glenwood, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tabitha J. Gardner, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Vicki R. Danley, Sidney, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MULLINS, Presiding Judge.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her child, K.M., born in 2011.1 She argues the State failed to prove the
statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and the
juvenile court erred in determining reasonable efforts had been made to reunify
her with her child.
The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS) in May 2015 when the child sustained an injury near his right eye
when the mother threw a water bottle at him because she was angry. The
mother reported that, a week prior to this injury, she had thrown a box at her child
that left a bruise.
In January 2017, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2016).2 We review termination-of-
parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa
2016). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give
them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quoting In
re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014)). Our primary consideration is the
best interests of the child. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006).
Under section 232.116(1)(f), the court may terminate parental rights if the
court finds the State has proved by clear and convincing evidence the child (1) is
four years of age or older; (2) has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
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The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of any unknown father.
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The court dismissed the termination petition as to paragraph (e), concluding the State
had failed to prove the mother had not maintained significant and meaningful contact
with her child.
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(CINA); (3) has been removed from the physical custody of the parent for at least
twelve of the last eighteen months, or the last twelve consecutive months and
any trial period at home has been less than thirty days; and (4) cannot be
returned to the parent’s custody at the time of the termination hearing.
The mother does not dispute the State proved the first three elements
required under section 232.116(1)(f): At the time of the termination hearing, the
child was over the age of four, had been adjudicated CINA in July 2015, and had
been removed from the mother’s physical custody since May 2015 without any
trial periods at home. Instead, the mother argues DHS failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunify her with her child—that is, the State failed to prove the child
could not be returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. See
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000) (“The State must show reasonable
efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the
care of a parent [at the time of the termination hearing].”).
The State must make reasonable efforts to reunify the family as quickly as
possible after a child has been removed from his or her parents’ care and
custody. Iowa Code § 232.102(7). In determining whether reasonable efforts
have been made, the court considers “[t]he type, duration, and intensity of
services or support offered or provided to the child and the child’s family.” Id.
§ 232.102(10)(a)(1). “[T]he nature and extent of visitation is always controlled by
the best interests of the child.” In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996).
The mother complains the required Parent Child Interactive Therapy
(PCIT) program was not a good fit for her and presented an unreasonable barrier
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to reunification. She also claims she was never given the opportunity to prove
she could parent her child safely.
The juvenile court found the child could not be returned to the mother’s
care at the time of the termination hearing in December 2016 because the
mother had not progressed past weekly four-hour semi-supervised visits, had not
completed the first phase of PCIT—which focused on enhancing a positive
relationship between her and her child—despite participating in the program for
over twenty sessions, and had not been able to repair her relationship with her
child. The court noted that, although the mother had made some progress and
had been engaged in services, she did not internalize or implement the parenting
skills she had been learning since the case had begun over eighteen months
before.
At the termination hearing, the DHS worker testified the reason the mother
had not progressed to unsupervised visits or to visits for longer than four hours
was because she was unable to parent her child independently for longer periods
of time. The worker also testified the mother often needed prompting to engage
with her child, was unable to meet the child’s emotional needs and show him
affection, appeared content with their limited visits, and did not take advantage of
all of her opportunities to contact him. The worker further testified the mother
continued to struggle with anger-management issues and dealing with typical
child behaviors. She was unable to implement the skills she learned in parenting
classes and did not recognize safety concerns. She was unemployed throughout
the vast majority of the case and was unable to financially provide for her child.
She also did not have reliable transportation or stable housing. Upon our de
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novo review of the record, we find the State proved the statutory grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence.
Further, the record shows the mother was offered and participated in
numerous services, including PCIT; Family Safety, Risk, and Permanency
services; mental-health evaluations; individual therapy; parenting classes; parent
partner; integrated home health services; and vocational rehabilitation. At the
review hearing in December 2015, the mother requested in-home services, which
DHS provided. We agree with the juvenile court that reasonable efforts were
provided in this case.
We must now view this case with a sense of urgency. See In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d at 495; see also In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 777 (Iowa 2012) (“It is well-
settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has
proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a
parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the
child.” (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010))). “[A]t some point, the
rights and needs of the child[] rise above the rights and needs of the parent.” In
re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). This child needs and
deserves permanency and stability. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa
2010); In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997) (“It is simply not in the best
interests of children to continue to keep them in temporary foster homes while
the natural parents get their lives together.”). He has been placed with a foster
family who wishes to adopt him. Termination is in this child’s best interests.
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Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f).
AFFIRMED.