J-S09029-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
NATHAN CHANDLER
Appellant No. 1903 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered May 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0500021-1990
BEFORE: SHOGAN, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 19, 2017
Appellant, Nathan Chandler, appeals pro se from the May 13, 2016
order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
dismissing as untimely his petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The factual and procedural background is undisputed. Briefly,
Appellant filed the instant petition on August 10, 2015, approximately 23
years after his judgment of sentence became final on November 8, 1992
(i.e., ninety days after his petition for allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was denied). Despite the facial untimeliness, Appellant argues his
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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PCRA petition qualifies for the timeliness exception set forth in
§ 9545(b)(1)(ii) based on his reading of Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117
A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015). Appellant’s Brief at 8-11. In Appellant’s view,
Hopkins rendered his sentence unconstitutional and illegal. Id.
“[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews its
conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). All PCRA
petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within
one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an exception to
timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “The PCRA’s time
restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, [i]f a PCRA petition is
untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the
petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to
address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d
520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (first alteration in original) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). As timeliness is separate and distinct from the
merits of Appellant’s underlying claims, we first determine whether this
PCRA petition is timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d
306, 310 (Pa. 2008) (consideration of Brady claim separate from
consideration of its timeliness). The timeliness requirements of the PCRA
petition must be met, even if the underlying claim is a challenge to the
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legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 60
(Pa. 2007) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within
the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the
exceptions thereto”) (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223
(1999)).
As noted, Appellant argues that Hopkins qualifies as an exception to
the one-year filing deadline under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). We
discern several flaws in Appellant’s argument. In Hopkins, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317, which required
a mandatory minimum sentence if certain controlled substances crimes
occurred within 1,000 feet of a school, was unconstitutional under Alleyne
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Hopkins, 117 A.3d at 249.
Hopkins was decided on direct appeal, and did not mandate its application
to post-conviction proceedings. Id. Even if the Supreme Court had said its
ruling applied to post-conviction proceedings, Appellant failed to explain how
Hopkins would be relevant here, since his case does not involve Section
6317. Thus, Appellant’s reliance on Hopkins is misplaced.
It should also be noted that Hopkins is an application of Alleyne.
Alleyne, however, is not applicable to the instant matter because
Appellant’s case was at the collateral stage when Alleyne was decided on
June 23, 2013, and Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820
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(Pa. 2016) (“We hold that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases
pending on collateral review[.]”). “If [Alleyne] does not apply retroactively,
then a case extending [Alleyne] should not apply retroactively.” Walker v.
United States, 810 F.3d 568, 575 (8th Cir. 2016).
Finally, even if application of Alleyne was not precluded under
Washington, Appellant would not be entitled to the benefits of Alleyne.
The mandatory minimum sentence imposed on Appellant under 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 97151 would not be affected by Alleyne because the fact of his prior
conviction was not required to be submitted to the jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt before forming the basis of a mandatory minimum
sentence. See Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2160 n.1. Indeed, in fashioning the
rule announced in Alleyne, the Supreme Court expressly declined to revisit
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1
Section 9715, in relevant part, reads:
(a) Mandatory life imprisonment.--Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 9712 (relating to sentences for offenses
committed with firearms), 9713 (relating to sentences for
offenses committed on public transportation) or 9714 (relating to
sentences for second and subsequent offenses), any person
convicted of murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth
who has previously been convicted at any time of murder or
voluntary manslaughter in this Commonwealth or of the same or
substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction shall be
sentenced to life imprisonment, notwithstanding any other
provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9715(a). Here, the trial court imposed a mandatory life
sentence under Section 9715 because Appellant had a prior conviction for
third-degree murder. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/13/16, at 1 n.2.
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its holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998),
wherein it endorsed the application of provisions that increase the penalty
for a crime based upon the fact of a prior conviction. See Alleyne, 133 S.Ct.
at 2160 n.1.
Because Appellant’s facially untimely petition fails to invoke a valid
exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA, and because Hopkins
does not apply retroactively on collateral review, Appellant is not entitled to
relief. Therefore, the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/19/2017
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Com. v. Chandler, N.
Combined Opinion