NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HERODIS A. DOMINGUEZ, No. 15-71124
Petitioner, Agency No. A094-319-033
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Herodis A. Dominguez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his
appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying his application for cancellation
of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
questions of law. Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012).
We deny the petition for review.
The agency properly concluded that Dominguez’s conviction under
California Penal Code (“C.P.C.”) § 422 is a crime involving moral turpitude under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), where the maximum sentence of incarceration that
could have been imposed was one year. See id. (describing a disqualifying crime
involving moral turpitude as one for which a sentence of one year or longer may be
imposed); Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 1163 (a conviction under C.P.C. § 422 is
categorically a crime involving moral turpitude); C.P.C. § 422 (providing for
punishment “by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year”).
Accordingly, the agency properly concluded that Dominguez is ineligible for
cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (cancellation is not
available to aliens who have been convicted of an offense under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)).
Contrary to Dominguez’s contention, the “petty offense exception” of 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) does not render him eligible for cancellation of
removal, where his conviction is otherwise described under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). See Mancilla-Delafuente v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 1262, 1265-66
(9th Cir. 2015) (alien not entitled to the petty offense exception where the
conviction is also covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)).
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Dominguez’s reliance on Garcia-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 840 (9th Cir.
2003), is misplaced, where the BIA acknowledged that he had been convicted of a
misdemeanor and properly looked at the maximum possible sentence under C.P.C.
§ 422. To the extent Dominguez relies on Garcia-Lopez to assert that the
maximum possible sentence for a misdemeanor in California is six months, see 334
F.3d at 846, that determination has been overruled by Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d
773, 778 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
In light of this determination, we do not reach Dominguez’s contentions that
he satisfied other requirements for cancellation of removal.
Dominguez’s contention that his convictions do not render him removable is
unavailing, where he conceded removability under a different charge.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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