J-A30012-16
2017 PA Super 115
VALERIE HUYETT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
DOUG’S FAMILY PHARMACY
No. 294 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 5, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Civil Division at No(s): 08-4706
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON AND STABILE, JJ.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2017
This matter comes before this panel following a prior decision vacating
a judgment and remanding to the trial court for its application of the proper
legal standard to determine whether to award attorney fees pursuant to §
962(c.2) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the “PHRA”), 43 P.S. §
951 et seq.. See Huyett v. Doug’s Family Pharm., 122 A.3d 1136
(Pa.Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum). Valerie Huyett, the
prevailing party below, renews her challenge to the trial court’s denial of
attorney fees. After careful review, we affirm.
We glean the relevant facts from our review of the record. Valerie
Huyett, a 38-year-old married mother of two young children, worked for
eleven years at Doug’s Family Pharmacy as a pharmacy technician. She
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received pay raises annually. Douglas Hess was the owner/operator of the
Pharmacy, and his wife, Lisa Hess, assisted him in running the business.
On August 24, 2006, Ms. Huyett was diagnosed with Hodgkins
lymphoma, a form of cancer. She communicated that diagnosis to her
immediate supervisor, Stephanie Mitchell, a pharmacist. Four days later, on
August 30, 2006, she received a telephone call from Mr. Hess. According to
Ms. Huyett, Mr. Hess told her that he was terminating her employment
because he could not deal with the scheduling issues related to her
treatments. He subsequently proposed that she sign a formal resignation,
and in return he would not contest her collection of unemployment
compensation benefits, he would pay her for three weeks of vacation, an
additional one week’s pay, and two sick days. N.T. Trial, 10/10/12, at 225.
When she refused to sign the resignation, he opposed her receipt of
unemployment compensation benefits. Nonetheless, she was awarded
unemployment.
Ms. Mitchell provided critical evidence on Ms. Huyett’s behalf. She
testified that she started at Doug’s Family Pharmacy in September 2005 as a
part-time pharmacist, and was a full-time employee from January 2006 to
May 2007. She was impressed with Ms. Huyett and described her as “one of
the best technicians that I ever worked with.” N.T., 10/11/12, at 474.
Ms. Mitchell verified that, prior to receiving the cancer diagnosis, Ms.
Huyett had complained of frequent sore throats and she had a visible,
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palpable lump on her throat. Ms. Mitchell and Mrs. Hess had actually
touched the lump. On one occasion prior to August 2006, Ms. Mitchell
recalled that Ms. Huyett left work to go to an urgent care center as she was
having trouble swallowing. According to Ms. Mitchell, both Mr. and Mrs.
Hess were aware that Ms. Huyett was scheduled to undergo a biopsy and
she personally discussed with them the possibility that Ms. Huyett had
cancer.
Ms. Huyett telephoned Ms. Mitchell on August 24, 2006, and informed
her that she had Hodgkins lymphoma. Ms. Mitchell told her she did not have
to come to work that day, but Ms. Huyett insisted on working. Id. at 485.
Ms. Huyett did not come to work on August 30, 2006, however, because she
had been fired the night before. Ms. Mitchell mentioned to Mr. Hess that day
that she could not believe that Ms. Huyett no longer worked there and that
she had been diagnosed with cancer. Id. at 493. Mr. Hess responded that
her termination was best, both for him and for Ms. Huyett, as “she could go
out and collect unemployment. She doesn’t have to worry about showing up
for work, she could be at home going through her treatments, she could
collect her unemployment check and he doesn’t have to worry about getting
coverage for work because of -- when she is calling out sick with her
treatments.” Id. He called it a “win/win situation.” Id. When Ms. Huyett
recovered, Mr. Hess would “hire her back.” Id. Mr. Hess did not disparage
Ms. Huyett or her work performance.
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Ms. Mitchell testified that approximately one month after Ms. Huyatt’s
termination, she observed Mrs. Hess walking around with a clipboard making
a list of mistakes Ms. Huyett had made. Mrs. Hess questioned Ms. Mitchell
and the other employees about what they had observed and noted their
responses.
Mr. Hess justified the firing based on Ms. Huyett’s declining work
performance. He told the jury that, for the first nine years of her
employment, Ms. Huyett was an excellent employee. During the final two
years, however, her performance declined. She wore inappropriate attire to
work and was habitually late. He also provided examples of mistakes made
by Ms. Huyett and instances where she gave inappropriate advice to
customers. Some of these incidents were confirmed by Mrs. Hess and by
Emily O’Neill, an employee who worked at the Pharmacy during the relevant
period. Ms. Huyett disagreed with their accounts of her work performance.
At trial, Ms. Mitchell disputed that Ms. Huyett arrived to work late on
the day of her diagnosis, or that she was tardy and appeared hung over on
August 28, 2006. She was confronted on cross-examination with an email
that purported to be from her account and that was critical of Ms. Huyett’s
performance. Ms. Mitchell denied that she authored the entire email and she
posited that someone else had added the paragraphs that disparaged Ms.
Huyett. Ms. Mitchell subsequently left her employment at Doug’s Pharmacy
and started working full-time at CVS.
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It was Ms. Huyett’s contention that she was fired due to her disability
and she claimed an economic loss of $18,894.92. At trial, Ms. Huyett
presented her treating oncologist, Daniel L. Foreman, M.D., who opined that,
she “suffered physical and mental impairment affecting one or more of her
major life activities as a result of her diagnosis and treatment.” N.T.,
10/9/12, at 58. However, her treatment did not affect her ability to work as
a pharmacy technician. Id. at 59. She was capable of performing those
duties “without assistance, adjustment, or accommodation.” Id. at 60. The
administration of her chemotherapy could be arranged to accommodate her
work schedule. Id.
In support of his position that Ms. Huyett’s termination was motivated
by her inadequate work performance rather than discrimination, Mr. Hess
also offered the testimony of his attorney, J. Kitridge Fegley. The attorney
confirmed that Mr. and Mrs. Hess mentioned to him in early August 2006
that they intended to terminate an eleven-year employee when they
returned from their vacation. After Ms. Huyett was diagnosed with cancer
just weeks later, they sought his legal advice about terminating Ms. Huyett
in light of the diagnosis.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Huyett and against Doug’s
Family Pharmacy. It awarded damages for economic loss in the full amount
sought and $2,500.00 in non-economic damages. As the prevailing plaintiff,
Ms. Huyett petitioned for attorney fees totaling $106,429.30 pursuant to §
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962(c.2) of the PHRA. The trial court denied attorney fees because it did not
believe the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence as it “did not and
does not find the testimony of Stephanie Mitchell to be credible.” Order,
1/17/14, at 1-2. Doug’s Family Pharmacy filed a motion for post-trial relief
arguing that the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence. The
motion was denied.
Ms. Huyett appealed to this Court and alleged, inter alia, that the trial
court exceeded the permissible scope of its discretion and usurped the jury’s
credibility determinations when it did not find Stephanie Mitchell’s testimony
credible. This Court found that the trial court misapplied the law, vacated
the order, and remanded for the trial court to apply the proper legal
standard in determining whether Ms. Huyett was entitled to attorney fees.
The trial court was directed to weigh the evidence in accord with our
Supreme Court’s decision in Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998).
Doug’s Family Pharmacy’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme
Court was denied. See Huyett v. Doug’s Family Pharm., 129 A.3d 1243
(Pa. 2015) (unpublished decision).
Upon remand, the trial court weighed the evidence presented at trial
to determine whether Doug’s Family Pharmacy had engaged in an unlawful
discriminatory practice in violation of the PHRA. It concluded that the
evidence was “weak” and did not support a finding of a violation, and denied
attorney fees by order entered February 5, 2016.
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Ms. Huyett filed the within appeal and presents three questions for our
review:
A. Did the lower court err on Remand from this Court in its
February 5, 2016 Judgment and Order denying Appellant’s
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Costs when the trial
court – despite denying Appellee motion for post trial relief –
held that the jury’s verdict against the Appellee was not
supported by the evidence?
B. Did the lower court err on Remand from this Court in its
February 5, 2016 Judgment and Order denying Appellant’s
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Costs, insofar as the
lower court abrogated remedial intent of the anti-
discrimination provisions of the PHRA when it denied
Appellant the opportunity to be “made whole” for injuries she
suffered as a result of Appellee’s unlawful discrimination?
C. Did the lower court err on Remand from this Court in its
February 5, 2016 Judgment and Order denying Appellant’s
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Costs after she
prevailed in a jury trial on her PHRA claim when the lower
court, which was not the fact-finder at trial, usurped the
jury’s function in order to base its denial of Appellant’s post-
trial motion for fees on its unilateral findings on issues of fact
and credibility, and when the lower court distorted the
meaning of Appellant’s recovery to err in concluding that the
jury’s award was “modest.”
Appellant’s brief at 3-4.
Ms. Huyett’s three issues challenge the propriety of the trial court’s
denial of attorney fees and costs under the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act (“PHRA”), 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. In support thereof, Ms. Huyett advances
numerous arguments, which we will address in the order that facilitates our
disposition.
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The statutory provision in the PHRA that authorizes an award of
attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff is 43 P.S. § 962(c.2):
If, after a trial held pursuant to subsection (c), the court of
common pleas finds that a defendant engaged in or is engaging
in any unlawful discriminatory practice as defined in this act, the
court may award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing
plaintiff.
43 P.S. § 962(c.2) (emphasis supplied).1
“To the extent that the issue before us is a question of statutory
interpretation, . . . . our scope of review is plenary and the standard of
review is de novo.” Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1,
(Pa. 2011); Sayler v. Skutches, 40 A.3d 135 (Pa.Super. 2012). (citations
omitted). In reviewing the trial court’s determination under the PHRA, we
may not reverse unless the trial court committed an abuse of discretion.
Hoy v. Angelone, supra at 752. "[A]n abuse of discretion may not be
found merely because the appellate court might have reached a different
conclusion, but requires a showing of manifest unreasonableness, or
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly
erroneous." Id. (quoting Paden v. Baker Concrete Construction, Inc.,
658 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa. 1995)).
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1
The PHRA also authorizes the court to award attorney fees and costs to a
prevailing defendant upon a showing that the complaint was brought in bad
faith. See 43 P.S. § 962 (c.3)
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The policy of making the plaintiff whole is a recurring theme
underlying all of Ms. Huyett’s arguments. She contends that since the PHRA
is a remedial statute, individuals with disabilities have a right to be made
whole. According to Ms. Huyett, the PHRA, specifically § 962(c)(3),
mandates that the court order affirmative remedies that will effectuate that
intent.2 She contends that attorney fees, which are authorized under §
962(c.2), are affirmative remedies and implicitly mandatory where the
plaintiff prevails under the PHRA.
We note preliminarily that attorney fees are not identified in §
962(c)(3)’s remedial measures. Furthermore, while reinstatement or hiring,
and back pay are remedial measures for purpose of the PHRA, punitive
damages are not. Hoy, supra at 749. The legislature addressed attorney
fees in a separate subsection of the statute and provided that they “may” be
awarded, not that they “shall” be awarded. Our High Court expressly
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2
43 P.S. § 962(c)(3) (emphasis added) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has engaged in or is
engaging in an unlawful discriminatory practice charged in the
complaint, the court shall enjoin the respondent from engaging
in such unlawful discriminatory practice and order affirmative
action which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
hiring of employes, granting of back pay, or any other legal or
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability
shall not accrue from a date more than three years prior to the
filing of a complaint charging violations of this act.
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rejected the notion in Hoy that § 962(c.2) of the PHRA mandated the award
of attorney fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff. The Court reasoned that
the “term ‘may’ signals the legislature’s intention to rest the award of
counsel fees and costs within the discretion of the trial court.” Hoy, supra
at 751. The Court found this interpretation consistent with the Statutory
Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b), and its proviso that unambiguous
terms should not be disregarded in favor of the spirit of legislation.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court declined to be bound by the
interpretation of the analogous federal provision in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., which has been construed as
presumptively entitling a prevailing plaintiff to counsel fees and costs unless
special circumstances existed that justified no award. See Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1969). The Hoy Court concluded
that an award of counsel fees and costs under the PHRA was neither
mandatory nor presumptive, but fell within the sound discretion of the trial
court. The determination cannot be reversed unless the trial court
committed an abuse of discretion.
Ms. Huyett’s reliance upon Logan v. Marks, 704 A.2d 671, 673
(Pa.Super. 1997) (and federal cases cited therein), for the proposition that
“the prevailing party should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust[,]” is misplaced.
The attorney fee determination in Logan was governed by the Civil Rights
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Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, rather than the PHRA. As the Hoy
Court noted when it rejected the federal courts’ interpretation of an
analogous provision, we are not bound by federal law in construing our
statutes.
Ms. Huyett also relies upon Krebs v. United Ref. Co., 893 A.2d 776
(Pa.Super. 2006), a case decided under the Storage Tank and Spill
Prevention Act (“STSPA”), in support of her claim of entitlement to attorney
fees under a remedial statute such as the PHRA. The counsel fee provision
in that statute contained the following language:
(f) FEES AND COSTS.— The court, in issuing any final order in
any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of
litigation (including attorney and expert witness fees) to any
party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.
....
35 P.S. § 6021.1305.
We held in Krebs that, generally “where the General Assembly has
departed from the "American Rule" (where each party is responsible for his
or her own attorney fees and costs), by providing a fee-shifting remedy in a
remedial statute, the trial court's discretionary award or denial of attorneys'
fees must be made in a manner consistent with the aims and purposes of
that statute.” Krebs at 788. In Krebs, we relied upon Hoy in interpreting
the use of the term “may” as discretionary. We noted further that the
STSPA did not specifically define when an award of attorney fees and costs
would be appropriate or how to calculate them, and there was no controlling
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case law. We looked to the legislative intent as discerned through statutory
interpretation and similar legislation, and construed the statute liberally to
effectuate its purpose.
Ms. Huyett cites Krebs for the broad proposition that where a
remedial statute is involved, the trial court’s discretion must be exercised
“within the framework of the legislative purpose behind the enactment of the
fee-shifting provision.” Krebs, supra at 788. Therein, we reversed the trial
court’s denial of almost $300,000 in counsel fees to the successful plaintiff
because the court impermissibly tied the recovery of fees to the relative size
of the damage award. Ms. Huyett also directs our attention to Krassnoski
v. Rosey, 684 A.2d 635, 637-38 (Pa.Super. 1996), where we affirmed the
trial court’s award of attorney fees under the Protection from Abuse Act even
though the attorney prosecuted the action without charge, noting the
deterrent effect of counsel fee awards upon a defendant.
However, in the present case, as distinguished from Krebs and
Krassnoski, the statute authorizing attorney fees expressly defines when a
prevailing plaintiff is entitled to such fees. Moreover, our Supreme Court’s
decision in Hoy construing § 962(c.2) is controlling herein. The trial court
has the discretion to award attorney fees when it determines there has been
a violation of the PHRA.
Ms. Huyett contends, however, that Hoy did not promulgate a test for
determining whether counsel fees should be awarded, and thus, is not
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controlling in this regard. She disputes that the trial court is allowed to re-
weigh the evidence of a violation in making its determination. She attributes
that misconception to the concurring opinion of then-Judge McEwen, and
dismisses it as dicta. Ms. Huyett maintains that the trial court was bound by
the fact finder’s finding of discrimination, and that it lacked discretion to
weigh the evidence and make its own independent determination of whether
the PHRA was violated. In essence, she asserts that attorney fees are
mandated or presumptively warranted when the plaintiff prevails.
We disagree. The language of the statute itself addresses the basis on
which the trial court may award attorney fees: where the plaintiff prevails
and the trial court determines there has been a violation. Ms. Huyett’s
proposed construction of the statute renders this language superfluous.
Furthermore, in reviewing whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying counsel fees in Hoy, the Supreme Court favorably noted the
Superior Court majority’s observance that the appellant had received a
substantial monetary recovery, and Judge McEwen’s concurrence
characterizing the violation of the Act as “fairly debatable” and the evidence
as “not overwhelming.” Hoy, supra, at 752. It pointed out that, “[t]he trial
court weighed the verdict against the evidence and determined, in its
discretion, that an award of counsel fees was not appropriate[,]” and the
Court found no abuse of discretion. Id. However, since the trial court based
its denial of attorney fees on its determination that the verdict and punitive
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damages were a sufficient recovery for the discrimination suffered, and the
Court reversed the substantial punitive damage award, the Hoy Court
remanded to permit the trial court to reconsider attorney fees in light of that
change in circumstances. Upon remand, as Ms. Huyett correctly asserts, the
trial court awarded attorney fees.
Our sister court recently relied upon Hoy in Wagner v. Pa. Capitol
Police Dep't, 132 A.3d 1051, 1059 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2016), in holding that there
is no presumption of an award of attorney fees and costs to a prevailing
plaintiff under the PHRA. In that case, the jury awarded Wagner lost wages
but no non-economic damages. Wagner requested, inter alia, more than
$125,000 in counsel fees and costs. The trial court awarded him attorney
fees representing forty percent of the jury’s award, based on what it viewed
as a lack of evidence of pervasive discrimination and Wagner’s failure to
submit his fee agreement. The court’s calculation also reflected its
determination that most of the counsel fees were incurred in pursuing claims
upon which Wagner did not prevail. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court
found no abuse of discretion.
Herein, a prior panel reversed and remanded to the trial court with the
direction to weigh the evidence of a violation in light of the verdict. The trial
court herein complied and concluded that the violation of the PHRA was
“fairly debatable.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/13/16, at (unnumbered page) 3.
The court characterized the evidence supporting such a violation as “weak”
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and “not overwhelming” and denied attorney fees. Id. at (unnumbered
page) 4. Hence, the trial court followed our directive and applied the proper
legal standard.
Ms. Huyett argues that the trial court’s denial of attorney fees is
inconsistent with its denial of judgment NOV. She maintains that if the
record was legally insufficient to support a violation, the court should have
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), which it did not.
Ms. Huyett misapprehends the difference between JNOV and the
discretion afforded the trial court to award counsel fees under the PHRA. For
purposes of JNOV, the trial court was required to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner, Ms. Huyett, and determine
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. Thus, applying
that standard, where the testimony of Ms. Huyett and Stephanie Mitchell
conflicted with that offered by Mr. Hess and his witnesses, the court was
required to credit the testimony of the former. Consequently, the trial court
found the evidence legally sufficient to support the verdict, and properly
denied JNOV.
The issue herein is not whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the jury’s verdict, but whether the trial court, after engaging in its own,
permissible weighing of the evidence, concluded the defendant engaged in a
discriminatory practice in violation of the PHRA for purposes of awarding
attorney fees. That determination was an exercise of the trial court’s
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discretion independent of the jury’s verdict. Hence, the denial of JNOV and
the trial court’s rationale for denying counsel fees were not inconsistent.
Ms. Huyett complains that the trial court did not provide any
evidentiary support for its conclusion, although it was directed to do so. We
do not read this Court’s prior directive as requiring the trial court to specify
which evidence it found persuasive in arriving at its conclusion. The court
relied on the “transcript and evidence in totality.” Trial Court Memorandum,
5/17/16, at (unnumbered page) 4. We find no abuse of discretion in this
regard.
Ms. Huyett next argues that, based on this Court’s earlier decision, the
trial court was obligated to accept the jury’s ultimate factual determination
unless it was “clearly devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying
some hue of credibility, or . . . bears no rational relationship to the
supportive evidentiary data.” Huyett, supra at 122 A.3d 1136, n.5, 2015
Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1832 *7 n.5 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Krasnov.
v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir. 1972)). We do not view the cited
language, which was contained in a footnote, as imposing that standard.
Rather, the prior panel merely was referencing the federal appellate
standard of review of a district court decision, and noting that federal
decisions do not control our determinations.
Ms. Huyett also contends that the trial court erred in basing its
decision on the mistaken conclusion that the jury only awarded nominal
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recovery or modest damages. Not only was the characterization of the
recovery factually inaccurate, she contends that it was irrelevant to the
attorney fees determination.
We agree the size of the verdict or its relationship to the amount of
attorney fees does not control the fee determination. However, in Hoy, the
Supreme Court noted that the trial court considered the verdict and the
punitive damages award in determining that the appellant had received a
sufficient recovery for the discrimination suffered. It viewed the jury verdict
as “one factor” to be considered by the court in making the fee
determination. Hoy, supra at 752, n.9. We find no abuse of discretion
where the trial court herein merely noted the size of the verdict.
Finally, Ms. Huyett argues that the trial court’s denial of attorney fees
was the functional equivalent of reversing the jury verdict. She points out
that the Pharmacy pursued a counterclaim for slander that was unsupported,
forced her to defend against summary judgment, and demanded a jury trial.
Although she vindicated an important civil right, received an award of
damages for the full amount of the economic loss she suffered and an
additional $2,500 for non-economic loss, she was in a far worse financial
position after the trial due to the court’s refusal to award attorney fees. She
maintains that the court’s ruling frustrated the jury’s intent to make her
whole, and further, that she was entitled to be made whole under the
remedial PHRA statute.
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The PHRA provides explicit guidance to the trial court as to when
attorney fees are warranted. As the Supreme Court stated in Hoy, the
unambiguous terms of a statute cannot be disregarded to pursue its spirit.
Since the fee-shifting provision is a discretionary one, the legislature
obviously did not contemplate that all successful plaintiffs would
automatically recover counsel fees. Had it so intended, the legislature could
have so provided. Instead, the legislature left it up to the trial court’s
discretion to determine whether an award was appropriate.
Ms. Huyett was vindicated in her claim of discrimination and the jury
awarded her both economic and non-economic damages. She was not
entitled to attorney fees as a matter of right. The fact that her counsel fees
exceeded the amount of the damages awarded by the jury has no bearing
on our determination whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
those fees.
Upon remand for the determination of attorney fees, the trial court
followed this Court’s directive. It presided over the trial and had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses. Additionally, it reviewed the trial
transcript, weighed the evidence, and reached the conclusion that the
evidence of a violation of the PHRA was weak. In arriving at that finding,
the court stated that it did not reject the jury’s credibility determination, but
rather independently reweighed the evidence. This is precisely what the
PHRA and our Supreme Court’s decision in Hoy required of the trial court
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and the trial court was fully compliant with our earlier directive. Absent
herein is any showing that the trial court’s decision was manifestly
unreasonable or biased or so lacking in support as to be clearly erroneous,
and we may not reverse simply because we may have reached a different
result.
Judgment affirmed.
Judge Stabile joins the opinion.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/20/2017
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