J-S92013-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
SHERRI ADELKOFF, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
STEVEN ADELKOFF, :
:
Appellant : No. 711 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree April 25, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Family Court at No(s): FD 13-008242-016
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED: April 21, 2017
I respectfully dissent.
As this Court has explained,
[a] trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an
award of equitable distribution. Our standard of review when
assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable
distribution of marital property is “whether the trial court abused
its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow
proper legal procedure.” We do not lightly find an abuse of
discretion, which requires a showing of clear and convincing
evidence. This Court will not find an “abuse of discretion” unless
the law has been “overridden or misapplied or the judgment
exercised” was “manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in
the certified record.” In determining the propriety of an equitable
distribution award, courts must consider the distribution scheme
as a whole. “[W]e measure the circumstances of the case
against the objective of effectuating economic justice between
the parties and achieving a just determination of their property
rights
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S92013-16
Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted).
Here, the trial court found credible the testimony of Wife’s expert, Mr.
Brabender, who concluded that Husband’s interest in IEP could not be valued
at the time of the equitable distribution hearing. Trial Court Opinion,
7/7/2016, at 11. Based on this testimony, the court determined that IEP
was a going concern and crafted an order requiring Husband to hold the IEP
interest in a constructive trust for the benefit of both parties. It was well
within the court’s discretion to defer distribution of Husband’s IEP interest
until such interest can be valued. Based on our standard of review, I believe
we must affirm.
Additionally, I note that, while deferred disposition schemes are not
favored generally, in situations such as the one presented here, such
arrangements serve economic justice in the long run. I am unconvinced that
the Majority’s remand for a hearing at this juncture will result in a final
distribution order because there is no guarantee that the IEP interest can be
valued at this time. If Mr. Brabender testifies that the interest cannot be
valued, and the learned trial judge agrees and Husband again appeals, do
we have a second do-over? Experts are costly and attorneys are equally
expensive. The parties have had their bite at the apple. Remands could go
ad infinitum.
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J-S92013-16
Accordingly, because I find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in crafting its equitable distribution order, I would affirm.
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