NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TIM HASKIN, No. 15-56713
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02901-SVW-JEM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
US AIRWAYS, a corporate business entity;
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Tim Haskin appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal order and
summary judgment in his employment action alleging violations of Title VII and
the Railway Labor Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Lea v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 903 F.2d
624, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Haskin’s breach of
the duty of fair representation claim because Haskin failed to file his action within
six-months after the union’s time for asserting the grievances had expired. See
Lea, 903 F.2d at 633 (six-month statute of limitations applies to “hybrid claims”
under the Railway Labor Act); Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509-11 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“[I]n a duty of fair representation case, the six-month period generally
begins to run when an employee knows or should know of the alleged breach of
duty of fair representation by a union.”).
The district court properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Haskin’s breach
of contract claim against US Airways because the district court’s jurisdiction “over
the contractual claim against [US Airways] was contingent upon a showing by
[Haskin] that he had a triable claim against the union.” Peters v. Burlington N.
R.R., 931 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1990).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Haskin’s Title
VII claims without leave to amend because further amendment would be futile.
See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.
2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “a district court may
dismiss without leave where . . . amendment would be futile”); see also Chodos v.
2 15-56713
West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has
already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent
motions to amend is particularly broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Contrary to Haskin’s contention, because the district court dismissed
Haskin’s breach of contract claim against AMR Corp. and American Airlines, Inc.
without prejudice in its order dismissing Haskin’s Second Amended Complaint,
Haskin waived any challenge to that claim by failing to re-plead it in his Third
Amended Complaint. See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928 (“[F]or any claims voluntarily
dismissed, we will consider those claims to be waived if not repled.”).
We reject as meritless Haskin’s contention that the district court was
required to order mediation before ruling on defendants’ motions for summary
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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