NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD JEROME LAWSON, No. 16-16825
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00576-EPG
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ALVARADO, Officer; LEPE, Lieutenant,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Erica P. Grosjean, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted April 11, 2017***
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Ronald Jerome Lawson, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment in his action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging deliberate indifference
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
Lawson consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
to his safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order)
(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Lawson’s failure-to-protect claim
against defendants Alvarado and Lepe because Lawson failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that Alvarado or Lepe was deliberately indifferent to Lawson’s
safety by placing and keeping him in a cell with inmate Brown. See Cortez v. Skol,
776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth elements of a claim against
prison officials for failure-to-protect inmates from violence by other inmates); see
also Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991) (Bivens actions are
identical to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “save for the replacement of a state
actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Lawson’s third
amended complaint without leave to amend because further amendment would be
futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “a district court
may dismiss without leave where . . . amendment would be futile”); see also
Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., Inc., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a
district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in
2 16-16825
deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly broad” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as without merit Lawson’s contention that the district court was
required to permit Lawson to stand on an earlier complaint after he filed an
amended complaint.
We do not consider allegations not pled in the third amended complaint
because Lawson elected not to stand on his earlier complaint.
AFFIRMED.
3 16-16825